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Abstract 
 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) contained a specific 
VHFWLRQIRU³$UFKLSHODJLF6WDWHV´3DUW,9ZKLFKDre given many rights under the 
archipelagic regime including, if desired, to designate archipelagic sea lanes (ASLs) 
through their archipelagic waters. While designation of ASLs is optional, regardless of 
ASL status, the right of archipelagic sea lane passage (ASLP) for all maritime users is 
guaranteed. This thesis examines the case of the Republic of the Philippines in 
designating ASLs and the influences impacting this process at the state and international 
levels. 
This thesis argues that the process of adoption of archipelagic sea lanes by mid-ocean 
archipelagic states is one which favours the maritime powers over the archipelagic 
states. Further, in relation to the Philippine case, the efforts of the Republic of the 
Philippines in repeating some actions undertaken by Indonesia during its case, will 
strengthen the international system bias and end in a result which will be the by-product 
of interests other than that of the Philippine state.  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
In the field of island studies, the archipelago remains one of the least examined 
metageographical concepts. 
(Lewis & Wigen, 1997, quoted in Stratford et al, 2011: 118) 
 
1.1: GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
7KHILHOGRILVODQGVWXGLHVKDVEHHQGHFRGHGDV³WKHFULWLFDOLQWHU- and pluri-disciplinary 
study of islDQGVRQWKHLURZQWHUPV´%DOGDFFKLQR,QWKHFRXUVHRIP\
graduate studies, I have come to know many islands of the world. My knowledge of said 
islands is as varied and different as the islands themselves. I have been introduced to 
islands of numerous shapes and sizes which can be found in all corners of the planet. 
One particular type of island, or rather, I should say islands, became of great interest to 
me. What I am referring to are the islands known as archipelagos.  
What is an archipelago? As explained by Stratford et al. (2011: 120): 
 
The etymology of archipelago provided in the Oxford English Dictionary 
LQGLFDWHVWKDWWKHZRUGZDV³HYLGHQWO\DWUXH,WDOLDQFRPSRXQG´RIarch (from 
WKH*UHHNVLJQLI\LQJµRULJLQDO¶µSULQFLSDO¶DQGpelago (deep, abyss, sea). The 
coinage was probably suggested by the medieval Latin name of the Ægean Sea, 
Egeopelagus. The earliest usage of the word given by the OED occurs in a 
Treaty of 30 June 1268, between the Venetians and Byzantine Emperor Michael 
Palaeologus. What may be the first use, then, occurs in the context of the 
%\]DQWLQHHPSLUH¶VUHFODLPHGSRZHULQWKHJHDQ/DWHUXVHVLQWKHHDUO\
modern period indicate that the word continued to be used in its specific 
reference to the Ægean but was also gaining currency as a more general term for 
a group of islands in the sea.  
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Archipelagos are a geographically clustered group of islands which can vary in 
many ways which can include geologic composition, the number and size of islands, and 
the spatial geography of the islands. The geo-political aspects of archipelagos also range 
from sovereign country to sub-national jurisdiction of a land-locked or coastal state, or 
even a politically split archipelago, such as the Comoro archipelago, which is split 
between the sovereign state of Comoros and the French overseas department of 
Mayotte.  
:HEVWHU¶V'LFWLRQDU\GHILQHVDQDUFKLSHODJRDV³DJURXSRILVODQGV´
(http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/archipelago). Turning next to the Oxford 
Dictionary, it terms an archiSHODJRDV³DVHDRUVWUHWFKRIZDWHUKDYLQJPDQ\LVODQGV´
(http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/archipelago?q=archipelago). This 
GHILQLWLRQKDVEHHQQRWHGE\RQHVFKRODUDV³ILUVWHPSKDVL]>LQJ@WKHVHDZKLFKLV
LQWHUVSHUVHGZLWKLVODQGV´$QGUew, 1978: 47). 
The contrast between these two dictionary definitions of archipelagos is very 
WHOOLQJ,QWKHILHOGRI,VODQG6WXGLHV(SDOL+DX¶RIDLVUHFRJQL]HGDVWKHILUVWWRDGYDQFH
WKHFRQFHSWRIGLVWLQJXLVKLQJEHWZHHQ³LVODQGVLQDIDUVHD´DQG³DVHDRILVODQGV´
noting:   
The first emphasises dry surfaces in a vast ocean far from the centres of power. 
When you focus this way you stress the smallness and remoteness of the islands. 
The second is a more holistic perspective in which things are seen in the totality 
of their relationships. (1993: 7) 
+DX¶RIDZDVD3DFLILF,VODQGHUZKRVSRNHRIWKHWUDQVLWLRQRIWKHKLVWRULFDO
connotation of Oceania as reflected in his two above noted terms:  
It was continental men, namely Europeans, on entering the Pacific after crossing 
huge expanses of ocean, who introduced the view of 'islands in a far sea'. From 
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this perspective the islands are tiny, isolated dots in a vast ocean. Later on it was 
continental men, Europeans and Americans, who drew imaginary lines across the 
sea, making the colonial boundaries that, for the first time, confined ocean 
peoples to tiny spaces. These are the boundaries that today define the island 
states and territories of the Pacific. (1993: 7) 
His insights remind us that archipelagos are more than geographic constructions. 
Stratford et al. WKHRUL]HWKDW³SHUKDSVDWOHDVWDVFRQFHSWXDOPDQLIHVWDWLRQVDUFKLSHODJRV
are fluid cultural processes, sites of abstract and material relations of movement and 
rest, dependent on changing conditions of arWLFXODWLRQRUFRQQHFWLRQ´7KH\
DOVRDGYDQFHWKHLGHDWKDWZLWKLQDUFKLSHODJRVWKHGXDOLW\RIERWK³WKHRUHWLFDODQG
empirical archipelagic reODWLRQVH[LVW>V@´6WUDWIRUGHW al., 2011: 125). 
 
The specific archipelagos that my research deals with are the sovereign mid-
ocean archipelagic states. These states are composed solely of the islands which make 
up their respective archipelagos. LaFlamme (1983: 361) identified four major attributes 
which truly distinguish an archipelagic state from other states: a large number of islands; 
the consideration that the waters surrounding its islands are within its boundaries and an 
integral part of its heritage; the islands (with few exceptions) are small and 
economically underdeveloped; and a centrifugal tendency. This tendency invokes the 
characteristics of many societies such as, the centralization of critical populace mass, 
economic activities and power of the dominant island(s) and the trickle down 
dependency of the smaller, less developed islands. Fitzmaurice (1959: 88, quoted in 
La)ODPPHVWDWHVWKDW³the real essence of an archipelago is the concept of a 
self-contained and relatively compact group, not a loose congeries of islands dotted over 
DODUJHH[WHQWRIVHD´ 
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1.2: BACKGROUND 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 1982 identifies mid-
ocean archipelagic states as a distinct category which are given the power, if desired, to 
designate sea lanes through their archipelagic waters. The first goal of this thesis is to 
start a discussion that examines the practice of archipelagic sea lane designation by 
these states, including popular respRQVHVWKURXJKDVSHFLILF³LVODQGVWXGLHV´ lens. The 
second research goal is to demonstrate the inter-disciplinary nature of mid-ocean 
archipelagic states and their actions around designating (or not) archipelagic sea lanes 
(ASLs).  
1.3: THESIS OBJECTIVES 
My first thesis objective is to expand the knowledge of the area of mid-ocean 
archipelagic states and the rights afforded them under Part IV of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Given that this Convention is merely 
thirty years old and came into force in 1994, this field of study is relatively new. 
Furthermore, as only one of the twenty-two mid-ocean archipelagic states has gone 
through the archipelagic sea lane submission process, there is much to learn from this 
experience with an eye to the future. 
My second thesis objective is to research and understand how the Law of the Sea 
processes are unfolding for mid-ocean archipelagic states. It is noteworthy that this 
research will have much academic importance as well as practical application to assist 
other states in their deliberations of future policy decisions. Indeed, there is a lack of 
formal research on this topic, including from the specific comparative island studies 
perspective. 
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1.4: THESIS SIGNIFICANCE 
The short term significance of my research for the field of Island Studies is 
considerable. The Philippines are a timely and interesting case as they tackle this issue. 
There have been many developments in the last number of years. The existing pertinent 
academic literature in this sub-field is rather limited and consists mostly of contributions 
by legal academics, and other very important contributors who are involved in the ASL 
process (legislators, government consulted experts, public servants), and are writing of 
their own respective countries. I feel that one long-term, significant contribution for 
Island Studies is critical academic analysis to this issue and offer this from a 
comparative point of view drawing upon the inter-disciplinary nature of Island Studies 
and of this very issue itself.  
1.5: RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
My research questions developed from the previously stated research goals and 
objectives are: 
1.  Will the Philippines enact ASLs? 
2.  How specifically has the Indonesian experience influenced the 
Philippines? 
3.  What additional factors are influencing the Philippines? 
4.  What are the implications of these findings on the Philippines? 
5.  What are the implications of these findings on other mid-ocean 
archipelagic states? 
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Thesis Statement 
Hence, drawing upon these research questions, I propose that the actions and 
decisions of the Republic of the Philippines surrounding a possible archipelagic sea lane 
submission to the International Maritime Organization (IMO) have been influenced by 
PDQ\YDULDEOHVLQFOXGLQJWKHH[SHULHQFHDQGUHVXOWVRI,QGRQHVLD¶VDUFKLSHODJLFVHDODQH
submission to the same IMO.  
This thesis is driven by a real interest in the maritime aspects of islands. The 
linkages between islanders, the land, and the sea have been noted by many authors and 
academics across a number of disciplines including island studies throughout history. 
These linkages are further strengthened when one looks to the case of archipelagos.  
Additionally, the maritime frontier is the sole frontier, save outer space, which is 
free of jurisdictional claim (though many are pending) and set to be discovered. The 
high seas are an ever evolving journey through international relations, diplomacy, 
environmental concerns, resource management, and many other issues. The sum of these 
parts is the fact that islands are playing a central role in the maritime frontier and shall 
continue to do so. Questions abound as to the future of the high seas in the face of 
globalization. The short histories of UNCLOS, 1982; post-colonial sovereign islands; 
and a multitude of other dynamics find us at a time when the stakes are quite high and 
much is left to be decided.  
I was drawn to the maritime law aspect of islands when looking at the future of 
the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. Working deeper into the Law of the Sea, I discovered 
the stand-alone status of this archipelago (Article 234), as well as an entire dedicated 
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section on archipelagic states (Part IV). This thought process evolved further towards 
the unique case of mid-ocean archipelagic states as laid out in Part IV. 
Looking more closely at the subject, I was intrigued to find the challenges long 
faced by many archipelagic states, including two of the most populous island states in 
the world (Indonesia and the Philippines). It struck me as a very curious issue that such 
KHDYLO\SRSXODWHG³ODUJH´ archipelagic states would struggle on the international stage to 
have their voices heard, and their views accepted. 
These are the central reasons as to why I chose this topic. I feel that it is a very 
important and timely area of research for the field of island studies.  
1.6: THEORETICAL APPROACH  
I next consulted various social science methodology texts to determine which methods 
and designs best suited my research questions<LQZULWHVWKDW³KRZ´DQG
³ZK\´UHVHDUFKTXHVWLRQVOHQGWKHPVHOYHVWRFDVHVWXG\UHsearch, owing to the fact that 
³such questions deal with operational links needing to be traced over time.´  
$V<LQQRWHV³>D@VDUHVHDUFKVWUDWHJ\WKHFDVHVWXG\LVXVHGLQPDQ\
situations to contribute to our knowledge of individual, group, organizational, social, 
SROLWLFDODQGUHODWHGSKHQRPHQD´+DNLPLGHQWLILHVWKHFDVHVWXG\DV³WKH
social research equivalent of the spotlight or the microscope; its value depends crucially 
RQKRZZHOOWKHVWXG\LVIRFXVHG´3XQFKTXRWHGLQ6LOYHUPDQ
states:  
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The basic idea is that one case (or perhaps a small number of cases) will be 
studied in detail, using whatever methods seem appropriate. While there may be 
a variety of specific purposes and research questions, the general objective is to 
develop as full an understanding of that case as possible. 
 
$GGLWLRQDOO\<LQKLJKOLJKWVWKHFDVHVWXG\DSSURDFKDV³DQDOO-
encompassing method ± covering the logic of design, data collection techniques, and 
VSHFLILFDSSURDFKHVWRGDWDDQDO\VLV´+DNLPSRLQWVRXWWKDWE\GHVLJQFDVH
studies are flexible and demand a wider range of research skills from the researcher in 
collecting and analysing the data.  
This research is an explanatory case study which explains the hows and whys 
when it comes to the Philippine case of the archipelagic sea lanes issue. This single case 
is the most appropriate design given the recent developments surrounding ASL 
submission in the Philippines. The last few years have seen the Republic of the 
Philippines take noteworthy actions in both policy and legislation as it relates to 
UNCLOS.  
This study into influence from the Indonesian case strengthens the Philippine 
analysis, due to Indonesia being the only mid-ocean archipelagic state to proceed with 
ASL submission to the IMO. Furthermore, to a point both states share similarities of 
political geography, regional histories, regional (international) influences from state and 
intergovernmental sources, and a shared, long standing advocacy of the archipelagic 
concept.  
I carefully selected this explanatory case study because it was the most 
appropriate and timely case of archipelagic state action under UNCLOS, Part IV (ASL 
submission). The Indonesian and Philippine states have been the most visible, most 
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vocal, and most engaged archipelagic states in advocating for recognition within 
international maritime law of the concept of the wholeness of an archipelago. Indonesia 
is the only state to have gone through the ASL process. The Philippines have long been 
a leading voice for the archipelagic concept and have had several recent developments, 
raising the possibility of an ASL designation and submission in the near future.  
I chose to implement the case study approach in my research because I feel it is 
the most appropriate theoretical approach to fully research, analyse, and explain the 
Philippine state position and to identify linkages from the Indonesian case which are 
influencing the Philippines. Additionally, these linkages have the possibility of showing 
trends that can be applied to other mid-ocean archipelagic state cases in the future. The 
strategic selection of this particular case contributes significantly to the external validity 
of this case, by means of improved allowance for testing through literal and theoretical 
replication (Yin, 1989, as cited in de Vaus, 2001: 239).   
The selection of a case study approach, as with any theoretical approach, 
includes challenges and research limitations. In particular as mentioned previously, case 
studies rely very heavily on the researcher for a wide range of skills to collect and 
interpret the research data. Thus interpretation, validity, and reliability are the challenges 
which must be recognized. However, I feel that the strengths of this theoretical approach 
outweigh its limitations. 
Furthermore, this explanatory case takes a systemic approach to analyse its 
political geography elements.  As adapted from a study by Cohen and Rosenthal (1971: 
5-31, as quoted in Cohen, 1973: 17), their framework best explains the construction of a 
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systemic approach to studying geopolitics. The following template serves this case well 
when extrapolating this framework to review what has evolved into a geopolitical 
question of international law: 
The geopolitical system was advanced as the unit within which the political 
process interacts with geographical space. Political transactions, structures and 
societal forces are the components of the process; place, area and landscape are 
the components of geographical space. Process and space interact through the 
formation of political action areas, and various ideological attachments, 
organizations, and perceptions characterize these actions areas. 
1.7: METHODOLOGY 
This research is inter-disciplinary by design, given the multi-faceted nature of the issue 
of mid-ocean archipelagic states designating archipelagic sea lanes. Sub-fields which are 
drawn from include maritime law, international relations, domestic public policy and 
public administration, marine environmental science, political ecology, environmental 
politics, transportation and logistics, geography and anthropology. It is through the 
compiling of relevant data from these various sub-fields, that this thesis constructs a 
wider inter-disciplinary analysis of this issue. 
The research method employed in this thesis is qualitative research accomplished 
through a literature review with multiple sources of evidence. This allows for a full 
examination of the archipelagic concept, the Indonesian process, the Philippine 
possibility, and possible impacts on the Philippines by the Indonesian process. 
The research is largely focused through in-depth archival research utilizing 
primary sources such as historical documents, government publications and legislation, 
and official records, and secondary sources including academic texts, scholarly journal 
articles, theses, conference papers, reports, and print media. Interviews with respective 
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government officials in Indonesia and the Philippines were not conducted due to time 
and access constraints.  
Leading authors concerning the issue of mid-ocean archipelagic states in 
International Law include Evensen (1957), Dubner (1976), Rodgers (1981) and 
Munavvar (1993); and Southeastern Asia regional experts Tangsubkul (1984), 
Kwaitkowska and Agoes (1991), and Beckman (2007). Commenting on the IMO and its 
role and actions in this process are authors such as Warner (2000), Johnson (2000), and 
Forward (2009). Readings on the Indonesian case include Coquia (1983), Agoes (1991; 
1997), Djalal (2003; 2009) and Puspitawati (2005). Readings on the Philippines case 
include Santiago (1974), Batongbacal (2002; 2008), Encomienda (2009), and Bensurto 
Jr. (2012).  
Additional research included sources from the international community (United 
Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea, United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea I & III, International Maritime Organization);  government 
publications and legislation (Government of Indonesia, Government of the Philippines, 
Australian Government, United States Government); and print media sources (Far East 
Economic Review, New York Times, The Jakarta Post, The Philippine Star, Associated 
Press).  
During the course of my research, I utilized research facilities at the University 
of Prince Edward Island. Furthermore, I traveled on academic exchange to the 
University of Malta and utilized research facilities there, as well as at the United Nations 
International Maritime Law Institute which is housed in Msida, Malta. While in Malta, I 
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was quite fortunate to be given permission to sit in on multiple undergraduate law 
lectures by Professor David Attard1 dealing specifically with the Law of the Sea 
Convention. These lectures were invaluable in providing a better grounding in the legal 
nuances of maritime law.  
To conclude, this chosen method and procedure ensure that my research is 
comprehensive and encompasses all evidence to construct a completed case picture for 
this Philippine case.  
Case Study Design 
Yin (2003: 2H[SODLQVUHVHDUFKGHVLJQDV³a logical plan for getting from here to 
WKHUH´ZKHUH³here´ refers to the research questions poVHGDQG³WKHUH´ denotes the 
conclusions reached to the questions.  
Yin (2003: 21) offers five key segments to successful research design:  
1. $VWXG\¶VTXHVWLRQV 
2. Its propositions, if any; 
3. Its unit(s) of analysis; 
4. The logic linking the data to the propositions; and 
5. The criteria for interpreting the findings. 
                                                     
1
 Professor Attard is the Director of the International Maritime Law Institute, an organ of the International 
Maritime Organization. As of October 1, 2011, he is a sitting Judge on the International Tribunal for Law 
of the Sea (ITLOS). 
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This case involves looking at five research questions as stated previously 
(section 1.5) in this chapter. The proposition of this case is that the Philippine case study 
has been influenced by the Indonesian case. The unit of analysis in this case is 
archipelagic sea lane adoption by means of submissions to the International Maritime 
Organization by mid-ocean archipelagic states as defined and permitted by criteria 
outlined in Part IV of the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention.  
During the course of analyzing the data collected, I relied more heavily on a few 
chosen analytical tools. As outlined in Yin (2003), these include pattern matching, 
explanation building, rival explanations, and chronological analysis.  I employ pattern 
matching when analysing my research data to help assist in locating trends lending 
themselves to factors which are influencing this case, alongside the Indonesian 
experience. Secondly, as this is an explanatory case, I utilize a strong analytical 
narrative to build my explanation of this case. This explanation aims to explain which 
factors are influencing the case, and to attempt to quantify how great this influence is. 
Third, armed with identified possible influencing factors, I run these factors against the 
six real life rivals which Yin (2003: 113) lists:  
1. Direct Rival 
o ³$QLQWHUYHQWLRQ³VXVSHFW´RWKHUWKDQWKHWDUJHWLQWHUYHQWLRQ
³VXVSHFW´DFFRXQWVIRUWKHUHVXOWV´ 
2. Commingled Rival 
o ³2WKHULQWHUYHQWLRQVDQGWhe target intervention both contributed to the 
UHVXOWV´ 
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3. Implementation Rival 
o ³7KHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQSURFHVVQRWWKHVXEVWDQWLYHLQWHUYHQWLRQDFFRXQWV
IRUWKHUHVXOWV´ 
4. Rival Theory 
o ³$WKHRU\GLIIHUHQWIURPWKHRULJLQDOWKHRU\H[SODLQVWKHUHVXOWVEHWWHU´ 
5. Super Rival 
o ³$IRUFHODUJHUWKDQEXWLQFOXGLQJWKHLQWHUYHQWLRQDFFRXQWVIRUWKH
UHVXOWV´ 
6. Societal Rival 
o ³6RFLDOWUHQGVQRWDQ\SDUWLFXODUIRUFHRULQWHUYHQWLRQDFFRXQWIRUWKH
UHVXOWV´ 
The defined criteria this thesis shall employ for determining whether the 
proposition offered is supported by the data will include any direct references to the 
Indonesian case, or any alterations in government policy or direction concerning the 
Philippines ASL process that the evidence points to as stemming from the Indonesian 
case. The burden of proof, explanation and validity lie solely on the strength of 
arguments put forth in this thesis. 
This explanatory case strives to produce an idiographic explanation, which de 
9DXVGHILQHVDV³IRFXV>LQJ@RQSDUWLFXODUHYHnts, or cases, and seek[ing] to 
GHYHORSDFRPSOHWHH[SODQDWLRQRIHDFKFDVH´  Also, de Vaus (2001: 236) notes the 
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importance of case study design to the historical context by pointing out that case 
studies specifically include this element in order to offer a better understanding.  These 
two previously mentioned design features lend a better internal validity to this case (de 
Vaus, 2001: 233). 
1.8: STRUCTURE OF THESIS 
This thesis is structured through clearly defined chapters dealing with specific materials 
grouped into sections. This first chapter has introduced the background, thesis 
objectives, research goals, thesis significance, research questions, and research 
methodology and methods. The subsequent chapters are chronologically presented as 
follows: 
Chapter Two: Archipelagos and the Law of the Sea outlines the history of the 
UNCLOS process dating back to the end of World War II, including pertinent facts of 
,QGRQHVLD¶VH[SHULHQFHLQDGRSWLQJ$6/V. The chapter starts with the pre-preparatory 
work leading to the UN conferences, UNCLOS I and II, which are touched in short 
order. UNCLOS III and the archipelagic concept are then discussed at greater length, 
lead into a section on the UNCLOS, 1982; the genesis of this thirty year process. Then, 
Part IV (Archipelagic States) of UNCLOS is reviewed, along with the trade-off 
negotiated by mid-ocean archipelagic states for Part IV. Next, considerations around the 
legal history (or lack thereof) for mid-ocean archipelagic states are highlighted, along 
with another major creation of UNCLOS, 1982, the marine jurisdiction of Economic 
Exclusive Zones (EEZ). Chapter Two then moves to explain the historical background 
of the mid-ocean archipelagic state of Indonesia in relation to UNCLOS. Lastly, an 
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examination of the process undertaken by Indonesia to designate their archipelagic sea 
lanes, and the actions and role of the IMO is offered.  
Chapter Three: The Case of the Republic of the Philippines concisely presents 
the facts of the case of the Republic of the Philippines as it relates to UNCLOS. The 
chapter starts with an introduction to the Philippines case, providing concise background 
information on the Republic of the Philippines. Also discussed is Philippine domestic 
history around the archipelagic concept, with respect to national legislation and actions 
of the executive branch. This historical review is strengthened by looking at the 
evolution of the Philippine position relative to the archipelagic regime and UNCLOS.  
Highlighted is a 1997 text which presents a case for archipelagic sea lane (ASL) 
designation in the Philippines including two technically thought-out ASLs. Then, 
special attention is paid to the most important part of the case: the very recent legislative 
efforts of Philippine lawmakers to domestically designate three ASLs, the actions and 
decisions of which are closely examined.  
Chapter Four: Findings and Analysis sets out to answer my five research 
questions. To begin, I look to answer the most pressing question: will the Philippines 
enact ASLs? Having explained the Philippine case and whether ASLs will be enacted, I 
move to analysing how specifically the Indonesian experience has impacted the 
Philippines case. I then seek to answer my third research question, by identifying further 
factors beyond the Indonesian experience which are influencing the Philippine case.  
These factors are identified as the root issues of extensive debate within the 
populace and all branches of Philippine government surrounding the possibility of the 
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designation of archipelagic sea lanes. They include many policy matters such as regional 
states such as China, global maritime powers such as the United States, international 
intergovernmental organizations, and international public opinion and civil society 
actors, to name but a few. 
 These factors are contextually woven together into an explanatory narrative 
identifying common linkages. Further, these factors are applied against the recent 
Philippine actions in an effort to test how much, and illustrate the lengths to which, each 
factor has been accounted for and applied by the Republic of the Philippines.  
Finally, this chapter moves to the two remaining research questions which deal 
with implications based on the findings. These research questions are answered by 
theorizing what the implications of the study are, for the Philippines; and for the other 
mid-ocean archipelagic states. 
In Chapter Five: Conclusion I conclude this paper by summarizing the main 
arguments of this thesis. This summary of my findings is used to draw main 
conclusions. Furthermore, I offer comment as to possible further study within this 
subject area. 
1.9: CONCLUSION 
This chapter has introduced the case of the Republic of the Philippines and the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. This chapter has briefly discussed the 
history and background archipelagos, UNCLOS, and the relationship between them.  
Additionally the thesis objectives, research goals, thesis significance, research questions, 
and research methodology and methods have all been outlined. 
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Chapter Two: Archipelagos and the Law of the Sea 
 
In this new era on which we have entered, the effective unit of foreign policy and 
strategy is no longer the nation state, however large, but the coalition of such 
states brought together and held together for certain purposes. 
(Lester B. Pearson, 1956, future Prime Minister of Canada, quoted in Vital, 
2006: 84)   
 
2.1: INTRODUCTION 
The international climate in the post-World War II era was one of change. While the 
major maritime powers such as the United States, the U.S.S.R., and the United Kingdom 
continued to wield significant influence and authority, this period was marked by the 
vast divestment of colonies from many nations and the increased maturation of 
relatively young countries as well as those soon to emerge. 
Kapoor (2009: 177) noted three main keys which led to the increased 
international interest in further development of the law of the sea in the period following 
World War II: the rapid advancement in ocean technology, the emergence of new 
nations from the old colonial empires and the increased demand for ocean resources. 
The ever developing archipelagic states wanted to assert their voices on the 
international stage to ensure that their states had a cohesive unity and sovereignty which 
enclosed their islands and the waters surrounding them as one. This concept was a 
central nationalistic element of recently obtained sovereignty for these countries. As I 
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shall discuss in greater detail in section 2.8, Indonesia undertook policies and legislation 
to enshrine the archipelagic concept, with the Philippines shortly following suit. 
The importance of the archipelagic concept to the archipelagic state was 
immense. Sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity leading to security and stability 
were at, or near, the top of the list. Also, not to be discounted were the economic 
interests within the waters of the respective archipelagos: natural resources are an 
important asset to any island state. Indeed, these attributes are distinctive priorities of all 
states, be them land-locked, coastal or island. However, the international community 
was not very receptive to these PHDVXUHV8QGHUWKHORQJKHOG³Freedom of the High 
6HDV´ concept, vessels from all flag states had been using the waters and shipping lanes 
in and around the islands of both countries for decades, if not centuries. Burke (1977: 
269) termed the LQWHUHVWVRIWKLVSRVLWLRQDV³>H@fficiency, economy, and convenience in 
WUDQVSRUWDWLRQ>ZKLFK@VHUYHDOOQDWLRQV´DVSRVVLEO\DWULVN$QHYHQPRUHDODUPLQg 
topic for the maritime powers that could and, ultimately did, end up being raised was the 
status of the waters, raising restrictions on their respective navies.  
Jackson (2007: 142) believes that globalization is not displacing sovereignty, 
pointing out WKDWZKLOHLQWHJUDWLRQKDVYDVWO\LQFUHDVHGGXHWRWHFKQRORJ\LQWRGD\¶V
world, goods and vessels have been transiting the globe for centuries.  What this view 
fails to acknowledge is the effect of decolonization when superimposed over our rapidly 
integrating world. As I stated earlier in this section, these former colonies are 
predominately islands. Specifically, in the cases of Indonesia and the Philippines, these 
two archipelagic states are clusters of islands which have international marine routes 
passiQJWKURXJKWKHP-DFNVRQ¶VJHQHUDOL]DWLRQIDLOVWRUHFRJQL]HWKHSOLJKWRIWKHVH
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archipelagic states and the wider negotiations of UNCLOS which unfolded over the 
better part of the second half of the twentieth century.  
The archipelagic state has recently emerged on the international system. Indeed, 
/D)ODPPHQRWHVWKDW³>G@espite the fact that literally hundreds of 
anthropologists have conducted fieldwork within such societies, the concept of the 
archipelagic state has received relatively little DWWHQWLRQ´7KLVREVHUYDWLRQKROGVWUXHIRU
most fields of research, and the connected lack of understanding extends to the 
international system. Further complicating the archipelagic issue was the fact that it was 
largely absent from existing customary international law, and as such, it was a unique, 
one-off sui generis matter for debate and discussion. (Andrew, 1978: 50) Given what 
was at stake, a clear division of polar opposite viewpoints was clearly evident. The 
debate would unfold through the UNCLOS process and continues to an extent to this 
very day.  
2.2: LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Amongst the legal hurdles archipelagic states faced was the absence of this issue in 
H[LVWLQJLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ$QGUHZZDVTXLWHDFFXUDWHLQVWDWLQJWKDW³WKH
different regimes of jurisdiction or types of marine zones are borrowed from traditional 
international law, which is continent-based and land-centric, and thus poorly fit the 
DUFKLSHODJR¶VVLWXDWLRQ´:LWKUHVSHFWWRVRYHUHLJQW\WKHSULQFLSOHRIuti possidetis juris 
µDV\RXKDYHVRPD\\RXKROG¶PLJKWKDYHDSSOLHGThe uti possidetis juris principle 
means ³DFFRUGLQJWRZKLFKH[LVWLQJERXQGDULHVDUHWKHSUH-emptive basis for 
determining territorial jurisdictions in the absence of mutual agreement of all affected 
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VWDWHSDUWLHVWRGRRWKHUZLVH´(Ratner, 1996; Shaw, 1996, as quoted in Jackson, 2007: 
110).   
However, there are three main factors which seem to have ruled this principle 
out. First, the global context during the Cold War meant neither side (the United States 
and the U.S.S.R.) would want to broach this issue; second, the boundaries of the 
archipelagic states were contested by a large number of states at UNCLOS, including 
the maritime powers; and lastly, in the context of the Cold War, the strategic 
significance of the waters in question, and the lack of existing international law at the 
time of UNCLOS, meant that the maritime powers were not going to allow the 
archipelagic states to gain absolute sovereignty over their waters, thus restricting 
available access to user states.  
Further consideration can be undertaken of the international law regime which 
was in place for waters. Dating back to Hugo Grotius in 1609, the long standing debate 
has centered on the openness of the seas. Mare liberum, as referred to earlier, is Latin 
IRU³IUHHRSHQVHD´ and was the predominate school of thought in colonial seafaring 
powers for centuries (Santiago, 1974: 315). An opposing concept, mare clasum or 
³FORVHGVHD´ pertained and still does, to waters which fall under national jurisdiction 
(Santiago, 1974). Thus, there were two clearly defined polar opposing concepts with no 
visible middle ground. The masterstroke of UNCLOS would be to locate, construct and 
move towards an acceptable compromise for all nations. 
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2.3: THE UNITED NATIONS PROCESS 
The United Nations convened three multi-lateral conferences (UNCLOS I, II and III) 
over a period of thirty years to discuss matters surrounding marine and maritime issues 
including state maritime boundaries, the high seas, resources, mining and navigation. 
These conferences were large international affairs, where negotiators and diplomats 
from across the globe attempted to reach consensus to hash out an all-encompassing 
agreement.  
Prior to UNCLOS I, Jens Evensen, a Norwegian jurist, was engaged to produce a 
scholarly legal report on the issue of archipelagos and their waters. This report, Certain 
Legal Aspects Concerning the Delimitation of the Territorial Waters of Archipelagos, 
was submitted on November 29, 1957, and took a critical look at archipelagos. Evensen 
GHILQHGDQDUFKLSHODJRDV³«DIRUPDWLRQRIWZRRUPRUHLVODQGVLVOHWVRU
URFNVZKLFKJHRJUDSKLFDOO\PD\EHFRQVLGHUHGDVDZKROH´+HDOVRGLVWLQJXLVKHG
between two particular types of archipelagos: coastal, and outlying (mid-ocean). The 
report reviewed existing studies, the views of international bodies and publicists on the 
issue, and the practices of various archipelagic states. Evensen reached the following 
conclusion: 
In the writer's opinion, the waters between and inside the islands and islets 
of the above-mentioned type of archipelago must be considered as internal 
waters. But, where the waters of such an archipelago form a strait, it is in 
conformity with the prevailing rules of inter-national law that such a strait 
cannot be closed to traffic. Whether a water passage is to be considered a 
strait or not, must be decided in each specific case. 
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The archipelagic issue was not resolved at UNCLOS I. A lack of consensus around the 
legal status of waters found within mid-ocean archipelagos put the archipelagic issue on 
the table for future discussions (Talaie, 1998: 209). 81&/26,,LQYROYHG³QRGHWDLOHG
discussions on the issues related to mid-ocean archipelagos (Talaie, 1998). However, 
tense off-program discussions around the issue were taking place. After the completion 
of UNCLOS II, the Conference Chairman, Arthur Dean wrote:  
Under international law, foreign vessels may not pass through internal 
waters as of right, even if their passage is innocent. It is for this reason that 
we do not recognize the validity of this extensive and unilateral archipelago 
theory. (Dean, 1960, as noted in Coquia, 1983: 22) 
UNCLOS III 
The stage was set for a third conference to conclude negotiation and debate, bringing to 
fruition a comprehensive international agreement to bear. A media report in The Times 
(London) (June 12, 1974: 16) the week prior to the conference started commented: 
It also represents arguably the most complex set of negotiations ever undertaken. 
More governments are taking part than at any previous international meeting, 
LQFOXGLQJDJHQHUDODVVHPEO\RIWKH8QLWHG1DWLRQVLWVHOI«)RUHVVHQWLDOO\
Caracas, for 10 weeks, will be one vast horsetrading arena in which conflicting 
rights and interests will be bartered and bargained for, haggled over, swapped 
and abandoned. 
During the course of UNCLOS III, the archipelagic issue was a key point of debate.  
The mid-ocean archipelagic cause was strengthened through its numbers, as many newly 
independent states including Fiji, Tonga, Mauritius and the Bahamas joined forces with 
Indonesia and the Philippines in protecting their position (Talaie, 1998: 209). 
In the context of the ongoing Cold War, the maritime powers were in agreement 
on one matter ± WKDW³«WKHLULQWHUHVW in the mobility of their sea-borne strategic forces 
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>ZDV@µQRQ-QHJRWLDEOH¶´*KRVK. These forces included submarines which 
could be prevented from conducting unannounced and submerged operations within 
archipelagos should the waters be deemed internal (Andrew, 1978: 51).  Sanger (1983: 
83, as quoted in Greene, 1992: 8) identiILHGWKDW³>W@he superpowers made unimpeded 
passage through straits their single non-negotiable demand in the Law of the Sea 
Conference´ Succinctly put, the major maritime powers were of the belief that innocent 
passage rights within any archipelagic waters regardless of classification (territorial or 
internal) would negate their desired marine mobility (Andrew, 1978: 51). The possible 
reality of having eleven straits commonly used in international shipping and navigation 
falling into internal waters of archipelagos would certainly have caught the attention of 
the maritime powers (Gable, 1984: 13). 
A rather significant point in negotiations came about when the archipelagic 
group was split from the group of states which housed what the UNCLOS process 
referred tRDV³straits usHGIRULQWHUQDWLRQDOQDYLJDWLRQ´2  As Professor K.L. Koh had 
theorized about the relationship between archipelagic regimes and straits used for 
international navigation: 
«LIVWUDLWVXOWLPDWHO\OLQNSDUWRIWKHKLJKVHDVRUDQHFRQRPLF]RQHWKH
fact that  the  immediate  geographical  connection  consists  of two  bodies  of 
archipelagic waters  becomes  irrelevant.  If  this  is  accepted  then  some  
archipelagic  sea lanes  could  well be classified  as straits  used  for  
international navigation (Koh, 1982, as quoted in Rothwell, 1990: 500). 
                                                     
2
 UNCLOS, 1982, Part III: Straits used for International Navigation. 
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A further split occurred when Canada secured separate status for the Canadian Arctic 
Archipelago under what became UNCLOS Article 234.3  
Such divisions were a reality of the UNCLOS process and can be viewed in 
different manners. It might have possibly been a divide-and-conquer technique. 
Otherwise, from a different perspective, it could be seen as a natural division to further 
separate agendas. Such divisions were apparent as opinions were diverse and the stakes 
were unquestionably high.  
During the course of negotiations of UNCLOS III, a working group was struck 
to address the archipelagic issue through the development of what was known as the 
³Single Negotiating 7H[W´ (Amerasinghe, 1974: 546). The archipelagic states of 
Indonesia, the Philippines, Fiji and Mauritius; and the United Kingdom (as a major 
maritime power) both put forward separate proposals as to what the draft archipelagic 
regime text should be. These proposals were representative of the two opposing 
positions, and both advocated quite strongly for a closed regime (the archipelagic states) 
and an open regime (U.K.), respectively.  
Amerasinghe (1974: 556) identifies the aims of the U.K. proposals as limiting 
the archipelagic sea area and to align the proposed archipelagic regime closely to that of 
the territorial sea. Such aims were pursued to allow for a more open regime as noted 
above. LaFlamme (1983: 361), around the same time as the completion of UNCLOS III, 
pointed out that the objectives routinely levelled at the archipelagic concept were the 
                                                     
3
 Article 234 governs any ice-covered areas of all coastal states, however this example deals specifically 
with Canada and the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. 
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closing of certain shipping lanes4 and the monopolization of prime fishing grounds, but 
wisely noted that strategic military concerns are in fact equally, if not even more, 
important. 
The negotiations on UNCLOS III were concluded on April 30, 1982 
(Tangsubkul and Fung-wai, 1983: 858). In the large context of an exhaustive negotiation 
composed of different concurrent working groups set over a large number of years, it is 
difficult to fully assess how the final text came to be. Further complicating this task is 
the fact that much of the important and sensitive negotiations happened in camera, and 
were not recorded. These negotiations primarily attempted to address the issues of 
maritime law pertaining to military assets and passage rights, leading Booth (1985: 4) to 
UHIHUWRWKH³EDFNURRPTXDOLW\RIWKHGLSORPDWLFWUHDWPHQW´RIWKLVLVVXH 
2.4: THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, 1982 
The end result of UNCLOS III was the fully negotiated and agreed upon United Nations 
Convention on Law of the Sea. A key aspect of UNCLOS is the framework nature of 
WKLVDJUHHPHQW,WKDVEHHQWHUPHGDQ³XPEUHOODFRQYHQWLRQ´GXHWRWKHUHIHUHQFHVWR
applicable standards and regulations located in other international agreements and 
treaties.  
Given the enormity and complexity of hammering out an all-encompassing 
international agreement on maritime legal issues, UNCLOS, 1982 is a by-product of its 
circumstances and reality. Over the course of thirty years of negotiation, over a wide 
breadth of topics, through applying diplomacy and negotiation, concessions were made 
by many states on many issues.  In the words of UNCLOS III President Tommy Koh 
                                                     
4
 See also Hollick (1981), U.S. Foreign Policy and the Law of the Sea. 
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³DOWKRXJKWKH&RQYHQWLRQFRQVLVWVRIDVHULHVRIFRPSURPLVHVWKH\IRUPDQ
LQWHJUDOZKROH´ 
Additionally, as put so elegantly by Allott (1983: 8): 
But a Flying Dutchman wandering the sea areas of the world, carrying his 
copy of the Convention, would always be able to answer in legal terms the 
questions: who am I? who is that over there? where am I? what may I do 
now? what must I do now? The Convention would never fail him. 
These views about UNCLOS dating back to around the time of UNCLOS III completion 
are optimistically hopeful. Guoxing (2000: 7), no doubt with the benefit of hindsight, 
makes indirect reference to the challenges that had been faced in implementation, 
FDXWLRQLQJWKDW³GLIIHUHQFHLQXQGHUVWDQGLQJDQd interpretation is prevalent in the world 
FRPPXQLW\´6SHDNLQJWRWKHVSHFLILFV*XR[LQJPDNHVUHIHUHQFHWRWKHRQJRLQJ
disagreement on interpretation between archipelagic states (Indonesia) and maritime 
powers (United States). 
UNCLOS Created Marine Zones and Passage Regimes 
The objective clarity afforded by UNCLOS is embodied in the many newly created 
marine zones (Figure 1) and passage regimes5 contained in it. Batongbacal (2008: 2) 
explains the various jurisdictional considerations and rights attached to each of the 
marine zones mandated by UNCLOS in the following statement: 
Complete state sovereignty is recognized only within the internal waters.  In 
territorial waters and archipelagic waters, states allow all ships to simply pass 
through [read: transit passage] (if they do anything else while passing, they may 
be subject to state jurisdiction). Beyond  that  distance,  states  have  steadily  
less than  full  sovereignty  and  only  specific  powers (especially  access  to  
natural  resources),  until  the 200 nautical mile limit where the high seas begin. 
                                                     
5
 See Appendix D for all figures.See Appendix B for a complete list of UNCLOS definitions of marine 
zones and passage rights. 
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From there, the freedom to navigate and use the high seas remains, and the seas 
are the common heritage of humanity. 
Economic Exclusive Zones (EEZ)  
Economic Exclusive Zones were another new creation contained within UNCLOS. As 
explained by Dutton (2011: 54): 
The creation of the exclusive economic zone in 1982 by UNCLOS as a region 
extending beyond the territorial sea to a maximum of two hundred nautical miles 
IURPDFRDVWDOVWDWH¶VVKRUHVZDVDFDUHIXOly balanced compromise between the 
interests of coastal states in managing and protecting ocean resources and those 
of maritime user states in ensuring high-seas freedoms of navigation and 
overflight, including for military purposes. Thus while in the exclusive economic 
zone the coastal state was granted sovereign rights to resources and jurisdiction 
to make laws related to those resources, high-seas freedoms of navigation were 
specifically preserved for all states, to ensure the participation of maritime 
powers in the convention.  
%RRWKKLJKOLJKWVWKDWZLWKWKHFUHDWLRQRI((=V³RIWKHZRUOG¶VRFHDQV
(about 28 million square miles) [are placed] under national administration of various 
IRUPDWV´ 
Right of Transit Passage 
In the context of UNCLOS in its entirety, there is one passage regime of which to take 
SDUWLFXODUQRWH7KHULJKWRI³WUDQVLWSDVVDJH´FUHDWHGE\81&/26DSSOLHVWRDOOPDULQH
jurisdictions outside of internal waters, for all user states, in all coastal states. Olson 
(1996: 3) identifies thHGHYHORSPHQWDQGLQFOXVLRQRI³WUDQVLWSDVVDJH´ as the central 
strategic concept agreed upon in UNCLOS III, advocated for jointly by both the 
U.S.S.R. and the United States.  
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2.5: UNCLOS, 1982 ± PART IV: ARCHIPELAGIC STATES 
The archipelagic concept was negotiated and agreed upon as Part IV of the completed 
Convention. This apparent victory by the so termHGµOHVVHUVWDWHV¶ZDVLQGHHGJDLQLQJ
the legitimization of archipelagic waters. However, the end product is a compromise 
which illustrates the failure of archipelagic states to enshrine all their arguments into the 
final document (Coquia, 1983: 36). Faced with the pressures of the Cold War, the 
concessions provided by the archipelagic states were termed by one academic as 
³LQHVFDSDEOH´*KRVK987: 907). 
UNCLOS, Part IV deals specifically with archipelagic regimes (Figure 2).6 It 
grants certain powers to the states in exchange for certain concessions to user states 
(primarily the major maritime powers). ASL passage allows for flexibility with certain 
military modes of transit which would not be allowed under the regime of innocent 
passage rights. These include the abilities for submarines to remain submerged while 
transiting within ASLs and for surface military vessels to travel in formation or to 
launch and recover aircraft. Furthermore, the archipelagic state cannot suspend or 
hamper ASL passage, whereas, in the traditional internal waters regime, innocent 
passage rights can indeed be suspended (Tsamenyi; Mfodwo, 2001: 29).7 The 
archipelagic state is granted rights to temporarily suspend innocent passage rights in 
limited conditions (Rothwell, 1990: 498).8 Notwithstanding the ASLs, within the 
archipelagic waters, the archipelagic state regulates innocent passage rights for foreign 
vessels. Innocent passage rights call for prior notification, surface submarine travel and 
                                                     
6
 For a full documented history of the origin, development and new international status of the concept of 
archipelagic statesVHH813XEOLFDWLRQV³$UFKLSHODJLF6WDWHV Legislative History of Part IV of the 
United Nations Convention´ 
7
 See also, UNCLOS Article 52[1] 
8
 See also, UNCLOS Article 52[2] 
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suspension of flight operations (Far Eastern Economic Review, December 29, 
1994/January 5, 1995).9 Once an ASL submission is approved and implemented, it 
limits all overflight (air) traffic only to the airspace above the designated ASLs 
(Tsamenyi; Mfodwo, 2001: 29).10  
Herman (1985: 198) points out in the conclusion of his timely analysis of the off-
lying (mid-ocean) archipelagic concept within UNCLOS that it contains hidden legal 
coPSOH[LWLHVZLWKLQWKH³Archipelagic States´ section (Part IV). These complexities 
concern states fitting the state criteria as defined under Part IV, inexact science of 
delineating baselines and interpretations around the legal status of minor features such 
DV³UHHIVORZ-WLGHHOHYDWLRQVDQGURFNV´ 
There are twenty-two states that formally claim archipelagic state status under 
UNCLOS.11 Talaie (1998: 213) notes that each island state weighs its own factors and 
considerations in determining whether or not to proclaim archipelagic status. According 
to Kopela (2007: 501) fifteen of these have enacted baselines:12 However, Kopela fails 
to determine whether or not the respective statuses and baselines are compliant with 
UNCLOS. It should be noted that the Philippines is included on her list, but as shall be 
discussed, the Philippine baselines at that time were quite contentious, non-compliant 
                                                     
9
 See also, UNCLOS Article 52[1] 
10
 See also, UNCLOS Article 53[5] 
11
 These states are Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Cape Verde, Comoros, Dominican Republic, Fiji, 
Grenada, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kiribati, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Papua New Guinea, 
Philippines, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/table_summary_of_claims.pd
f> (As at July, 15, 2011). 
12
 As of 2007, the Bahamas, Comoros, Kiribati, Marshall Islands and Seychelles had not defined their 
archipelagic baselines. Kopela (2007: 515) raises a further interesting point that six mid-ocean 
archipelagic states (Dominican Republic, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Tuvalu and Solomon Islands) 
recognize innocent passage of both ships and aircraft; as opposed to UNCLOS, which only requires 
recognition of ships.  
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with UNCLOS, and not recognized by the international community. Consulting the 
United Nations (U.N.) summary of claims as of July 2011, five archipelagic states have 
enacted legislation that makes allowances for straight baselines: Dominican Republic, 
Grenada, Kiribati, Mauritius, and Vanuatu.13 
The Indonesian & Philippine Contributions to Part IV 
Both Indonesia and the Philippines played substantial roles in ensuring that 
the archipelagic concept was debated, and a recognizable portion of the concept 
was included in UNCLOS. The fundamental belief, on which Indonesia and the 
Philippines based their respective views of the archipelagic concept, was the 
UHTXLUHPHQWWRVDIHJXDUGWKHLULQGLYLGXDOVWDWHV¶SROLWLFDOXQLW\DQGWKHWHUULWRULDO
integrity of their land and waters as a singular unit (Tangsubkul, 1984, as quoted 
in Batongbacal, 2004: 50). 
Rothwell (1990: 497) points to three main points which Indonesia presented for their 
arguments:  
x its  consistent  adherence  to  the Wawasan Nusantara concept  in  Indonesian  
law,  having  effect  on  both internal  and  international  law14;  
x acquiescence  on  the  part  of neighbouring  states  who  implicitly  accepted  
the  existence  of  Indonesian baselines  which  surrounded  the  archipelago;  
and   
                                                     
13<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/table_summary_of_claims.
pdf> (As at July, 15, 2011) 
14
 :DZDVDQPHDQV³RXWORRN´1XVDQWDUDUHIHUVWR³SHRSOH´DQG³VHHNVWKHXQLILFDWLRQRIWKHODQGZDWHUV
DQGWKHSHRSOHRI,QGRQHVLD´5RWKZHOO 
32 
 
x the  international support  the  emerging  archipelagic  regime  advocated  by 
Indonesia,  the Philippines,  Fiji  and  Mauritius  had  received  in  international  
fora.  
It was noted by Munavvar (1995: 287-288) that the Philippines ³DUJXHGWKDWWKH
unity  of  the  archipelagic  state and  the  protection  of  its  security,  the  preservation  
of  its  political  and  economic unity, the preservation of its marine environment and the 
exploitation of its marine resources  justified  the  inclusion  of  the  waters  inside  an  
archipelago  under  the sovereignty  of  the  archipelagic  state  and  the  granting  of 
special  VWDWXVRYHUVXFKZDWHUV´15  
2.6: THE ARCHIPELAGIC CONCEPT 
As noted earlier, the PhilipSLQHV¶DUJXPHQWIRFXVHGRQWHUULWRULDOLQWHJULW\ and security, 
to bring these waters inside the archipelago under the sovereignty of the state. To reach 
this goal, the state must first define what limits constitute the archipelago. These 
arguments were supported and reinforced by other archipelagic states, including 
Indonesia. As stated by one prominent Indonesian:16  
It is the status of the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines which 
constitutes the most essential element of the concept rather than the method of 
drawing straight archipelagic baselines, in as much as it gives meaning to the 
concept of unity.  
2¶&RQQHOO1971, quoted in Herman, 1985: 177) writing prior to the commencement of 
the UNCLOS III was able to fully capture the core arguments of the archipelagic states: 
                                                     
15
 Also Bautista (2011), p. 43 
16
 Nugroho Wisnumurti, in Archipelagic Waters and Archipelagic Sea Lanes (as quoted in Kwaitkowska 
and Agoes, 1991), page unknown. 
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The essence of mid-ocean archipelago theory is that a relationship exists 
between the features themselves, so that a situation exists which is 
analogous to that of a complex coast of a continental country. In a sense a 
group of islands cannot be an archipelago without a centripetal emphasis 
which gives coherence to the whole, and expresses itself in an outer 
periphery which is the equivalent of WKH³JHQHUDOGLUHFWLRQRIWKHFRDVW´ 
At issue with the archipelagic concept were the considerations of customary 
IUHHGRPRIQDYLJDWLRQYHUVXVWKHDUFKLSHODJLFVWDWHV¶FRQFHSWRIWHUULWRULDOLQWHJULW\DQG
full sovereignty.  However, the archipelagic states truly viewed the larger context of 
these waters running much deeper into the very essence of their statehood: 
The  archipelago  concept  is  essentially  a  child  of the  basic  unity  that 
permeates  the  land,  the  water, and  the  people.  Geography, economics, 
politics, and, in some cases, history, interweave to form a seamless and distinct 
whole.  The  concept is a function  of the  identity  of the  archipelago itself; for  
without this  sense  of identity, the  archipelago will fail of statehood. (Santiago, 
1974: 364) 
The Archipelagic Concept Trade-Off 
In order to objectively review the archipelagic concept, the role of sovereignty 
within the concept must first be examined. How exactly does this trade-off work and 
what conditions does it place on the sovereignty of the archipelagic states? 
This trade-off involved the negotiation of the passage rights known as 
³DUFKLSHODJLFVHDODQHSDVVDJH´ (ASLP). Cay (2010: 39) refers to the archipelagic sea 
ODQHGHVLJQDWLRQDV³>WKH@JUHDWHVWFRQWULEXWLRQRIDUFhipelagic states to the international 
community, particularly to major maritime powers because their right to navigation 
WKURXJKDUFKLSHODJLFZDWHUVLVEHLQJXSKHOGDQGJXDUDQWHHG´ 
-DFNVRQH[SODLQVWKDW³VRYHUHLJQW\LVOLNH/(*2LWLVDUHODWively 
simple idea but you can build different things with it, large or small, as long as you 
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IROORZWKHUXOHV´+HQFHVRYHUHLJQW\LQYROYHVXQLIRUPSULQFLSOHVEXWFDQWDNHDQ\
number of forms in the real world. Given that the majority of the civilized world has 
long been discovered, mapped and divided, one particular frontier of sovereignty at this 
point in time involves the relatively new field of international maritime law. Freedom of 
the High Seas (mare liberum) was a staple doctrine of customary international law for 
centuries. Through the process of decolonization which has primary occurred in the 
second half of the twentieth century, many new independent states joined the 
international community. Many of these states were islands scattered throughout the 
oceans across the globe.  
These newly sovereign island states seated around the table during the UNCLOS 
process had their own national interests to pursue.  Jurisdiction of the physical land was 
not in question. However, the debate centered upon the waters surrounding these states 
and their jurisdictional limits over such waters would be a central aspect of the 
UNCLOS negotiations.  
Not surprisingly, the island states wanted full sovereignty over their waters. 
Specifically, archipelagic states had a very unique case to make. The matters of the 
design and drawing of the baselines enclosing these waters and the status of the said 
waters contained within were to be up for interpretation, discussion, and negotiation.  
2.7: CASE CLARITY 
This thesis is a single explanatory case examining and explaining the position of the 
Republic of the Philippines with respect to ASLs. However, research data are being 
drawn from the Indonesian case of ASL submission, and as such, it is important to 
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distinguish the differences between the two cases. As clarified by Santiago (1974: 372) 
close to forty years ago in the midst of the UNCLOS process:   
The  case of Indonesia  resembles  greatly  that  of the  Philippines,  as evidenced  
by  the  use  of identical  terms.  But  although similar,  the  two cases  bear the  
following  distinctions:  Firstly, perhaps  because  the  Indonesian  archipelago 
occupies  a  more central geographical  position  in South-east Asia, the  case of 
Indonesia  has  received  much more protest and  criticism.  Secondly,  while the  
Philippines is  a  unique example  of archipelago in  the  sense  that  it  has  two  
large  centers  (Luzon  and  Mindanao)  surrounded  by thousands  of islands  
and  separated  by relatively  broad  waters, Indonesia  is  even more unique  
because  it  has  not  only one  or two  centers, but  at least  four main parts  - 
Sumatra, Java,  Borneo,  and  Celebes.  In Indonesia,  the  whole  state  apparatus  
and  development  might  be seriously jeopardized  if  one  of these  four  islands  
were isolated  from  the  rest. 
2.8: THE INDONESIAN EXPERIENCE 
 
Background 
The Indonesian belief in the archipelagic concept has been discussed in some 
detail in a preceding chapter. Building further upon that explanation, the following quote 
from Indonesian diplomat Noegroho Wisnomoerti accurately captures the essence of the 
archipelagic concept in the nationalistic fabric and discourse (1987, as quoted in Ku, 
1991: 1):  
The nationhood of Indonesia is built on the concept of unity between the 
Indonesian islands and the inter-connecting waters. Those seas are regarded 
as a unifying, not a separating element...It was the first political 
manifestation of the concept of national unity which had inspired the 
nationalist movement started in 1908, to lead the national struggle for 
independence. 
Djuanda Declaration - 1957 
On December 13, 1957, the Government of Indonesia issued the Djuanda 
Declaration, a new policy which extended its territorial sea to 12 nautical miles (Agoes, 
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1991: 123). The DjuandD'HFODUDWLRQKDVEHHQFDOOHG³«,QGRQHVLD¶VPDMRUOHJDOPRYH
to establish its position as an archipelagic state´$JRHV, 1991).  Agoes identifies four 
main considerations for the issuing of the Djuanda Declaration: 
x the  geographical  shape  of  Indonesia  as  an  archipelagic  state consisting  of 
thousands  of islands,  has characteristics  and  features requiring  its  own  
special  regulation;  
x for  the  territorial  unity  of Indonesia,  all of the  archipelago  and  its 
connecting  waters  must be considered  a unified  whole;  
x the  territorial  sea  limit  under  Article  1 paragraph  1 of the  1939 ordinance  
is  no  longer  consistent  with  the  safety  and  security interests  of Indonesia;  
x every  state  has the  right  to  take  the  necessary  measures  to  protect the  
unity  and  safety  of its  territory. 
These four points are all rooted in the obvious desire to strongly maintain and 
UHLQIRUFH,QGRQHVLD¶VWHUULWRULDOLQWHJULW\7KLVLVWUXO\WKHOHJLWLPDWLRQRIWKHVWURQJ
nationalistic narrative by the newly sovereign state, the Wawasan Nusantara view, with 
the archipelagic concept at its very core. Hamzah (1984: 30) states that Wawasan 
Nusantara³UHSUHVHQWVWKHDSH[RILWVSROLWLFDODVSLUDWLRQRIRQHQDWLRQDOLW\RQH
language and one homeland; by integrating the land and the water territories of 
,QGRQHVLDLQWRRQHIDWKHUODQGDQLGHDZKLFKRULJLQDWHGLQD<RXWK3OHGJHLQ´ 
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Law No. 4 ± 1960 
In 1960, Indonesian lawmakers passed Law No. 4, a law which dealt further with 
the matter of territorial waters. This law contained four rather simple paragraphs 
summarized by the following points (Agoes, 1991: 124): 
x straight  baselines  shall  be drawn  connecting  the  outermost  points of the  
outermost  islands;  
x waters  situated  within  those  baselines,  including  the  sea-bed  and its  
subsoil,  as well as the  airspace  above  them,  and  their  resources, shall  be 
SODFHGXQGHUWKHFRXQWU\¶VIXOOVRYHUHLJQW\ 
x the  breadth  of the  territorial  sea  shall  be  12 nautical  miles;  and  
x innocent  passage  through  the  internal  waters  shall  be guaranteed, provided  
WKDWLWLVQRWSUHMXGLFLDOWRWKHFRXQWU\¶VLQWHUHVWVDQGDVORQJDVLWGRHV
not  disturb  its  security  and  good  order. 
This legislation immediately more than doubled the size of the Indonesian territory, 
owing to the inclusion of many square kilometers of territorial waters (Agoes, 1991). It 
can be pointed out that these two measures can be viewed as a progression of legalizing, 
and by extension, lending legitimacy to, the Indonesian archipelagic concept.  
The timing, scope and mandates of these two actions by the Indonesian 
government were the by-products of the ongoing UNCLOS process. The Djuanda 
Declaration appears to have been a cautious small first step that was taken prior to the 
convening of UNCLOS I. The Indonesian government wanted to test the reaction of the 
international community to the Declaration, prior to formally enshrining the ideals into 
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law (Agoes, 1991: 124). By contrast, after failing to receive support for the archipelagic 
concept at UNCLOS I, the Indonesian government chose to deliberately enact Law No. 
4 (1960), prior to the start of UNCLOS II (Agoes, 1991). 
Indonesian Straits Incidents 
Indonesia has fiercely enforced and protected its waters since 
independence. It has made attempts to close its straits to user state vessels on four 
separate occasions: 1958, 1964, 1978 and 1988. These attempts were reactions to 
the actions of the Netherlands (1958), Britain (1964), and in the last two instances, 
³DQHIIRUWWRLPSRVH,QGRQHVLD¶VVRYHUHLJQW\RYHUVRPHRIWKHZRUOG¶VPRVWYLWDO
FKRNHSRLQWV´ (Far Eastern Economic Review, Dec. 29, 1994/Jan. 5, 1995). 
A report in the Far Eastern Economic Review in 1996 was the first to 
disclose a 1978 incident whHUH³«DQ,QGRQHVLDQIULJDWHGURSSHGGHSWK-charges 
FORVHWRWZR6RYLHWVXEPDULQHVWKDWKDGLJQRUHGLQVWUXFWLRQVWRVXUIDFH´7R
engage in such an episode against a maritime superpower, albeit at a calmer period 
of the Cold War, truly underlines the strong Indonesian resolve over its waters. 
The views of the United States can be observed through this passage from a 
letter dated April 4, 1989 which was written by Mr. David H. Small, then United 
States Assistant Legal Adviser for Oceans and International Environmental and 
Scientific Affairs (as quoted in Leich, 1989: 560): 
The United States cannot accept either express closure of the straits or 
conduct that has the effect of denying navigation and overflight rights. 
While it is perfectly reasonable for an archipelagic state to conduct naval 
exercises in its straits, either expressly or constructively, that creates a threat 
to the safety of users of the straits, or that hampers the right of navigation 
and overflight through the straits or archipelagic sea lanes. 
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These seemingly aggressive Indonesian actions were explained by Etty Agoes, then 
Executive Director of the Centre for Archipelagic Studies, Law and Development 
-DNDUWD,QGRQHVLDLQWKXV³6RPHSHRSOHIHHOZHKDYHWRSURWHFWRXUVWDWXV
because we sSHQWVRPXFKWLPHILJKWLQJIRULW«,W¶VQRWVRPXFKWKH\¶UHKDUGOLQHUV
bXWWKH\¶UHWU\LQJWREHFDUHIXO´ (Far Eastern Economic Review, 1996). In view of the 
strong nationalistic views held by Indonesia concerning Wawasan Nusantara and the 
archipelagic concept, it was to be with great resolve and diplomacy that the Government 
set out to plan its ASL submission. 
2.9: INDONESIAN ASL PROCESS 
Indonesia began the long process of ASL designation in 1994 with a series of national 
surveys, and on the public administration side, finished national inter-agency 
coordination in 1995 (Djalal: 2009). Hashim Djalal, then Ambassador-at-Large for 
Maritime Affairs to the Foreign Minister, YLHZHGDQ$6/VXEPLVVLRQDV³>0DNLQJ@
,QGRQHVLDPRUHRIDZKROH«,WKDVDORQJ-tHUPVWUDWHJLFVLJQLILFDQFH´,QWKHVDPH
report, officials indicated a proposal was not targeting international shipping, but rather 
³puttLQJDUHLQRQIRUHLJQZDUVKLSV´Far Eastern Economic Review, Dec. 29, 1994/Jan. 
5, 1995). 
External consultations occurred in 1996 with the International Hydrographic 
Organization, and user states including the United States, the United Kingdom and 
Australia (Djalal: 2009). These bilateral consultations focused on both the design of the 
archipelagic sea lanes and the rules that would apply to their usage. The strategic 
importance of the Indonesian sea lanes cannot be understated. A forced diversion of the 
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archipelago by sea-going vessels would add over three thousand miles and massive 
budgetary overages in fuel and all other incurred expenses (Ghosh, 1987: 905). 
However, it was later argued by Rushli (2012: 2) that the Indonesian sea lanes 
while vital are more so secondary to the Strait of Malacca and Singapore, owing to the 
increased journey length from Asia Pacific to the Indian Ocean. He offers the 
Indonesian route of Lombok-Makassar adds 7,500 nautical miles and increases annual 
shipping costs anywhere from $84 billion USD to $250 billion USD (Rushli, 2012). It is 
noted that the Lombok-Makassar route is an important route for Australian trade, and 
FRQFOXGHVWKDWWKH,QGRQHVLDQURXWHV³SOD\DFULWLFDOUROHLQWKHIORZRIWKHZRUOG¶V
shipping´ and any interruption on these routes would negatively impact international 
shipping and the global economy (Rushli, 2012). 
The Indonesian government noted in their submission to the International 
Maritime Organization¶V (IMO), Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) that they 
considered the following factors (Table 1) during the course of determining and 
designing their ASLs. 
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Table 1: Factors considered by Indonesia during ASL process17 
International transportation and aviation needs through Indonesia's archipelagic waters 
Hydrographic and natural marine conditions 
The intensity of coastal and inter-island navigation and overflight 
Fishing activities 
Existing oil and gas exploration and exploitation 
The presence of installations and structures 
Protection of the marine environment 
Coastal and marine tourism development 
Indonesian peace, stability and security particularly in the heavily populated coastal 
zones 
The capacity of law enforcement agencies to monitor navigation and overflight in 
relation to the safeguarding of law and order. 
   
Indonesia ran into opposition in its initial efforts to enact its ASLs, finding two 
significant areas of contention with the maritime powers. Indonesia wanted to 
unilaterally enact ASLs without seeking approval and without referring the matter to any 
international bodies. Moreover, Indonesia only intended to enact three north-south lanes 
and no east-west lane (Edwards, 1998: 15-16). This entire file was to be settled before 
the International Maritime Organization.  
                                                     
17
 Government of Indonesia submission to the IMO MSC (as quoted in Johnson, 2000), p. 326-327 
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2.10: THE INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION 
Towards the completion of the UNCLOS process, a looming question became the U.N. 
regulation of the new Convention. Kingham and McRae (1978: 127) noted that existing 
U.N. agencies seemed capable of this task; however, organizational reviews and top 
level direction to ensure appropriate and harmonious distribution of areas of 
responsibility would be required. Specifically focusing on Part IV (archipelagic regime), 
would an existing U.N. organ be mandated to regulate or would a new agency need to be 
created?  
The Law of WKH6HD&RQYHQWLRQHQVKULQHGVWDWHV¶ rights to regulate the adoption 
of ASLs tR³WKHFRPSHWHQW,QWHUQDWLRQDO2UJDQL]DWLRQ´$UWLFOH>@7KLV
UHVSRQVLELOLW\KDVIDOOHQWRWKH8QLWHG1DWLRQV¶,QWHUQDWLRQDO0DULWLPH2UJDQL]DWLRQ
(Beckman, 2007: 120; also Johnson, 2000, Batongbacal, 2004; Bateman, 2007; 
Forward, 2009). The International Maritime Organization (IMO) came into existence in 
1948 as a U.N. mandated body responsible for deliberating and regulating shipping 
PDWWHUVDQGVWDQGDUGV+DUULVRQ7KH,02¶VRZQGRFXPHQWDWLRQVWDWHVWKH
purpose of the organization as (as quoted in Harrison, 2011: 156):  
to provide machinery for co-operation among Governments in the field of 
governmental regulation and practices relating to technical matters of all 
kinds affecting shipping engaged in the international trade; [and] to 
encourage and facilitate the general adoption of the highest practicable 
standards in matters concerning the maritime safety [sic.], efficiency of 
navigation and prevention and control of marine pollution from ships. 
Indonesian Objection to Mandate 
Indonesia held some key objections concerning the perceived mandate of the 
IMO when it came to the ASL process. These objections centered around the fact that 
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the IMO is an organization with a focus on international shipping and trade. Building 
upon the earlier quoted SXUSRVHWKH,02¶VRZQPLVVLRQVWDWHPHQWLGHQWLILHVLWVSXUSRVH
³LV>WRSURPRWH@VDIHVHFXUHDQGHIILFLHQWVKLSSLQJRQFOHDQRFHDQV´DVTXRWHGLQ
Forward, 2009: 152).  
Indonesia notified the IMO in 1996 that it intended to submit its proposal for 
consideration. This triggered the long process (Figure 4),  in which Indonesia attempted 
to achieve adoption of their ASL submission. The IMO designated its Maritime Safety 
Committee (MSC) to take control of this file. The MSC deeming this matter as a routing 
issue, further delegated the file to its navigational sub-committee.   
The role and mandate of the IMO was a contentious subject between the 
maritime powers and Indonesia. Indonesia was of the opinion that the IMO would fill a 
technical role, to review the proposal and deem it safe for navigation (Edwards, 1999: 
7KH\UHFRJQL]HGWKH,02¶VDXWKRULW\PHUHO\³RQPDWWHUVUHODWLQJWRQDYLJDWLRQDO
aids and the safety of shipping ± QRWRQWKHGHOLQHDWLRQRIVHDODQHV´Far East 
Economic Review, February 29, 1996). An unidentified source within the Indonesian 
'HIHQFH0LQLVWU\ZDVTXRWHGHDUO\LQH[SODLQLQJ³:H>,QGRQHVLD@ZLOOGHVLJQDWH
WKHVHDODQHVXQLODWHUDOO\«EXWZHZLOOVHHNWKH,02¶VDGYLFHRQWKHW\SHDQG
intensLW\RIQDYLJDWLRQDODLGV´Far East Economic Review). 
The maritime powers were of the belief that the IMO was required to adopt a 
PXFKPRUH³KDQGVRQ´ approach. An Australian statement which was widely supported 
by other states indicated that much larger issues, such as the number of normal routes 
and other international law matters, needed to be considered by the IMO (Edwards, 
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1999: 17). The Indonesian submission was left vulnerable to the maritime powers due to 
one simple sentence contained within the submission; "Pending the designation of other 
sea lanes through other parts of the archipelagic waters, the right of sea lanes passage 
may be exercised in the relevant archipelagic waters in accordance with the Law of the 
Sea Convention, 1982" (as quoted in Edwards, 1999: 16). 
The Sticking Point of a Fourth ASL 
The initial Indonesian proposal consisted of three north-south archipelagic sea 
lanes. The international community and the maritime powers protested the absence of 
over ten additional routes (Kaye, 2008: 16). In 1996, during the course of the 
negotiation, Walter Slocombe, American Under-Secretary of Defence for Policy, went 
RQUHFRUGWRVWDWHWKDW,QGRQHVLDKDG³E\QRPHDQV´UXOHGRXWDIRXUWK$6/DQHDVW-west 
one (Far East Economic Review, May 2, 1996). Two weeks later, Ali Alatas, the 
Indonesian Foreign Minister was quoted in the New York Times (May 16, 1996):  
They want a fourth archipelagic sea-lane going east-ZHVWWKURXJKWKH-DYD6HD«
But we have told them that the Java Sea is full of undersea cables and oil rigs. It's 
a very shallow sea, in many parts only 45 meters. So we are rather reluctant to 
make it an archipelagic sea-lane. 
In opposition to any additional lanes being proposed, Indonesian representatives 
indicated that shallow depths, overcrowding with domestic marine traffic, and the 
presence of oil and gas rigs made these proposed areas unsafe for passage by user states 
YHVVHOVDQG³HVSHFLDOO\VXEPHUJHGVXEPDULQHV´New York Times).  
By late 1997, Indonesia had offered a small concession to the Americans in 
particular. Indonesia offered a short ASL that would act as an entry branch onto their 
submitted Sunda Strait lane (north-south) allowing surface military vessels en-route to 
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RUIURP6LQJDSRUHWR³PDLQWDLQRSHUDWLRQDOUHDGLQHVV´Far East Economic Review, 
August 21, 1997). However, the Indonesian position on a fourth east-west lane was 
bluntly restated in the Far Eastern Economic Review ZKLFKUHDG³>,QGRQHVLD@DUHVWLOO
opposed to an east-west sea lane that would traverse the length of the archipelago, 
pointing out that onl\WKUHHRUIRXUZDUVKLSVDFWXDOO\XVHWKDWURXWHHDFK\HDUDQ\ZD\´ 
Bilateral Discussions 
                Bilateral discussions became an important forum for this matter. These dated 
DVIDUEDFNDVZLWK³DQXPEHURIELODWHUDOFRQVXOWDWLRQV´(GZDUGV1998: 15) 
between the United States and Indonesia. In the period covering February 1996 to early 
2000, there occurred three formal bilateral meetings between Indonesia and Australia, 
and, one formal bilateral meeting between the United States and Australia (Warner, 
2000: 170). My research did not manage to uncover how many informal meetings or 
discussions between any or all state parties occurred.  
2.12: GENERAL PROVISIONS ON THE ADOPTION, DESIGNATION, AND 
SUBSTITUTION OF ARCHIPELAGIC SEA LANES 
Through the formal and bilateral meetings, the IMO came to consider nineteen 
agreed upon points around process for an ASL submission. These points were endorsed 
and issued as the General Provisions on the Adoption, Designation, and Substitution of 
Archipelagic Sea Lanes (GPASL). Johnson (2000: 322) highlights four key 
developments which VKHWHUPVDV³PDMRULQQRYDWLRQV´ encompassed in the GPASL: 
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x the creation of a concept of partial designation; 
x rHLQIRUFHPHQWRIWKH³REOLJDWLRQ´LQ$UW>@) upon archipelagic states to 
include all international navigation routes in their archipelagic sea-lanes 
proposals; 
x more onerous pre-proposal procedures especially for the archipelagic state; and 
x a formalised role for foreign states in relation to the preparation and 
determination of a proposal 
Johnson (2000: 331) noted that the GPASL increases the control of user states and the 
IMO over the designation process. Batongbacal (2004: 67) analyses the impacts of the 
GPASL on mid-ocean archipelagic states concluding: 
From an archipelagic state perspective, the GPASL may have undermined, rather 
than strengthened, the archipelagic state regime under the LOS Convention. The 
introduction of the concept of partial proposal or designation takes away from the 
archipelagic state the initiative to decide with finality on the designation of its 
ASLs, nullifies the benefit of designating any ASLs at all, and undermines the 
provisions of Part IV referring to substitution of sea lanes, elimination of similarly 
convenient routes, and application of innocent passage in undesignated routes. It 
severely limits the ability of the archipelagic state to rationalize the maritime 
traffic routes within its archipelagic waters, and practically legitimizes 
unmitigated passage through all waters of the archipelago. In addition, although 
the GPASL was issued by an international institution with competence over 
commercial shipping, its truly important provisions were actually negotiated and 
settled outside the IMO, between a select few members concerned with non-
commercial issues such as naval mobility. 
 
Warner (2000: 170) offers that, ZKLOHWKH*3$6/VDUHLQGLFDWLYHRI³VRPHSUDFWLFDO
compromises necessary to implement [ASLs]´ WKH\GLG³DFKLHYH>V@DQDSSURSULDWH
balance between archipelagic and user state interests.´  
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2.13: GPASL INTRODUCTION OF PARTIAL REGIME 
The GPASLs introduced a concept advocated by the maritime states of a partial 
submission or proposal by Indonesia. The GPASLs define partial archipelagic sea 
lanes proposal DV³>$n] archipelagic sea lanes proposal by an archipelagic state which 
does not meet the requirement to include all normal passage routes and navigational 
FKDQQHOVDVUHTXLUHGE\81&/26SDUD´DVTXRWHGLQ:DUQHU7KH
IMO determined that partial designation allowed for tKH³FRQWLQXHGH[HUFLVHRI$6/3LQ
other routes normally used for international navigation located within archipelagic 
ZDWHUV´QRWZLWKVWDQGLQJWKHDXWKRUL]DWLRQRIWKHWKUHHVXEPLWWHG,QGonesian 
archipelagic sea lanes (as quoted in Batongbacal, 2004: 55). Harrison (2011: 185) 
FRQWHQGVWKDWDSDUWLDOSURSRVDOFRQFHSWLV³>$@SURFHGXUDOGHYLFHWKDWDLPVWRVDWLVI\
the conditions in Article 53(4) that archipelagic sea lanes must include all normal 
passage routes used as routes for international navigation or RYHUIOLJKW´:DUQHUULJKWO\
points out the notion of a partial proposal or designation was not foreseen in UNCLOS, 
and clearing up the status of navigational rights for user states outside the designated 
ASLs was the main focus of the bilateral meetings upon agreement of the partial 
allowance (2000, quoted in Batongbacal, 2004: 55, Also Rothwell, 1990; Bateman, 
2007). 
Not all are so sure as to the benefit of this regime. As Bateman (2007: 44) points 
out, a partial designation is, in actuality, not consistent with UNCLOS Article 53(4), 
ZKLFKFDOOVIRU$6/VWR³LQFOXGHDOOQRUPDOSDVVDJHURXWHV´%DWRQJEDFDOIXUWKHUDUJXHV
his position opposing the partial concept, explaining:  
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The concept of partial designation also undermines the provision allowing the 
archipelagic state to substitute sea lanes under article 53(7) of the LOS 
Convention, and to no longer designate sea lanes which duplicate routes of similar 
FRQYHQLHQFHEHWZHHQWKHVDPHHQWU\DQGH[LWSRLQWVXQGHUDUWLFOH«,ID
complete ASL designation PXVWDWDOOWLPHVLQFOXGH³DOOURXWHV´WKHQWKHUHLVQR
situation in which substitution can be called for, nor is there any opportunity to 
eliminate redundant routes; for that matter, neither is there any more utility in 
designating any ASLs since ASLP can be exercised practically anywhere in 
archipelagic waters.  (2004: 56)                           
In the same article, Batongbacal supports his position by quoting Warner (2000) who 
VDLG³>L@t has constantly been the position of the archipelagic states that solely innocent 
passage should apply in all other archipelagic waters, if ASLs have been formally 
SURSRVHGDQGDSSURYHGE\WKH,02´%DWRQJEDFDODOVRVWDWHVWKDW³should a 
proposal be viewed as partial by user states it seems unlikely that the regime of innocent 
pasVDJHVKDOOVROHO\DSSO\´ These observations are echoed by Forward (2009: 143) who 
FDOOHGWKHSDUWLDOSURSRVDOD³VLJQLILFDQWYLFWRU\´IRUWKHPDULWLPHSRZHUVQRWLQJVXFK
DGHVLJQDWLRQ³UHQGHUHGWKH,QGRQHVLDQ$6/VSUDFWLFDOO\XVHless because there is no 
compulsion for maritime countries to use them´  
Batongbacal (2004: 66) later notes that the Indonesian designation revealed the 
key fundamental issue surrounding establishment of an ASL regime is the impact on the 
military and state vessels of user states. Specifically, military vessels and their varied 
operations, which Batongbacal: UHIHUVWRDV³QDYDOVXUIDFHVXE-surface, and aerial 
united´ are heavily restricted by a complete ASL designation, while commercial traffic 
can merely exercise innocent passage rights within all archipelagic waters. 
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In the view of Captain Jonathan P. Edwards, USN, JAGC (United States Navy, 
-XGJH$GYRFDWH*HQHUDO¶V&RUSV,18 when viewing the different ASL passage regimes in 
a military operations context:  
From an operational standpoint, designation of a partial system of archipelagic sea 
lanes is preferable to designation of a complete system. This is because in a 
complete system, international law does not require archipelagic states to include 
normal passage routes of similar convenience between the same entry and exit 
points. A complete system is therefore likely to have fewer sea lanes than a 
partial system will have normal passage routes. [emphasis added] (1999: 22) 
The Royal Australian Navy stated in their policy and opinion newsletter, Semaphore 
(2005: 2):  
,WLVLQ,QGRQHVLD¶VLQWHUHVWVWRGHVLJQDWHDOOQRUPDOURXWHVDV$6/V2QFHLWKDV
fully designated its ASLs, transiting vessels will be restricted to exercising ASLP 
only in those ASLs, and will be limited to innocent passage through the rest of the 
archipelago. Until this is completed, Indonesia will have difficulty in enforcing its 
domestic law against transiting vessels. 
On the matter of military and state vessels, Batongbacal maintains that: 
SXFKVKLSVDUHEH\RQGWKH,02¶VMXULVGLFWLRQDQGFRPSHWHQFHZKLFKLVZK\WKH
substantial negotiations and discussions addressing the contentious issues had to 
take place not in the IMO sessions, but rather in bilateral inter-sessional meetings. 
This is an LQGLFDWLRQRIWKH,02¶VOLPLWDWLRQDVDGLVSXWHVHWWOHPHQWIRUXP. 
[emphasis added] (2004: 66) 
2.14: CONSEQUENCES OF THE IMO DECISION (PARTIAL REGIME)  
,QGRQHVLD¶VDUFKLSHODJLFVHDODQHSURSRVDOZDVGHHPHGE\WKH,02DVDSDUWLDO
submission, and thus a partial regime was designed in May 1998 (Cay, 2010: 5). The 
partial designating of the Indonesian ASLs also carried with it obligations towards the 
end goal of a full designation. Indonesia is required to update the IMO on its plans for 
                                                     
18
 (GZDUGV¶YLHZLVRIIHUHGLQDQDFDGHPLFSDSHUZKLFKZDVVXEPLWWHGWRWKH1DYDO:DU&ROOHJH,WLV
important to note thDWVXFKDSDSHULVGHHPHGWRUHSUHVHQWVROHO\WKHDXWKRU¶VYLHZVDQGQRWWKRVHRIWKH
U.S. military or U.S. Government. 
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preparatory work (i.e. VXUYH\VDQG³LVXOWLPDWHO\UHTXLUHGWRSURSRVHIRUDGRSWLRQ
archipelagic sea lanes including all normal passage routes and navigational channels´ 
however, no timeline is attached to these obligations (Semaphore RAN, 2005: 2).  
The analysed impacts of this decision seem clear. Johnson (2000: 332) writes in 
her conclusion that the general consequence of the Indonesian process was that it 
³UHLQIRUFHGWKDW>$6/@UHJLPH
VIRFXVRQSUHVHUYLQJWKHLQWHUHVWVRIXVHUVWDWHVDUJXDEO\
to a further diminution of control by archipelagic states´ Harrison (2011: 198) more 
GLUHFWO\REVHUYHV³>W@he IMO offers another example of informal mechanisms for 
change being used by states in preference to the formal amendment procedures found in 
WKH&RQYHQWLRQ´ 
The response of the Indonesian government in the aftermath of the IMO 
ruling has been rather careful. There has been no further action or submissions by 
Indonesia to the IMO. Arguably, this illustrates either a complete loss of 
confidence in the IMO in the role of neutral body, or could go as far as a rejection 
RIWKH,02¶VPDQGDWH)RUZDUG,QGRQHVLDGLGWDNHWKHVWHSRI
enacting domestic legislation in 2002, which enshrined the three ASLs into law as 
a full designation, granting only innocent passage rights to all maritime traffic 
outside of them (Forward, 2009). It was not until 2003 at an IMO conference that 
Indonesia offered up any inclination it may consider consenting to a desired east-
west lane; however, the same source referenced Indonesian officials indicating the 
UHTXLUHGVXUYH\LQJIRUVXFKDODQH³PLJKWWDNHVHYHUDOPRUH\HDUV´Far Eastern 
Economic Review, July 17, 2003).  
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2.15: CONCLUSION 
This chapter has outlined the history of the UNCLOS process dating back to the end of 
World War II, including the archipelagic concept long advocated for the archipelagic 
states. This process cumulated in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 
which enshrined the rights of mid-ocean archipelagic states under  Part IV (Archipelagic 
States). These rights were the negotiated  trade-off between the major maritime powers 
and the archipelagic states; which were forced to compromise on their archipelagic 
concept. Lastly, this chapter explained the historical background of the mid-ocean 
archipelagic state of Indonesia in relation to UNCLOS, highlighting the process 
undertaken by Indonesia to designate their archipelagic sea lanes. The role and actions 
of the International Maritime Organization in the Indonesian process and the 
establishment of the General Provisions on the Adoption, Designation, and Substitution 
of Archipelagic Sea Lanes were discussed, looking at the impact on Indonesia and in 
relation to the initially negotiation compromise found in UNCLOS, Part IV.
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Chapter Three: The Case of the Republic of the Philippines 
 
³An island is a nervous duality: it confronts us as a juxtaposition and confluence 
of the understanding of local and global realities, of interior and exterior 
references of meaning, of having roots at home while also deploying routes 
away froPKRPH´  
 
(Godfrey Baldacchino, Islands ± Objects of Representation, 2005: 248) 
 
3.1: BACKGROUND 
The Republic of the Philippines is an archipelagic state comprised of 7,107 islands, 
geographically stretching over many miles of water (Bautista, 2010: 115). Its long 
history with the archipelagic concept was previously introduced in Chapter Two. 
Additionally, the previous chapter explained the key points of the development of 
international maritime law throughout the UNCLOS process. This process identified the 
prerequisite matter of state baselines that, together with the status of waters enclosed 
within, make up the key aspects of the archipelagic concept. Such issues need to be 
reviewed as they are so interwoven with archipelagic sea lanes.19   
3.2: TIMELINE OF THE ACTIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES 
Note Verbale (1955) 
The Philippines stated their position concerning their waters, in essence the 
archipelagic concept, in a Note Verbale to the Secretariat of the United Nations dated 
                                                     
19
 For more information, read Batongbacal, Jay. Philippine Maritime Territories and Jurisdictions; Part I: 
Why the Law of the Sea is so critical for the Philippines. Asia Pacific Policy Bulletin. Asian Center ± 
University of the Philippines. 2008 
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December 12, 1955, during the course of the initial preparatory work in advance of 
UNCLOS I: 
The position of the Philippine Government in the matter is that all waters 
around, between and connecting the different islands belonging to the 
Philippine Archipelago irrespective of their widths or dimensions, are 
necessary appurtenances of its land territory, forming an integral part of the 
national or inland waters, subject to the exclusive sovereignty of the 
Philippines. (as quoted in Ku, 1991: 17)  
UNCLOS I & II 
The Philippines attempted to advance the topic of straight baselines for 
archipelagos (archipelagic concept) for debate in UNCLOS I and II. However, this effort 
was abandoned due to disagreement by the major maritime powers and a general 
absence of any other backing (Batongbacal, 2002: 2).  Johnston (1988: 115) explains the 
specifics of this attempt at UNCLOS I in the following passage20: 
At UNCLOS I the Philippines introduced two alternative versions of a proposal 
for incorporation into the proposed convention: either that the straight baseline 
method, which had been approved by the ICJ21, should be extended to 
DUFKLSHODJRVO\LQJRIIWKHFRDVW³ZKRVHFRPSRQHQWSDUWVDUHVXIILFLHQWO\FORVHWR
one another to form a compact whole, and have been historically considered 
collectively as a single uniW´RUWKDWLVODQGJURXSVZLWKWKRVHFKDUDFWHULVWLFV
³PD\EHWDNHQLQWKHLUWRWDOLW\DQGWKHPHWKRGRIVWUDLJKWEDVHOLQHVPD\EH
DSSOLHGWRGHWHUPLQHWKHLUWHUULWRULDOVHD´,QERWKYHUVLRQVRIWKH3KLOLSSLQH
SURSRVDOLWZDVPDGHFOHDUWKDWWKHEDVHOLQHV³shall be drawn along the coast of 
WKHRXWHUPRVWLVODQGVIROORZLQJWKHJHQHUDOFRQILJXUDWLRQRIWKHDUFKLSHODJR´
Both versions were rejected, and indeed almost ignored. 
In the aftermath of the failure of UNCLOS and an apparent lack of international will to 
address the archipelagic concept, the Philippines enacted Republic Act 3046, An Act to 
Define the Baselines of the Territorial Sea of the Philippines, on June 17, 1961 (Talaie, 
1998: 209).  
                                                     
20
 The quoted passages within are from UN Doc A/CONF.13/C.I/L.98, 1 April 1958 
21
 ICJ refers to the International Court of Justice 
54 
 
Republic Act 3046 (1961) 
Republic Act 3046 was the first piece of domestic legislation enacted by the 
Philippines to define the limits of their territory. This Act established straight baselines 
around the outermost islands of the archipelago, based on the Treaty of Paris (1898) 
limits (RA 3046, Preamble). Moreover, Republic Act 3046 designated all waters within 
these baselines as inland or internal waters (RA 3046, Section 2).  
Republic Act 5446 (1968) 
Republic Act 3406 was amended on September 18, 1968, by the passing of 
Republic Act 5446 (Tangsubkul, 1984: 46). The significant reason for amendment was 
to include Sabah22 (North Borneo) within the Philippine territory as it related to drawing 
the baselines (Santiago, as cited in Tangsubkul, 1984: 46), as the new Republic Act 
5446 (Section 2) clearly stated: 
The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago 
as provided in this Act is without prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of 
the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over 
which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty.  
Presidential Decree 1599 (1978) 
Presidential Decree 1599 came into effect on June 11, 1978, establishing the 
Philippine Economic Exclusive Zone (EEZ): 
There is hereby established a zone to be known as the exclusive economic zone 
of the Philippines. The exclusive economic zone shall extend to a distance of two 
hundred nautical miles beyond and from the baseline from which the territorial 
sea is measured: provided, that, where the outer limits of the zone as thus 
determined overlap the exclusive economic zone of an adjacent or neighbouring 
State, the common boundaries shall be determined by agreement with the State 
                                                     
22
 Sabah is a territory on Borneo Island, today recognized as a Malaysian state which is also claimed by 
the Republic of the Philippines. 
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concerned or in accordance with pertinent generally recognized principles of 
international law on delimitation. (Section 1) 
(http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/PHL_1978_
Decree.pdf) 
UNCLOS Signing Objection (1982) 
The Philippines signed UNCLOS on December 10, 1982 and ratified it on May 
8, 1984 (Garcia, 2005: 55). At the time of signing, as allowed under Article 310, a 
formal declaration was made which explicitly stated that the Philippine signing did not 
impact their views on sovereignty (Appendix C). This declaration, while in line with 
their domestic legislation and Constitution, took a diametrically opposing view to the 
very international convention which the country was signing. Accordingly so, this 
declaration was officially protested by many states.  
This declaration highlighted the precarious position which the Government of 
the Philippines was attempting to maintain. They had negotiated in good faith during the 
course of the UNCLOS process and were unhappy with certain concessions that were 
made by archipelagic states. It has also been recognized as a domestic political 
maneuver; that is, a tool to assist in ensuring ratification by the Philippine legislature 
(Batongbacal, 2005: 6). 
Baseline Legislative Efforts (1987) 
In 1987, the Congress of the Philippines debated legislation (HBN 16085; SBN 
206 ± See Table 2) FRQFHUQLQJWKHWHUULWRU\¶VEDVHOLQHVZKLFKZDVXOWLPDWHO\GHIHDWHG
(Encomienda, 2009: 460). Mr. Alberto A. Encomienda, Secretary-General; Maritime 
and Ocean Affairs Center, Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of the Philippines, 
remarked in a panel discussion on ASLP in 2009:  
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7KDW¶VZK\,FLWHGLQP\SUHVHQWDWLRQWKDWZD\EDFNLQZHOOEHIRUH
UNCLOS came into force, we did attempt to pass legislation in Congress in 
order to get our archipelagic basepoints and baselines to conform to UNCLOS. 
That law did not pass because of political considerations not having to do 
with UNCLOS. [emphasis added] 
The Period of 1990-2008 
The almost twenty year period spanning from 1990 until 2008 produced few 
immediate changes to the status quo of the Philippine position on the archipelagic 
concept. In 1991, Kwaitkowska (1991: 4) noted that in contrast to the Indonesian 
legislation, the Philippine VWDWXWHVDUHQRWHZRUWK\IRUEHLQJWKH³PRVWH[FHVVLYHLQVWDQFH
RIQRQFRPIRUPLW\´ZLWK81&/267KLVZDVGXHWRWKHDEVHQFHRf recognition of 
innocent passage rights within the legislation, owing to the waters being defined as 
internal waters (Kwaitkowska, 1991). Also, one of the baselines contained in Republic 
Act 3046 (1961), even with the amendment by Republic Act 5446 (1968), stretches well 
over 125 nautical miles (NM) which contravenes UNCLOS Article 47(2) which only 
allows archipelagic baselines up to 100 NM, save for three percent which may be 
longer, up to 125 NM (Kwaitkowska, 1991). 
Such was the case of two contradictory positions, even after becoming a 
signatory to the Convention much earlier (1982): 81&/26DQGWKH3KLOLSSLQHV¶
domestic legislation. Indeed, the domestic legislation became more difficult to cling to 
upon UNCLOS entering into force in 1994. Nevertheless, the Republic of the 
Philippines continued to hold to their long standing position. However, the turn of the 
millennium began to see a slow sea change in the Philippines in terms of their maritime 
policy. The following table, Table 2, shows the legislative efforts to amend Philippine 
baseline legislation. 
57 
 
Table 2: Proposed Legislation to Amend Philippine Baselines23 
 
As this table demonstrates, it took fourteen years for legislators to choose to make a 
second attempt to amend the existing baselines. This attempt in 2001 was solely made in 
the lower house, the first bicameral joint effort since 1987 not occurring until 2007. 
Encomienda (2009: 460) explains why there was such a long delay, looking to the 
events that happened during the 1987 debate: 
It was a very bitterly fought, contested proceeding, such that there was no 
attempt again until about five years ago to have another run at getting legislation. 
Now, it is nearly five years in the making. It has passed the lower house of 
Congress, but it has yet to go to the Senate. 
Republic Act 9522 (2009) 
These proposed legislative pieces became Republic Act 9522, which was passed 
on March 10, 2009, formally legislating the archipelagic baselines of the Republic of the 
Philippines (Section 1). These baselines are straight baselines and bring the Philippine 
                                                     
23
 6RXUFH%HQVXUWR-U+HQU\6³$UFKLSHODJLF3KLOLSSLQHV$4XHVWLRQRI3ROLF\DQG/DZ´&RQIHUHQFH
Presentation. (2012), Slide 17.  
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baseline system into UNCLOS compliance (Cay, 2010: 55). This legislation further 
FODLPVWZRVHSDUDWH³Regime of Islands´ as governed by UNCLOS Article 121; the 
Scarborough Shoal and the Philippine Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) (Section 2).24 
Additionally, 5$LQVWUXFWVIRULWVHOIDQGDOOEDVHOLQHVDQGPDSVWREH³GHSRVLWHG
DQGUHJLVWHUHGZLWKWKH6HFUHWDU\*HQHUDORIWKH8QLWHG1DWLRQV´6HFWLRQ/DVWO\5$
9522 amends all pre-H[LVWLQJ³ODZVGHFUHHVH[HFXWLYHRUGHUVUXOHVDQGLVVXDQFHV´HJ
Republic Act 3406, Republic Act 5446), to ensure uniformity with this Act (Section 8.).  
There was significant opposition to the passage of RA 9522 within the 
Philippines. Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago opposed this legislation in the belief that 
³LIWKH3KLOLSSLQHVGeclares itself an archipelagic state, the declaration would contradict 
the Treaty of Paris which sets out the boundaries of the Philippine national territory, 
which are wider than those allowed by the LOSC [LaZRIWKH6HD&RQYHQWLRQ@´
(Bautista, 2010: 117).  
Furthermore, Santiago argued: 
If the Philippines declares itself an archipelagic state, our zone of sovereignty 
would collapse. Our internal waters would become archipelagic waters where the 
ships of all states will enjoy the right of innocent passage. In addition, foreign 
states would have the right of so-called archipelagic sea lane passage.  Ships of 
all states would have the right of passage and their aircraft would have the right 
of over flight (Santiago, 2009, as quoted in Bautista, 2010: 117). 
Additionally, opposition appeared as a case against the Republic of the 
Philippines Government, brought to the Supreme Court of the Philippines (Bensurto Jr., 
2012: Slide 22). G.R. No. 187167 (Prof. Merlin Magallona, et al v. Eduardo Ermita, et 
                                                     
24
 UNCLOS Article 121 defines an Island and affords Islands rightful claim over their own Territorial 
Seas, Contiguous Zone, EEZ and Continental Shelf as outlined by UNCLOS. The KIG is formally defined 
in Presidential Decree 1596. 
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al) was filed by two law professors (one also being a Representative) and thirty-seven 
University of the Philippines College of Law students. The petitioners claimed that RA 
ZDVXQFRQVWLWXWLRQDOEHFDXVHLW³GLVPHPEHUVa large portion of the national 
WHUULWRU\´*51R'HFLVLRQ 
The Supreme Court dismissed the case in a unanimous ruling on July 16, 2011 
(ibid). Associate Justice Carpio in his decision noted several key points, the first of 
which was that the passing of RA 9522 had in fact increased the size of the Philippine 
maritime area (Figure 5), as shown in the following table: 
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         Table 3: Maritime Area of the Republic of the Philippines25 
 Extent of maritime area using 
RA 3046, as amended, taking 
LQWRDFFRXQWWKH7UHDW\RI3DULV¶
delimitation (in square nautical 
miles) 
Extent of maritime area using 
RA 9522, taking into account 
UNCLOS III (in square nautical 
miles) 
Internal or 
archipelagic waters 
  
166,858 
  
171,435 
  
Territorial Sea 
  
274,136 
  
32,106 
  
Exclusive Economic 
Zone 
  
  
  
  
382,669 
TOTAL 440,994 586,210 
 
 
                                                     
25
 Source: G.R. No. 187167 (Prof. Merlin Magallona, et al. v. Eduardo Ermita, et. al.) Decision 
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6HFRQGO\$VVRFLDWH-XVWLFH&DUSLRLQUHMHFWLQJWKHSHWLWLRQHUV¶DUJXPHQWV
against Article 2 (RA9522), writes: 
In fact, the demarcation of the baselines enables the Philippines to delimit its 
exclusive economic zone, reserving solely to the Philippines the exploitation of 
all living and non-living resources within such zone. Such a maritime delineation 
binds the international community since the delineation is in strict observance of 
UNCLOS III. If the maritime delineation is contrary to UNCLOS III, the 
international community will of course reject it and will refuse to be bound by it. 
UNCLOS III favors States with a long coastline like the Philippines. UNCLOS 
III creates a sui generis maritime space ± the exclusive economic zone ± in 
waters previously part of the high seas. UNCLOS III grants new rights to coastal 
states to exclusively exploit the resources found within this zone up to 200 
nautical miles. UNCLOS III, however, preserves the traditional freedom of 
navigation of other states that attached to this zone beyond the territorial sea 
before UNCLOS III (G.R. No. 187167 Decision). 
Lastly, in concluding, Associate Justice Carpio offers the following explanation 
of the true merit of RA 9522: 
Absent an UNCLOS III compliant baselines law, an archipelagic state like the 
Philippines will find itself devoid of internationally acceptable baselines from 
where the breadth of its maritime zones and continental shelf is measured. This 
is recipe for a two-fronted disaster: first, it sends an open invitation to the 
seafaring powers to freely enter and exploit the resources in the waters and 
submarine areas around our archipelago; and secondLWZHDNHQVWKHFRXQWU\¶V
case in any international dispute over Philippine maritime space. These are 
consequences Congress wisely avoided. 
The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine 
archipelago and adjacent areas, as embodied in RA 9522, allows an 
internationally-recognized GHOLPLWDWLRQRIWKHEUHDGWKRIWKH3KLOLSSLQHV¶
maritime zones and continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step on 
the part of the Philippines in safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the 
Constitution and our national interest (G.R. No. 187167 Decision). 
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3.3 THE MATTER OF PHILIPPINE ASLs 
1997 ASL Proposal 
In 1997, the Institute of International Legal Studies at the University of the 
Philippines released its maiden publication in its Ocean Law and Policy Series. This 
publication eQWLWOHG³Issue Focus: Designation RI6HD/DQHVLQWKH3KLOLSSLQHV´ offers an 
in-depth look at a probable ASL submission.26As illustrated by Figure 7, this publication 
proposed two ASLs for the Republic of the Philippines.  
These two lanes, one east-west and one north-south, are described by the author 
as follows: 
The East-West will traverse from Balabac Strait to Sulu Sea Junction going 
through Bohol Sea between Northern Mindanao and Southern Negros Islands 
and the Bohol Islands then through Surigao Strait going through Pacific Ocean. 
The North-South route is from Celebes Sea going through Sibuto Passage 
between Sibuto Island and Simunol Island, Bongao passing through the Sulu Sea 
to Mindoro Strait into the South China Sea (Manansala, 1997: 7, as quoted in 
Palma, 2009: 7; Cay, 2010: 59). 
Additionally, a separate author of a different chapter in this text outlines factors 
for consideration by the Philippines, should they indicate a desire to make an ASL 
designation and thus, submission (Feir, 1997: 12-14, as quoted in Palma, 2009: 9; Cay, 
2010: 59)27: 
 
                                                     
26
 During the course of my literature review, I was unable to obtain a copy of this publication. Efforts 
ZHUHPDGHWKURXJK83(,¶V5REHUWVRQ/LEUDU\WKHLQWHU-library loan system and also the Library of 
Congress. Palma (2009) and Cay (2010) both make specific reference to the ASL proposal from this 
publication in their respective works. 
27
 :KLOH3DOPDDQG&D\ERWKFLWH)HLU¶VOLVWQHLWKHUDXWKRUFKRVHWRH[SODLQRXWRUGLUHFWO\HODERUDWHXSon 
LW3DOPDRQO\UHSURGXFHV)HLU¶VOLVWZKLOH&D\VSHDNVWRWKHPHULWVRI0DQDQVDOD¶VWZRSURSRVHG$6/V
DVH[SODLQHGDERYHYDOLGDWHGDJDLQVW&D\¶VRZQFULWHULDRI/HJDO,VVXHV(QYLURQPHQWDO,VVXHVDQG
Major Security Issues (pp. 59-65).  
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x the effectiveness of the government to monitor the sea lanes; 
x security of the country; 
x measures to ensure safe, expeditious and continuous passage; 
x fisheries and marine environment; 
x inter-island shipping; and  
x the possible connection with the Indonesian established ASLP. 
3.4 DOMESTIC LEGISLATION TO ESTABLISH PHILIPPINE ASLs 
House Bill No. 4153, tabled by Speaker Feliciano Belmonte Jr., was filed in the 
Philippine House of Representatives on February 8, 2011 (Congress of the 
Philippines).  It was referred to the House Foreign Affairs Committee on February 
15, 2011; the committee reported back in June of that year recommending to 
³DSSURYHZLWKRXWDPHQGPHQW´&RQJUHVVRIWKH3KLOLSSLQHV). The Bill was 
approved on January 24, 2012, receiving unanimous support (189-0) (Congress of 
the Philippines). The approved House Bill No. 4153 was sent to the Senate for 
consideration on January 26, 2012, and was referred to the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee (January 31, 2012) (Congress of the Philippines).28 
However, the Senate were also working on an identical proposed piece of 
legislation.  
Senate Bill No. 2738 was tabled E\6HQDWRU$QWRQLR³6RQQ\´)7ULOODQHV
IV on March 10, 2011, roughly one month after House Bill No. 4153 was filed in 
                                                     
28
 While tabled by Speaker Belmonte Jr., the Philippine Congress allows Representatives to sign upon 
bills as co-DXWKRUVZLWKWKHSULQFLSDODXWKRU¶VSHUPLVVLRQ)RUDIXOOOLVWRIWKHILIW\-one Representatives 
credited with co-DXWKRUVKLS6HH/RUHOHL9&DVWLOOR³+RXse Approves Establishment of Archipelagic 
6HD/DQHV´&RQJUHVVRIWKH3KLOLSSLQHV-DQXDU\ 
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the Lower House (Senate of the Philippines). The Senate Bill (No. 2738) was 
referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 14, 2011, where it 
was joined by the House Bill (No. 4153) more than ten months later (Senate of the 
Philippines). Senator Trillanes identified the purpose of his proposed legislation as 
being to define the maritime boundaries of the Philippines as outlined by criteria 
set forth in UNCLOS (Manila Standard Times, April 4, 2011). The same media 
report featured comments by Palawan Rep. (House of Representatives) Antonio 
$OYDUH]ZKRLVDJDLQVWWKHELOOFLWLQJD³«FRPSURPLVH>RI@QDWLRQDOVHFXULW\DV
the Armed Forces ha[ve] no naval or aerial capability to protect WKHFRXQWU\¶V
VRYHUHLJQW\´Manila Standard Times). I believe it is conceivable that Alvarez is 
geographically sensitive, given the close proximity of Palawan to the Spratly 
Islands, eighteen kilometers to the north (Manila Standard Times). Also, it should 
be noted that two of the three proposed ASLs exit Philippine waters on either end 
of the island of Palawan. 
Further opposition from Palawan on these bills came in the fall of 2011, as the 
Palawan Council for Sustainable Development passed a resolution against the proposed 
legislation (Inquirer Southern Luzon, September 19, 2011). This resolution was further 
enhanced as it was signed by Palawan provincial governor Abraham Mitra on 
6HSWHPEHU,QPHGLDUHSRUWV0LWUDZDVTXRWHGDVVWDWLQJ³:H¶UHDIUDLGLWV
provisions will not be binding to foreign vessels and might prejudice small fishermen, 
open our seas and the province WRPRUHIRUHLJQLQFXUVLRQV´Inquirer Southern Luzon). 
Further concerns raised in this particular media report included swiftly 
increasing Chinese naval power in the region and breaching the protected marine areas 
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in the area including the Tubbataha Reefs National Marine Park (Inquirer Southern 
Luzon, September 19, 2011). The governor indicated that organized opposition would 
be applied against the Senate since the House was fully expecteGWRSDVVLWV¶ELOOZKLFK
it did). He further expressed that Palawan Province would lobby to delay any ASL 
GHVLJQDWLRQVXQWLOWKHQDWLRQDOJRYHUQPHQWFRQVXOWHGZLWKWKH,02³DVWRWKHQHFHVVLW\
propriet\DQGORFDWLRQRIWKH$6/´Inquirer Southern Luzon).  
Given the grave concerns raised by Palawan representatives, the 
gRYHUQRU¶VILQDOVWDWHPHQWFRQFHUQLQJZKDWDPRXQWVWR,02DSSURYDOFDQEH
interpreted as technically correct, but it still very alarming. It appears to be a basic 
contradiction of the concerns of Palawan, aimed at disarming the national 
government, but at what I would consider a much greater cost. This posturing 
illustrates the choice facing the Philippines government as when to initiate 
dialogue with the IMO, the choice which is at the very foundation of this case. 
House Bill No. 4153 and Senate Bill No. 2738 are identical. Short-titled 
the Philippine Archipelagic Sea Lanes Act(s), these propose to amend the existing 
Republic Act 9522, outlining rights and regulations placed upon vessels of any 
flag which are exercising passage rights within Philippine ASLs (The Philippine 
Star, February 3, 2012). The amendments outline the terms of passage rights, in 
practice mirroring the passage rights as outlined under UNCLOS. This legislation 
also includes geographic coordinates to designate the intended ASLs and air routes 
(The Philippine Star).  These Bills propose three ASLs for the Philippine 
archipelago, which are shown in the following figures: Figure 8 (collectively); 
Figure 9 (ASL #1); Figure 10 (ASL #2); Figure 11 (ASL #3):  
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Archipelagic Sea Lane #1 
 
ASL #1 is an east-west lane which spans the Balintang Channel within the 
Luzon Strait, above Luzon Island in the very north of the Philippines, described in the 
proposed legislation as follows (HB 4153: 7): 
The archipelagic sea lane that may be used for exercising the right of 
archipelagic sea lanes passage for sailing from the Philippine Sea to the South 
China Sea or vice versa through the Balintang Channel, is Archipelagic Sea Lane 
,« (Section 11[a]) 
This specific route was not incorporated in the 1997 proposal (section 3.3, 1997 ASL 
Proposal). Nor was any route to the north of the island of Luzon, servicing the Luzon 
Strait, included.  
Archipelagic Sea Lane #2 
 
ASL #2 runs east-west through the heart of the Philippine archipelago, 
interconnecting many different bodies of water, described in the proposed legislation as 
(HB 4153: 8): 
The archipelagic sea lane that may be used for exercising the right of 
archipelagic sea lanes passage for sailing from the Philippine Sea to the South 
China Sea or vice versa through the Surigao Strait, Bohol Sea, Sulu Sea, 
1DVXEDWD&KDQQHODQG%DODEDF6WUDLWLV$UFKLSHODJLF6HD/DQH,,« (Section 
11[b]) 
This lane, ASL #2, appears to match one of the two lanes found in the 1997 ASL 
proposal (section 3.3). While not having specific waypoints for the 1997 lanes, visual 
inspection of the two images (1997; 2011) has convinced this author they are indeed 
identical.  
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This route in particular was identified by critics to have the potential to place 
pressure upon the Tubbataha Reef, a UNESCO World Heritage Site; and the Verde 
Island Passage Marine Corridor, an area of exceptional marine and shorefish 
biodiversity (Encomienda, 2009, as quoted in Cay, 2010: 61). These areas are amongst 
the most fragile and biodiverse marine regions found in the world (Encomienda, quoted 
in Cay). These accusations are refuted by Bensurto Jr., who explicitly expounds: 
The allegation that Tubattaha Reef will be violated and ran over by the proposed 
ASL is not correct. The axis lines actually do not touch the protective zone of 
Tubattaha Reef. The extent of the theoretical 20 M limit beyond which, ships 
traversing the ASL are not allowed to deviate is not a license for ships or the 
ASL to violate the protective zone of Tubattaha Reef. Tubattaha Reef is 
protected by law and the ASL 20m limit for deviation does not repeal or modify 
this particular law. The ASL is by no means a license to disregard the protective 
zone of Tubattaha. On the contrary, ships traversing the ASL are obligated to 
UHVSHFW3KLOLSSLQHODZLQWKLVUHJDUGXQGHUWKH³GXHUHJDUG´SULQFLSOH (2012: 
Slide 50) 
Archipelagic Sea Lane #3 
 
ASL #3 runs north-south down the Philippine archipelago, hugging the easterly 
edge of the Eastern Sulu Sea¶VOHQJWKGHVFULEHGLQ the proposed legislation as (HB 
4153: 8): 
The archipelagic sea lane that may be used for exercising the right of 
archipelagic sea lanes passage for sailing from the Celebes Sea to the South 
China Sea or vice versa through the Basilan Strait, Eastern Sulu Sea and 
0LQGRUR6WUDLWLV$UFKLSHODJLF6HD/DQH,,,« (Section 11[c]) 
 
A variation of this route appears as the second ASL in the 1997 ASL proposal (section 
3.3). The Mindoro Strait leg (between waypoints (G) and (H)) appears identical, after 
which the ASL cuts back into the middle of the Sulu Sea, running predominately 
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straight south and exiting the Philippine territory between Sabah (North Borneo) and the 
western most island of Tawi-Tawi province.  
3.5: PROBABLE REASONING BEHIND DOMESTIC LEGISLATION 
Domestic Political Agendas/Posturing 
Given that elected representatives from two different parties introduced identical 
legislation in the two houses of the Philippine Parliament within weeks of each other, 
there is a probability that this is a case of political gamesmanship. However, this 
possibility seems rather remote given that the House Bill was introduced by the Speaker 
of the House. The Speaker is a member of the governing party and sits on the 
3UHVLGHQW¶V/HJLVODWLYH([HFXWLYHDevelopment Advisory Council (LEDAC) (111th 
LEDAC Meeting Brief).  LEDAC met under the current President for the first time on 
February 28, 2011 (111th LEDAC Meeting Brief7KLVFRXQFLOGULYHVWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶V
legislative agenda, and this first meeting seUYHGWRSUHVHQWWKH3UHVLGHQW¶VOHJLVODtive 
priorities to members (111th LEDAC Meeting Brief). The February 28, 2011 meeting 
presented priority bills which were grouped under five distinct categories. Located under 
WKHKHDGLQJ³Sovereignty, Security, and Rule of /DZ´ were two bills of particular 
interest: The Archipelagic Sea Lane Act and The Act to Define the Maritime Zones of the 
Republic of the Philippines (111th LEDAC Meeting Brief). 
Testing Public Opinion? 
Given the above stated facts, it is possible that this legislation was introduced in 
order to test the will of the people when it comes to the possibility of making a full ASL 
submission to the IMO. Since both the government and opposition members were quick 
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to table something during the same session of Parliament, both sides could be interested 
in gauging public interest in this divisive issue. However, since it is on the Presidential 
priority legislative agenda, this seems like an unlikely political maneuver by the 
opposition.  
Advancing the ASL Submission Process 
The probable reason for this domestic legislation, supported by strong evidence, is the 
intention of the Republic of the Philippines to move forward towards ASL designation. 
The Office of the President and Philippine lawmakers have collaborated to advance the 
ASL submission process by tabling the identical bills. This is a distinct possibility as the 
3KLOLSSLQH6HQDWHZHEVLWHQRWHV³0DMRUOHJLVODWLRQLVRIWHQLQWURGXFHGLQERWKKRXVHVLQ
the form of companion (identical) bills, the purpose of which is to speed up the 
legislative process by encouraging both chambers to consider the measure 
VLPXOWDQHRXVO\´6HQDWHRIWKH3KLOLSSLQHV$GGLWLRQDOly, this tactic is noted to 
³GUDPDWL]HWKHLPSRUWDQFHRUXUJHQF\RIWKHLVVXHDQGVKRZEURDGVXSSRUW for the 
OHJLVODWLRQ´6HQDWHRIWKH3KLOLSSLQHV). 
The very fact that the Speaker of the Lower House and a prominent Senator were 
the two legislators to bring these bills forward could, in fact, mean that these bills are 
companions. Senator Trillanes does not sit on LEDAC, and is a member of an 
opposition party. However, none of my research to date has indicated explicitly that 
these pieces of legislation are companion bills. Notwithstanding this fact, none of my 
research has explicitly indicated or proven the opposite to be true. The circumstantial 
evidence would appear to support these bills being companion bills advancing the 
UNCLOS compliance agenda as set forth by the President. 
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What impacts will this course of action have? 
The impacts of the chosen course of action of tabling draft legislation could be 
momentous, and possibly negatively so for the government and people of the 
Philippines. 7KHIRUHPRVWFRQFHUQLQJLPSDFWLVWKHEDVLFHIIHFWRIµWLSSLQJRQH¶VKDQG¶
in relation to any future ASL submission to the IMO. With national legislation on public 
record, the Philippines, in essence, have given the major maritime powers and 
international community a baseline from which to negotiate. Coupled with the fact that 
an official ASL submission has not been formally confirmed as of yet by the Philippine 
government, this gives the international community a significant head start, and I argue, 
further tilts the process against the Philippines before any IMO process even convenes.  
Another probable impact surrounds the ongoing work of the Philippine 
government on a possible ASL submission. The government did establish a working 
group composed of representatives from various departments and agencies. The very 
action of tabling this legislation for debate would seem to circumvent and pre-empt the 
work of this previously struck government working group.  
Additionally, I would question whether a piece of legislation is the proper 
vehicle to advance an issue into the public domain for input, consultation, and comment. 
A piece of legislation is rather static and explicitly defined which, while allowing for 
changes through amendment, is not conducive as a starting point for discussion. I would 
suspect that the Philippine government intends to consult with many stakeholders, 
including but not limited to citizens, other levels of government and various experts in 
the course of designing an ASL submission.  
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Rather than adopt this course of action, this issue could have been introduced by 
the politicians by means of a position paper (white paper, discussion paper). While two 
pieces of legislation are currently at Senate Committee and will have witnesses present, 
such events could have occurred with a position paper as well.  
Table 4: Progress of 2011 ASL Legislation 
Feb. 8, 2011  HB 4153 filed in House of Representatives 
Feb. 15, 2011  HB 4153 referred to House Foreign Affairs Committee 
Feb.  28, 2011  First LEDAC Meeting under President Aquino 
Mar. 10, 2011             SB 2738 introduced to the Senate 
Mar. 14, 2011             SB 2738 referred to Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
Jan. 24, 2012              HB 4153 passes unanimously in House of Representatives 
Jan. 26, 2012              HB 4153 sent to the Senate 
Jan. 31, 2012              HB 4153 referred to Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
Apr. 11, 2012             Start of Scarborough Shoal incident.  
                                    It would continue to escalate throughout the spring. 
Apr. 23, 2012             Notice of meeting for Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
Apr. 27, 2012             Public meeting of Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
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As mentioned earlier, the two pieces of legislation are still before the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee. On April 23, 2012, a notice of meeting was given for the 
Committee to meet on April 27, 2012, to consider three issues: 
1. West Philippines Sea Issues (Bajo de Masinloc and Spratly Islands) 
2. Maritime Zone Bills 
i. SBN 2723, SBN 2737, HBN 4185 
3. Archipelagic Sea Lanes Bills 
i. SBN 2738, HBN 4153 
The meeting was a public hearing that was scheduled to last for three hours. As 
indicated by the meeting notice, the primary issue of concern was the West Philippines 
Sea Issues; Bajo de Masinloc (Scarborough Shoal) and the Spratly Islands. An 
escalating incident with the Chinese at Scarborough Shoal during this time would seem 
to explain the time sensitive scheduling of this Senate Committee. Further, due to the 
overlapping nature of these three agenda issues, one can ascertain the majority of the 
discussion at this meeting dealt specifically with the escalating incident.  
Indeed, The Manila Times from April 27, 2012 featured an article on this 
meeting entitled ³6HQDWHWDFNOHV3DQDWDJGLVSXWH.´ Within the article, Committee Chair 
6HQDWRU/HJDUGDZDVDWWULEXWHGDVVD\LQJ³WKHKHDULQJZLOO focus on the legal and 
SROLWLFDOUHSHUFXVVLRQVDULVLQJIURPWKHLPSDVVH´7KHDUWLFOHIXUWKHUUHSRUWVWKDW
government and private sector officials were invited ³WRSURYLGHLQSXWVDQGXSGDWHVRQ
the steps the country is planning to take to resolve the impaVVH´ 
  
73 
 
3.6: POSSIBLE FACTORS INFLUENCING THE PHILIPPINES ASL PROCESS 
The effect of the Indonesian experience 
The matter of a partial submission is one of the possible main concerns for the 
Philippines around ASL designation and submission. The continued use of non-
designated routes by maritime sWDWHVZLWKLQ,QGRQHVLDLVWKRXJKWWR³HIIHFWLYHO\
TXDUDQWLQH,QGRQHVLD¶VEHKDYLRXU´>UHDGRSSRVLWLRQWRWKHSDUWLDOFRQFHSW@.D\H
17). Such actions do not go unnoticed by the greater international community, including 
other mid-ocean archipelagic states. As I shall discuss as part of a subsequent variable, 
the United States, in particular, chose to take direct maritime and aviation action in a 
government program to emphasize American views on claims they feel are excessive 
and unjustified to which many states are subjected. It certainly must have an impact on 
the minds of policy makers to see Indonesia subject to such actions, even after a long 
and drawn-RXWSDUWLDO³YLFWRU\´  
Republic of the Philippines Comment on IMO Indonesian Process 
The Philippines delegation made two comments when the MSC of the IMO 
approved the GPASLs and the partial Indonesian proposal. The Philippine delegation 
gave notice that it may, in the future, propose amendments to the General Provisions on 
6KLSV¶5RXWing; and it also explicitly stated that the discussions and agreements on the 
GHVLJQDWLRQRI,QGRQHVLDQ¶VDUFKLSHODJLFVHDODQHVVKRXOGH[FOXVLYHO\DSSO\WRWKH
Indonesian archipelagic sea lanes and should not be interpreted as creating a precedent 
for future applications for the designation of archipelagic sea lanes (Beckman, 2007: 
127). 
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The Philippines were clearly concerned with the direction of the process 
considering the Indonesian proposal. The Philippine statement was the chance to 
formally put on the official record their views on this process as individualistic to 
,QGRQHVLD¶VSURSRVDODnd not as a precedent setting direction.  Owing to the fact that the 
issues were decided in inter-sessional meetings between Indonesia and the user states, 
and not in the course of the sanctioned IMO process, the Philippines refused to agree to 
be bound by the results of these negotiations (Batongbacal, 2004: 59). It is unclear as to 
whether the Philippines would be bound by precedence to the IMO process experienced 
by Indonesia. 
IMO Influence 
,QWKHIUDPHZRUNRI³,02,QIOXHQFH´ the biggest concern for the 
Philippines is the possibility of a partial proposal ruling. Given the historical 
context of the operation of user states in the waters within the Philippine 
archipelago, there is a real potential for multiple lanes to be considered before the 
IMO.  
Coquia (as quoted in Kwaitkowska & Agoes, 1991) ruminated that any 
consideration of Philippine straits  as those employed for international navigation 
DVYLHZHGWKURXJK81&/26ZRXOG³«SUDFWLFDOO\RSHQDOOZDWHUVZLWKLQWKH
3KLOLSSLQHDUFKLSHODJR«This would certainly nullify the very concept of the 
archipelagic State.´[emphasis added] 
This analysis has proved very telling albeit in slightly different parameters. 
:KLOH&RTXLD¶VIRUHZDUQLQJLQWKHFRQWH[WRIVWUDLWVIRULQWHUQDWLRQDOQDYLJDWLRQ
did not come to be, the issue of a partial proposal through the IMO presents a very 
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similar and realistic danger for mid-ocean archipelagic states. This danger is that 
there are numerous routes which have been utilized for international navigation 
within the archipelagic waters of the Philippines. Hence, there is a very good 
chance that regardless of the number of routes brought forward in any Philippine 
submission, there will be a multitude of additional possible routes which could be 
advocated for by the larger international community.  
%HQVXUWR-U¶VFRQIHUHQFHSUHVHQWDWLRQSRLQWVZRXOGDSSHDUWRFODULI\WKH
5HSXEOLFRIWKH3KLOLSSLQHV¶SRVLWLRQDQGWKRXJKWprocess concerning the role of the 
IMO in a Philippine designation of ASLs and possible formal submission. He confirms 
that the Philippines will submit their designated ASLs to the IMO (2012, Slide 59). He 
also offers his counter opinion on the subject of domestic ASL designation prior to IMO 
DSSURYDOEHLQJ³SUHPDWXUH´FLWLQJ 
the designation of ASL 1) is not only necessary but it is also urgent for the 
Philippines to protect its security and marine environment; and 2) for which 
reason, the designation of sHDODQHVDVDYDOLGH[HUFLVHRIDVWDWH¶VVXEVWDQWLYH
and inherent right to preserve itself could not be negated by the procedural 
requirement under Article 53.9.29 (2012, Slide 52) 
 
7KHPDLQSRLQWRI%HQVXUWR-U¶VDUJXPHQWLVWKDW81&/26VSHFLILFDOO\$UWicle 
53(9), does not explicitly state that IMO approval must precede the designation of ASLs 
by a mid-ocean archipelagic state (2012, Slide 59) Thus, as argued in a following slide:  
As such, the taking of a different procedure to comply with international law will 
not necessarily give the IMO the authority not to adopt the sea lanes earlier 
designated by an archipelagic state. In the first place, IMO is not empowered to 
approve or disapprove designated sea lanes. Its exact function under Article 53.9 
                                                     
29
 The referred to procedural requirement under UNCLOS Article 53(9) is the IMO adoption of ASLs in 
consultation with the submitting mid-ocean archipelagic state. 
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is spHFLILFDOO\OLPLWHGWR³PD\DGRSWRQO\VXFKVHDODQHVDQGWUDIILFVHSDUDWLRQ
schemes as may be agreed with the archipelagic state.´ (2012, Slide 60) 
Bensurto, Jr. concludes his position (and one must surmise, the Republic of the 
Philippines position concurrently), that the legitimacy of any ASL designation, partial or 
IXOOPXVWPHUHO\SDVVWKHWHVWRI³FRPPDQG>LQJ@UHVSHFWIURPWKH international 
community.´ 
UNCLOS Compliance with Territorial Boundaries 
The history of the Philippines and its boundaries is a complex one. The Republic 
of the Philippines claims successor-state status from the United States as received via 
treaty from Spain (Bautista, 2011: 44). The Republic of the Philippines stakes its claims 
to its territorial boundaries by means of three treaties: the Treaty of Paris (December 10, 
1898), between Spain and the United States; the Treaty of Washington (November 7, 
1900) between the United and Spain; and the Treaty concluded on January 2, 1930 
between the United States and Great Britain (Bautista, 2008, as quoted in Bautista, 
2011: 38). 
Throughout the entire UNCLOS process, the Philippines made repeated attempts 
for acknowledgement and recognition of their international treaty limits under the 
international law principle of historic title (Ingles, 1983, as quoted in Bautista, 2011: 
44). However, due to objectives by the maritime powers, the United States chief among 
them, the Philippine efforts were not successful. Bautista (2011: 35) points out the two 
main reasons why the boundaries are contested in international law, and generally not 
accepted by the greater international community. He first highlights the absolute 
position of Philippines government that their national boundaries are the ones found in 
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the 1898 Treaty of Paris. The second reason is the more contentious fact that the 
Philippines view their waters as internal within these baselines, complete with full 
sovereignty.  
Additionally, prior to RA 9522, some of these baselines were too long and 
collectively covered too large of an area to fit the archipelagic regime under UNCLOS, 
which limits lengths of individual baselines and total water to land ratio at 9:1 (Article 
47(1)). In this situation the Philippines are not alone, as Tsamenyi, Schofield and 
Milligan (2009: 445, as cited in Cay, 2010: 69) point out Cape Verde, the Dominican 
Republic, and the Maldives are also all identified as mid-ocean archipelagic states that 
have enacted baselines which contravene Article 47 of UNCLOS. This, in effect, would 
void the archipelagic waters claimed by the said states, and as such, would not permit 
ASL submission to the IMO. 
An amending of the baselines to bring them into UNCLOS compliance was 
advocated for by Batongbacal in the year prior to the introduction of RA 9522. He 
writes: 
Under  UNCLOS,  the Philippines can enclose even much larger bodies of water  
than  within  the  treaty  limits,  and  place them  under  internationally 
recognized  sovereign  rights  and jurisdictions.  This  includes  sovereignty  over  
archipelagic  waters, which  can  extend  farther  than what  non-archipelagic  
states  are entitled  to.  For  this,  we  need  to define  the  baselines  along  our 
coast  and  then  extend  the  maritime  zones  from  them.  We  can enclose  the  
Sulu  Sea  and  all  inter-island  waters  without  question, even  if  beyond  the  
12  nautical miles from shore. Practically all of the  important  living and  non-
living resources  and  presently  possible uses  of  the  ocean,  from  fishing  to 
petroleum  exploitation,  would  fall within  those  maritime  zones  and our  
control  over  them  would  not  be  subject  to question  so  long  as  we  abide  
by  UNCLOS.    These maritime zones encompass a much greater area than was 
ever included in the International Treaty Limits (2008: 4). 
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BatongEDFDO¶VSDVVLRQDWHDUJXPent raises several valid points, the most predominant of 
which is international recognition and legitimacy of the sovereignty and control over the 
maritime space and marine and seabed resources.  
Batongbacal also reminds readers that such control is conditional based on 
adhering to UNCLOS. He further explains such rights come with a trade-off, the very 
essence of the debate and the compromise found in the previously explained UNCLOS, 
Part IV:  
We are to allow the passage  of  foreign  vessels, including  submarines, through  
those  waters under  certain  conditions, but only as long as they  are  only  
passing through  and  not  making a  call  to  any  port.  If they  do  anything  not 
connected  with  simply passing  through,  then we  have  the  right  to exercise  
our  sovereignty and  jurisdiction (2008: 4). 
UNCLOS Compliance with the Republic of the Philippines Constitution 
At the national level, the Philippines Constitution has undergone a number of 
redrafts and reissues since independence. However, one of the few constants that has 
remained in the document is the archipelagic concept. A useful example is found below 
in the most recent version of the Philippine Constitution: 
1987 Philippines Constitution 
Article 1 
The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the 
islands and waters embraced therein, and all other territories over which 
the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, 
fluvial and aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the 
subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas.   The waters 
around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, 
regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal 
waters of the Philippines.   [emphasis added] 
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The Constitution of the Philippines has long been, and continues to be, non-complaint 
with UNCLOS.30 The archipelagic concept embodied through the definition of national 
territory which includes internal waters, is fully enshrined in law. Internal waters restrict 
DQ\³LQQRFHQWSDVVDJH´ rights and also require pre-notification by all vessels.  
The two opposing viewpoints of this issue are quite divisive for the Philippines. 
A root cause for this division can be traced back to the independence movement itself. 
The government of the newly independent Philippines pursued a very strong nation 
building policy which was very much centered upon the archipelagic concept. The 
unified archipelago of the independent Philippines was championed as a central theme 
which helped to stabilize the state.  
Domestic Public Opinion 
Thus, the people of the PhilippLQHVDUHYHU\KHVLWDQWWR³ORVH´ what they view as 
their internal waters. To subscribe in its entirety to UNCLOS would be to have 
archipelagic waters, not internal waters. Archipelagic waters are still sovereign waters; 
however as explained earlier they have a few conditions to sovereignty attached 
(passage rights). It appears that the collective public conscience and popular opinion are 
very much against this trade off.  
Much like Indonesia, the Philippines has long championed its belief in the 
archipelagic concept, a concept inclusive of the principle of full sovereignty over its 
waters.  Given the long standing fight since independence against numerous state 
                                                     
30
 The United Nations has the 1973 Philippine Constitution on file, rather than the 1987 version. The 
VSHFLILFVHFWLRQRQILOHLVWKHGHILQLWLRQRI³1DWLRQDO7HUULWRU\´DVLOOXVWUDWHGE\$UWLFOH,VXVSHFW
the reason why the previous Constitution (1973) is on file, is that while the Constitution was updated the 
GHILQLWLRQRI³1DWLRQDO7HUULWRU\´KDVORQJUHPDLQHGWKHVDPH 
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parties, the people of the Philippines have yet to warm up to a weakening of their 
perceived sovereignty. This point was further illustrated with formal opposition to the 
passing of RA 9522 (2009) as noted in a previous section.  
Time and Expense for ASL Proposal 
Clearly, should the Philippines choose to submit an ASL proposal to the IMO 
they will want to do it once, and do it right. Given what is at stake, the surveying and 
other preparatory work will be immense. It is clear that the geographic alignment and 
composition of the Philippine archipelago is unique and vastly different from the 
Indonesian archipelago. The Philippines government will want to have a watertight 
proposal and be armed with as much pertinent and relevant data as it can accumulate in 
order to speak to and defend its proposal successfully. There is a need for a strong 
political will to broach the divisive ASL issue, and take action to invest significantly in 
manpower, technology, and expertise in order to best determine the possible routing for 
ASLs. The government of the Philippines has engaged working groups in the past 
surrounding this issue, but this research in unable to confirm if there has been any 
investment in the required technical preparatory work. 
Philippine National Marine Policy (1994) 
In 1994, the Philippines enacted a National Marine Policy (NMP) aimed to 
³H[HUFLVHLWVVWHZDUGVKLSUHVSRQVLELOLWLHVKDUPRQL]HH[LVWLQJODZVDQGRFHDQXVHV
promote coordination among government agencies concerned with the use of maritime 
space and resources, and maximize benefits from utilization of ocean resources within 
VXVWDLQDEOHOLPLWV´&LFLQ-Sain, 2004, as quoted in Garcia, 2005: 14). The NMP 
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championed four core criteria for consideration in all marine policy decisions (Garcia, 
2005: 56): 
x Development planning should take into account the archipelagic 
characteristics of the country. 
x Coastal marine areas are viewed as the locus of community, 
ecology, and resources. 
x Implementation of the LOSC [UNCLOS] must be consistent 
with national interests as prescribed in the NMP.  [emphasis 
added] 
x Concerned and affected sectors actively participate in a 
coordinative and consultative planning and policy-making process 
through the Cabinet Committee on Maritime and Ocean Affairs. 
Garcia reports WKDWWKH103³YLHZV>81&/26@DVDOHJDOUHIRUPDJHQGDDQGDYDOXDEOH
input in defining the geographic scope of thHFRXQWU\¶VRFHDQSROLF\.´ Hence, it would 
seem that the NMP has the opportunity to encourage reformation of the Philippine 
legislation to bring it in line with UNCLOS, and furthermore, clarifying the maritime 
boundaries of the Republic. 
Inter-Island Transport/Domestic Economy 
Batongbacal points out that as of 1997 the Philippines transports up to 98 percent 
of its domestic trade in goods via the marine based inter-island shipping network (1997, 
as quoted in Batongbacal, 2004: 51; 2005: 8). Given the centrifugal characteristic of 
archipelagic states, this figure would represent a significant density of domestic marine 
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shipping traffic in already EXV\ZDWHUV7KLVFKDUDFWHULVWLFLVHQKDQFHGGXHWR6DQWLDJR¶V
already noted observation of the Philippines containing two large centers, these being 
Luzon and Mindanao. 
The Philippine economy is also very reliant on marine industries including 
fishing. As noted by Toganivalu of Fiji at a 1974 UNCLOS III session, archipelagic 
SHRSOHVDUHWKH³IDUPHUVRIWKHVHD´81&/26,,,2IILFLal Records, as quoted in Ghosh, 
1987: 905). The Philippines 2002 Census of Fisheries tallied about 1.8 million 
municipal and commercial fishing operators; within this figure 1.752 million are 
individual, municipal fishers (Garcia, 2005: 27).31  
The historical importance of the inter-island maritime network cannot be 
overstated. Movement of people and goods by water is the key linkage for the Philippine 
archipelago. The maritime mode of transport was, and continues to be, the only viable 
transportation network amongst the islands of the Philippines. Thus, the economy of the 
Philippines is very reliant and possibly vulnerable to disruption of the movement of 
persons and goods on the crowded waters of its archipelago. This fact, coupled with 
potential impact on the commercial and non-commercial domestic fisheries, should 
reinforce the challenge and hazards of ASL designation. 
As a probable benefitting counterpoint, it was highlighted by Tangsubkul and 
Fung-wai (1983: 869) that Indonesia and the Philippines possess the highest ratio of 
water to land in the Southeast Asian region, coupled with the least developed fisheries.  
Based on this, they identified that the adoption of UNCLOS and 200 NM EEZ would 
                                                     
31
 Municipal fisheries refers to vessels less than three gross tons, non-vessel fishing and aquaculture 
activities. 
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allow for a greater prospect of enhancements in fishing gear, techniques, conservation 
methods and industry management (Tangsubkul and Fung-wai, 1983). 
Routing Concerns 
Should the Philippines decide to formulate a submission for consideration; a 
number of factors identified in this chapter will also need to be weighed against the 
routing of any ASLs. It is noted that conceivable ASLs routes would be crossing inter-
island transportation routes, many fishing grounds, as well as large, commercial fishing 
operations (Bateman, 2007: 46). 
Environmental Concern 
The Philippines is known to be a unique eco-system filled with an impressive 
number of marine and coastal species of flora, fauna and habitats. Beckman (2007: 128) 
highlights two areas of great concern to the Philippines in the consideration of 
designating ASLs: the narrow width of the existing sea lanes and the environmental 
hazards to the uniquely bio-diverse marine areas of the archipelago. In a recently 
released report, the United Nations Environmental Programme reported that the 
Philippines are estimated to have 1,170 Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) of various 
scales and governance (UNEP National and Regional Networks of Marine Protected 
Areas: A Review in Progress). 
Tsamenyi and Mfodwo (2001: 37) point out that growing concerns surrounding 
maritime shipping traffic and the impact and risks to the marine environment will in 
their minds lead to additional regulation at all levels, thus further restricting the 
traditional freedoms of navigation. These authors note that such restrictions will likely 
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predominately occur through the efforts of archipelagic and coastal states to project their 
regulatory influence further (literally and figuratively) over their marine areas. 
One idea which was advanced in 1996 by Ambassador Alberto A. Encomienda, 
the Secretary-General of the Maritime and Ocean Affairs Center within the Philippine 
Foreign Affairs Ministry, was to designate the entire Philippines archipelago as a 
Particularly Sensitive Sea Area (PSSA) (The Philippine Star, December 15, 2006; Cay, 
2010: 61). This designation would have forced the IMO to take action to offer special 
protection due to vulnerability to shipping activities.32 The idea of a PSSA designation 
was discussed, but it did not progress from initial discussions as the Philippines has 
shifted its maritime policy towards UNCLOS compliance and ASL designation. 
Regulatory & Enforcement Capacity 
A factor of significance for both the Philippines and the greater international 
community is the Philippine ability to regulate and enforce the ASLs and the attached 
passage rights. This ability is in regard to the access and safe passages of the lanes. 
Furthermore, the waters of the greater Southeast Asian area are an area of greater 
concentration for piracy. Historically, International Maritime Bureau (IMB) figures 
ranging from the mid-1990s to the early years of the new millennium indicated that 
around one half of all maritime piracy acts in those years occurred in Southeast Asian 
waters (Bradford, 2011: 190). More recently, IMB statistics from 2010 place this area 
second only to the Horn of Africa in piracy and armed robbery occurrence, with 
seventy-one recorded cases (Bradford, 2011).  
                                                     
32
 http://www.imo.org/ourwork/environment/pollutionprevention/pssas/Pages/Default.aspx. The IMO 
defines a PSSA as an area that needs special protection through action by IMO because of its significance 
for recognized ecological or socio-economic or scientific reasons and which may be vulnerable to damage 
by international maritime activities. 
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Political Geography of the Philippines  
7KLVH[WHUQDOLQIOXHQFHSROLWLFDOJHRJUDSK\LVDOVRNQRZQDV³JHRSROLWLFV´ a 
term that invokes the idea of the various facets of geography combined with sub-fields 
of political science. Consulting the texts, Cohen (1973: 6) callVSROLWLFDOJHRJUDSK\³WKH
VSDWLDOFRQVHTXHQFHVRIWKHSROLWLFDOSURFHVV´A Dictionary of Geography defines 
SROLWLFDOJHRJUDSK\DV³7KHVWXG\RIVWDWHVWKHLUIURQWLHUVDQGERXQGDULHVWKHLULQWHU- 
and global relations, their contacts and their groupings; the variation of political 
phenomena from place to place, considered with other features of the earth as the home 
RI0DQ´0RQNKRXVH 
The archipelagos of both Indonesia and the Philippines are situated relatively 
close together at the junction of the North Pacific Ocean, the China Seas, and the Indian 
Ocean (Figure 12). This strategic location finds them intersecting many international 
shipping lanes. Ghosh (1987: 905) pointed out that a detour around Indonesia would add 
over three thousand miles to a sea journey. In addition, Amerasinghe (1974: 559) noted 
during the height of UNCLOS III that closure of the Indonesian and Philippine maritime 
areas to international shipping would hamper access between the Indian and Pacific 
oceans, making international maritime shipping more complicated and expensive. The 
close proximity of these archipelagic states to the Asian mainland, India and the Bay of 
Bengal, and Australia guarantees their economic importance will only continue to grow 
as the Asian economy expands and emerges.  
This location also puts Indonesia and the Philippines right in the transit corridors 
of the navies of the world (Figure 13). Additionally, there are strategic concerns for the 
western military powers with many operations occurring on the East African and Middle 
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Eastern area. Indeed, it has been noted that the strategic situation has, in fact, grown and 
intensified in the age of globalization and nuclearization (Chew, 2007: 19). Some 
analysts have also argued that the strategic importance has increased since UNCLOS has 
entered into force (New York Times, May 16, 1996). As identified and discussed by 
Bateman (2007: 47): 
[T]he Philippine archipelago sits astride major shipping routes between the 
Americas and southern China and Southeast Asia, as well as between northern 
Australia and the Lombok Strait and Northeast Asia. The narrowness of some 
straits highlights the potential difficulties in developing axis lines and applying 
the ten per cent rule in UNCLOS Article 53(5). Other international shipping 
routes lie immediately to the north of the Philippines through the Luzon Strait 
between Taiwan and the Philippines, and to the south between Mindanao and 
Indonesia. Parts of these routes pass through Philippine archipelagic waters. 
Physical Geography of the Philippines 
A second external influence tied into geography is the physical geography of the 
Philippines. A Dictionary of Geography (1970) defines physical geography DV³>W@hose 
aspects of [geography] which are concerned with the shape and form of the land-
surface, the configuration, extent and nature of the seas and oceans, the enveloping 
DWPRVSKHUHWKHWKLQOD\HURIWKHVRLODQGWKHµQDWXUDO¶YHJHWDWLRQFRYHU´ 
The marine spatial dimension of physical geography of the Philippines, dealing with the 
condensed concentration of the entire archipelago, is probably the most relevant issue in 
physical geography to this case.  Additionally, a sub-element of physical geography 
deals with the classification and functional purpose of many straits in Philippine waters 
for international navigation (Figure 14). Palma (2009: 7) classifies five key routes of 
international navigation out of the many that run through the Philippine territory33: 
                                                     
33
 3DOPDFODVVLILHVWKH/X]RQ6XULJDRDQG%DODEDFURXWHVDV³FULWLFDOIRUPLOLWDU\DFWLYLWLHV´ZKLOHFLWLQJ
the other areas as areas of international tanker usage. 
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x Luzon Strait-Bashi Channel-Balintang Channel, and Babuyan Channel;  
x Verde Island Passage-San Bernardino Strait;  
x Mindoro Strait-Basilan Strait-Sibutu Passage;  
x Surigao Strait-Balabac Strait; and  
x Balut Channel 
Australia 
Australia is in a unique position of being strategically and economically 
dependent upon the sea lanes through the Southeast Asian archipelagos (Warner, 2000: 
170). Over ninety-five percent RI$XVWUDOLD¶VLQWHUQDWLRQDOLPSRUW volume is via sea; and 
over ninety-nine percent RI$XVWUDOLD¶VFRPPXQLFDWLRQVGDWDWUDIILFLVYLDILEUHRSWLF
submarine cables (Kaye, 2008: 1). Olsen (1996: 18) additionally illustrated the 
importance of Indonesia to Australia identifying that sixty percent of Australian marine 
traffic transits through Indonesia. 
While its fortunes are associated more so with Indonesia, there is still importance 
for Australia in the Philippine archipelago. Australia continues to be engaged in 
Southeast Asia, but still relies on strategic allies such as the United States to assist in 
ensuring that its regional foreign policy interests are best served.34   
The United States of America35 
The United States has long been involved in Southeast Asia, dating back as far 
the Spanish-American War in the late nineteenth century. America in fact, took 
                                                     
34
 The American and Australian governments recently came to an agreement that sees a U.S. military 
presence once again on the continent of Australia. United States Marines are serving in Darwin, Northern 
Australia and indications are the size and capacity of the American contingent will continue to grow. 
35
 6HHHVSHFLDOO\7RPP\.RK³8QLWHG6WDWHVDQG6RXWKHDVW$VLD´The Asia Foundation (2008). 
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possession of the entire Philippine archipelago as an overseas territory under the Treaty 
of Paris in 1898 (CIA World Factbook). They would not relinquish control of the 
Philippines until after the completion of World War II (CIA World Factbook).  
*LYHQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV¶SURORQJHGSHULRGRIFRORQLDOGRPLQDQFe and 
VSHDUKHDGLQJRIWKH$OOLHV¶DFWLRQVLQWKH3DFLILFWheatre during World War II, American 
influence has been quite significant across this region, and specifically in the 
Philippines. The initial relationship after American negotiation with the Spanish is rather 
complicated. The Philippine people had waged resistance to the Spanish, and were 
assured the Americans were looking to free them, just as the Americans had done with 
the Cubans. Thus, once American colonial rule was imposed, a bloody and very bitter 
civil war erupted which the Americans were able to squash. After this initial period, the 
relationship between the Philippines and the United States in the mid-twentieth century 
appears to have been strong. The Americans had returned and liberated the Philippines 
from Japanese occupation. In the post-war period, independence was given to the 
Philippines quite willingly by the Americans. In fact, as Wight (1978: 230) notes, within 
the decolonization period following World War II, with all imperial powers and their 
FRORQLHVRQO\WKH3KLOLSSLQHVUHFHLYHGLQGHSHQGHQFH³JUDQWHGZLWKHQWLUHVSRQWDQHLW\
E\WKHLPSHULDOSRZHU´:KLOHWKLVYLHZLJQRUHVWKDWPDQ\small islands were similarly 
given away, it does illustrate the nature of the colonial relationship between the United 
States of America and the Philippines in the aftermath of World War II.   
With Philippine independence this close connection continued, especially around 
the area of external security. This formalized connection dated back to the eight party 
Southeast Asian Collective Defence Treaty, signed in September 1954 in Manila. 
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Indeed, it was noted around this time WKDWWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVSOD\HGWKH³XQSUHFHGHQWHG
role of maintaining the new buffer zone round the borders of resurgent China, which had 
become the principal Asiatic front in the [C]old [W]ar, and especially of trying to 
strengthen the weak states of South-east Asia, lying between China in the north, India in 
WKHZHVWDQG$XVWUDOLDLQWKHVRXWK´ (Koh, 2008: 39).   As further noted by Tommy Koh: 
Since the end of World War II, Southeast Asia has regarded the United States as 
a security guarantor of the Asia-Pacific and welcomes its forward deployed 
PLOLWDU\SUHVHQFHLQWKHUHJLRQ$PHULFD¶VVHFXULW\SUHVHQFHKDVHQVXUHGWKDW
Southeast Asia has not been dominated by any one power; a core objective of 
U.S. security strategy in the region (2008: 39). 
The maritime mobility afforded to the United States and to its navy would have been 
next to absolute during this period. The central principle around which this U.S. 
maritime power has been built is the autonomy of the high seas, which is known as 
freedom of navigation.  
Historical American Foreign Policy towards the Philippines 
$PHULFD¶V long standing interest in maritime mobility fits nicely into the 
American foreign policy ideology of containment of the U.S.S.R., followed by a focus 
on the Middle East (Iran containment, Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts), and now the 
current foreign policy priority of China and Southeast Asia. This containment method 
allows the U.S. to push out its assets and borders through permanent military 
instillations much closer to the states in question. These instillations allow for 
garrisoned military members and operating or supporting platforms for both naval and 
air assets.  
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Thus, with the continued concentration on the Middle East and Eurasia, the 
waters of the Indonesian and Philippine archipelagos are vastly strategic areas of 
potential operation for the United States. The Americans had long maintained bases in 
the Philippines, the most important of them being Clark Air Force Base and Subic Bay 
Naval Base, and had taken sole responsibility for external security of the Philippines 
throughout its independent history (Storey, 1999).  These bases were also important to 
the Philippine economy, being the second largest employer in country, trailing only the 
government (Royle, 2001: 144). 
The Philippine-American military relationship changed significantly after the 
close of the Cold War (Storey, 1999). Philippine opinion became split once the threat of 
the Cold War had passed as to the necessity of housing American installations and 
personnel.36 As described by Storey (1999): 
In 1991, volcanic ash from the Mount Pinatubo volcano rendered Clark Air 
Force Base unusable, and the United States withdrew. Although the United 
States military wanted to continue to use Subic Bay, the Philippine Senate voted 
to terminate the U.S. lease over the bases in September 1991. Washington chose 
not to re-negotiate the treaty as the closure of the bases fitted in with plans to 
"down-size" U.S. forces in the region following the end of the Cold War. In 
September 1992, the Americans handed over Subic Bay to the Philippine 
Government, and two months later, the last U.S. military personnel left the 
Philippines. 
U.S. Position on Treaty of Paris/Philippine Baselines 
The United States never supported the Philippine efforts to have the baselines as 
defined under the Treaty of Paris (1898) recognized by the international community. 
Following the declaration made by the Philippines in 1986 upon signing UNCLOS, 
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 6WRUH\,DQ³&UHHSLQJ$VVHUWLYHQHVV&KLQDWKH3KLOLSSLQHVDQGWKH6RXWK&KLQD6HD'LVSXWH´
Contemporary Southeast Asia. Vol. 21. No. 1. (1999). Page unknown. 
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which reaffirmed their expanded baselines, the U.S. made their own responsive 
statement:  
The Government of the United States does not share its view concerning the 
proper interpretation of the provisions of those treaties, as they relate to the 
rights of the Philippines in the waters surrounding the Philippine Islands. 
The Government of the United States continues to be of the opinion that 
neither those treaties, nor subsequent practice, has conferred upon the United 
States, nor upon the Republic of the Philippines as successor to the United 
States, greater rights in the waters surrounding the Philippine Islands than 
are otherwise recognized in customary international law. (Roach and Smith, 
1996: 221, as quoted in Bautista, 2010: 122) 
UNCLOS & Non-Signing 
In the course of the UNCLOS negotiations, the major maritime powers (U.S., 
U.S.S.R. and U.K.) were very hesitant to yield any ground around the issue of mid-
ocean archipelagic states. As previously mentioned, the most contentious issue 
surrounded the achievable balance between the long entrenched international law 
position of freedom of navigation by user states over the waters in question, against the 
DUFKLSHODJLFVWDWHV¶SRVLWLRQRIUHVWULFWLYHDFFHVVDQGLncreased sovereignty by 
themselves.  
The reservations of the maritime powers were stated from the beginning of the 
process. The United States made their position explicitly clear in a 1958 press release: 
If you lump islands into an archipelago and utilize a straight baseline system 
connecting the outermost points of such islands and then draw a twelve-mile 
area around the entire archipelago, you unilaterally attempt to convert 
into territorial waters or possibly even internal waters vast areas of the 
high seas formerly freely used for centuries by the ships of all countries. 
[emphasis added] (Dubner, 1976: 41) 
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In the early 1980s, Mr. Elliot Richardson (Special Representative of the President 
for the Law of the Sea Convention and head of the U.S. delegation to UNCLOS III), 
outlined the five main naval interests for the U.S. (Booth, 1985: 63-67): 
x Limiting the expansion of the territorial sea  
x Maintaining passage through straits  
x Maintaining passage through archipelagic seas  
x Maintaining traditional rights in the areas covered by the new EEZs  
x Creation of a carefully balanced and compulsory system of dispute settlement 
It is important to also point out once again that the contention around this 
balance was hinged on the impact on the military and governmental vessels of the 
maritime powers. In the course of UNCLOS negotiations, the foreign policy interests of 
military freedom of maneuverability were very much front of mind, rather than any 
considerations around trans-national shipping.37 However, as noted in the previous 
chapter, a compromise was struck and Part IV of UNCLOS mandating archipelagic 
regimes became a reality. Nonetheless, as forcefully stated by Galdorisi (1997: 144), 
³3UHVHUYDWLRQRIWKHULJKWVRIQDYLJDWLRQDQGRYHUIOLJKWIRU86PLOLWDU\VKLSVDQG 
aircraft, other U.S. flagged craft, and other U.S. owned ships and aircraft has always 
been a top priority ± if not the top priority ± RI8QLWHG6WDWHVRFHDQVSROLF\´ 
It is also timely now to note that the United States has yet to sign on to the Law 
of the Sea Convention. While their refusal specifically centers on the part which deals 
with sea-bed mining, they also do have noted reservations around aspects of the 
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 While strategic considerations were a priority in relation to foreign policy, the issue of shipping access 
was still important and often referenced. See Hollick (1981), U.S. Foreign Policy and the Law of the Sea. 
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archipelagic regime including certain states baselines and maritime claims. The refusal 
to sign, which dates back to the Reagan administration, may have, in recent years, come 
closer to ending. The administrations of both George W. Bush (Bellinger III, 2006: 4) 
and Barack Obama (Bower and Poling, 2012: 1) have voiced their desire to see 
Congress vote to support the signing of UNCLOS.  
$VQRWHGE\%HOOLQJHU,,,³$VWKHQDWLRQZLWKWKHZRUOG¶VODUJHVWQDY\
an extensive coastline and a continental shelf with enormous oil and gas reserves, and 
substantial commercial shipping interests, the United States certainly has much more to 
JDLQWKDQORVHIURPMRLQLQJWKH/DZRIWKH6HD&RQYHQWLRQ´3URIHVVRUJohn Norton 
Moore, an American Law of the SHDH[SHUWDWWKH8QLYHUVLW\RI9LUJLQLD¶V&HQWHUIRU
Oceans Law and Policy, believes that UNCLOS is at its core a product of U.S. national 
interests and highlights three key reasons for continual U.S. observance of UNCLOS: 
³UHVWRULQJ86RFHDQVOHDGHUVKLSSURWHFWLQJ86RFHDQVLQWHUHVWVDQGHQKDQFLQJ86
foreign polLF\´0LKHYD-Natova, 2005: 29). However, regardless of the official position 
of the U.S. and the status of its signing, it is still in good faith adhering to the principles 
of UNCLOS. This is not likely to change into the future, nor will their expectation that 
the Republic of the Philippines will submit an ASL proposal for consideration at some 
point.  
FON Program 
As noted previously, the UNCLOS process was an exercise in agreement 
through consensus, thus allowing the maritime powers to veto any measures not suiting 
them. The United States did exactly this when faced with the issue of the maritime 
boundaries of the Republic of the Philippines, one which was founded in the 1898 
94 
 
Treaty of Paris and, as discussed earlier, advanced under the grounds of historic title 
(Van Dyke, 1985, as quoted in Bautista, 2011: 44). This disapproval of the Philippine 
proposal removed it from the discussion and scuttled any chance of the wider 
international acceptance that was sought.  However, this is not the only method to which 
the United States has resorted to in order to show their displeasure or contrary view to 
DQRWKHUVWDWH¶VSRVLWLRQ 
The United States Navy acting with direction from the Defense Department and 
the State Department began a formalized program termed Freedom of Navigation in 
1979. The U.S. State Department website 
(http://www.state.gov/e/oes/ocns/opa/maritimesecurity/) states the following explanation 
for the FON Program: 
U.S. policy since 1983 provides that the United States will exercise and 
assert its navigation and overflight rights and freedoms on a worldwide basis 
in a manner that is consistent with the balance of interests reflected in the 
Law of the Sea (LOS) Convention. The United States will not, however, 
acquiesce in unilateral acts of other states designed to restrict the rights and 
freedoms of the international community in navigation and overflight and 
other related high seas uses. The FON Program since 1979 has highlighted 
the navigation provisions of the LOS Convention to further the recognition 
of the vital national need to protect maritime rights throughout the world. 
The FON Program operates on a triple track, involving not only diplomatic 
representations and operational assertions by U.S. military units, but also 
bilateral and multilateral consultations with other governments in an effort to 
promote maritime stability and consistency with international law, stressing 
the need for and obligation of all states to adhere to the customary 
international law rules and practices reflected in the LOS Convention. 
 
For an explanation on the inner-workings of the program, we turn to Greene 
(1992), himself a serving U.S. Naval Officer at the time:  
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Each year the State Department prepares a target list of those nations 
making excessive territorial sea claims and confers with the U.S. Navy 
about which nations on the list will be subject to a challenge during that 
operational year. The Navy usually has a free hand in how it will 
implement the program, except where politically sensitive areas (PSA) are 
FRQFHUQHG«LQWKRVHFDVHVWKH6WDWH'HSDrtment requires prior 
coordination. Simply put, this program involves United States military 
assets deliberately encroaching on territory claimed by sovereign states 
which the Americans do not view as legitimate claims under UNCLOS. 
(1992: 14) 
 
While this explanation is now over twenty years old, it sheds some light as to how 
the program was operated. Also, while some slight change in personnel, process 
and policy (politically sensitive areas) is inevitable, the shared jurisdictional 
design, and checks and balances between the U.S. Department of Defense and 
U.S. State Department have remained. The FON Program is applied to claims 
from many states, including allies, and is vetted through annual report to 
Congress, made by both the United States Navy and the State Department (Kaye, 
2008: 38). 
FON Program Example (Indonesian Bawean Island F-18 Incident) 
In July 2003, it was reported that the American carrier the USS Carl Vinson 
launched five F-VZKLOHLQ,QGRQHVLD¶VDUFKLSHODJLFZDWHUVVRPHNLORPHWUHV
outside of the designated ASL (Far Eastern Economic Review, July 17, 2003). 38 The 
Indonesian Air Force scrambled F-16 fighters to intercept the American aircraft, and the 
incident received significant attention domestically in Indonesia (Bunturo, 2010: 186). 
The incident was further fueled by disagreement over the rights and requirements of the 
Indonesian state and the American vessels and aircraft. Additionally, the Indonesian 
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 This is a brief description of the incident. For a full account, See: Buntoro, 2010: 186-192.  
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government claimed the American F-18s violated international law by means of over 
flight of Bawean Island (Figure 15) (Bunturo, 2010: 191). An article in the Far East 
Economic Review (July 17, 2003) quoted a senior US official who termed the incident 
³QRUPDOIOLJKWRSHUDWLRQV´ In a corresponding report, former Indonesian Ambassador-
at-Large for the Law of the Sea, Hasjim Djalal indicated the Americans had not broken 
any international laws, due to ,QGRQHVLD¶Vpartial ASL submission and designation, and 
lack of east-west sea lanes (The Jakarta Post, July 7, 2003). Given the stated facts of 
this incident and the American response, it is clear that this was a deliberate action that 
was carried out under the FON program. 
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FON Program and the Philippines 
 
Table 5: US FON Operations (Philippines) ± 1997-201139 
 
                                                     
39
 All data taken directly from US Department of Defense ± Freedom of Navigation Program Operational 
Assertions.  
 
Fiscal 
Year1 
Multiple Operations (X) 
[Figure if Given] 
Excessive Maritime Claim Challenged 
1997 X [47] Excessive straight baselines; claims archipelagic waters as internal waters 
1998 X [32] Excessive straight baselines; claims archipelagic waters as internal waters 
1999 X [34] Excessive straight baselines; claims archipelagic waters as internal waters 
2000 X [28] Excessive straight baselines 
2000-2003 X Excessive straight baselines; claims archipelagic waters as internal waters 
2004 X Excessive straight baselines; claims archipelagic waters as internal waters 
2005 X Excessive straight baselines; claims archipelagic waters as internal waters 
2006 X Excessive straight baselines; claims archipelagic waters as internal waters 
2007 X Claim of archipelagic waters as internal waters 
2008 X Excessive archipelagic baselines 
2009 X Excessive archipelagic baselines 
2010 X Excessive archipelagic baselines 
2011    [0] No Philippine FON operations 
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The data contained in the table reveal a few interesting trends and facts 
surrounding the U.S. FON program as it relates to the Philippines. While there have not 
been flashpoint incidents receiving international attention like the Indonesian examples, 
there is a clear trend of FON operations directed at the Philippines happening in 
significant numbers. The Philippine maritime claims specifically targeted by the FON 
program over these years are the archipelagic baselines and the Philippine interpretation 
concerning the sovereignty of their archipelagic waters. 
For the first year of data reported in Table 5 (Fiscal Year 1997), the United 
States military conducted an operational assertion through Philippine claimed waters at 
an average of close to one transit per week (forty-seven occurrences). As stated in the 
FON reports, these transits were carried out under the respective right of innocent 
passage, transit passage or high seas freedom. The three successive years in which 
figures were obtained, show a slight decrease from FY 1997, but a rather constant level 
of roughly thirty operational assertions a year.  
Unfortunately, the change in reporting method in FY 2000 halted the disclosure 
of the specific number of operations. The FY 2000-2003 summary report and 
subsequent years only identify if more than one operation was carried out against the 
respective country in that fiscal year. Thus, this data shows, for ten consecutive years 
(FY 2001-FY 2010) for which no hard data are available, the FON program carried out 
more than one operational assertion against Philippine claims every year until 2010.  
The most interesting and timely discovery in this FON data is that in FY 2011, 
the United States conducted zero FON operational assertions within Philippine claimed 
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territory. This does not mean that the United States has changed its position on 
PhilipSLQHV¶PDULWLPHclaims; the U.S. continues to not recognize these claims. On 
January 14, 2011, then Defense Secretary Robert Gates, during a speaking engagement 
DW.HLR8QLYHUVLW\LQ7RN\RUHPDUNHG³$IXQGDPHQWDOSULQFLSOHRIWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV
virtually sLQFHLWVIRXQGLQJLVIUHHGRPRIQDYLJDWLRQ«:HIHHOYHU\VWURQJO\DQGLWLV
HQVKULQHGLQWKH81/DZRIWKH6HD7UHDW\«>7KLVLV@$QH[DPSOHZKHUHLWZRXOGEH
YHU\GLIILFXOWIRUXVWRFRPSURPLVH´YLD<RXWXEH86'HSDUWPHQWRI6WDWH± East Asia 
& Pacific Media Hub).  
However, for the moment it would seem that larger strategic concerns (i.e. 
China) and the cultivating of a more prosperous and advantageous relationship with the 
Philippines has taken the state off the FON program roster. FY 2012 data was not 
accessible at the time of writing, but it would be interesting to see if this trend has 
continued. Also it is important to note that, with the passing of RA 9522 (2009), the 
Philippines have made their baselines compliant and started on the course of full 
UNCLOS compliance. 
Bradford (2011: 183) states the key strategic aim of American maritime 
RSHUDWLRQVLV³«WRVXVWDLQFUHGLEOHFRPEDWSRZHULQWKH:HVWHUQ3DFLILFDQG$UDELDQ
Gulf/Indian Ocean so as to preclude attempts at interrupting vital sea lines of 
FRPPXQLFDWLRQDQGFRPPHUFH´7KHDFWLRQRIPDLQWDLQLQJVXFKDGHWHUUHQWIRUFHLVD
useful pawn to be wielded and, should the need arise, could also be deployed as a 
proactive or reactionary force. Additionally, as concluded by Bradford:  
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The United States is a resident power in the Indo-Pacific and the free flow of 
commerce to, from, and within that region is vital to the prosperity of Asia, 
the United States and the world. Therefore, the United States has clearly 
established its commitment to sustaining safe and secure sea lanes open to 
all. (2011: 203) 
Concluding Thought 
The Southeast Asian area is a fast developing region and expanding on its global 
significance. In 2005, American exports to East Asia were worth $169 billion (Kay, 
2005: 4). The United States will be eager to maintain cordial relations with their allies in 
the area, of which the Philippines are close to top of the list. The two countries share a 
mutual-defence treaty, but the treaty does not elaborate on American assistance in 
contested jurisdictions (Scarborough Shoal, Spartly Islands, etc) (Kay, 2005: 4). The 
Republic of the Philippines is also an officially recognized major non-NATO ally of the 
United States (The Economist, April 28, 2012). This relationship will continue to 
develop and grow, notwithstanding any disagreement around the Philippines and its 
baselines.  
The United States has implemented major shifts in its maritime assets in the 
region in the last number of years moving them closer to Indo-Pacific sea lanes, and the 
U.S. DOD officials have resolved to increase their positions in Southeast Asia into the 
future (Bradford, 2011: 183). A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, the 
2007 released U.S. strategy contained two key statements, highlighted by Bradford, 
which RXWOLQHWKH$PHULFDQ¶VVWUDWHJLFUHOLDQFHRQWKHVHDODQHVRI,QGRQHVLDDQGWKH
Philippines:  
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Credible combat power will be continuously postured in the Western Pacific 
and the Arabian Gulf/Indian Ocean to protect our vital interests, assure our 
friends and allies of our continuing commitment to regional security, and 
deter and dissuade potential adversaries and peer competitors. 
« 
We will not permit conditions under which our maritime forces would be 
impeded from freedom  of  maneuver  and  freedom  of  access,  nor  will  
we  permit an  adversary  to  disrupt  the  global  supply  chain  by  
attempting  to block vital sea-lines of communication and commerce. (2011: 
185) 
Additionally, as the Obama administration enters its second term, the 
American foreign policy focus is further transitioning. This shift, widely reported 
DVD³3LYRWWR$VLD´ has been referred to by Deputy Defense Secretary Ashton B. 
&DUWHUDVD³QHZVWUDWHJLFHUD´YLD<RXWXEH86'HSDUWPHQWRI6WDWH± East Asia 
& Pacific Media Hub). This phrase would appear to be the buzzword for 
rebranding America away from the War of Terror and towards the emerging issues 
in Southeast Asia. As explained by the Deputy Defense Secretary to a press 
roundtable in Tokyo on July 21, 2012, there are two key points which illustrate the 
American efforts to refocus energies towards Asia Pacific: 
All the capacity that has been tied up in Iraq and Afghanistan for the last ten 
years is capacity that we can focus now on Asia-Pacific theatre. That is 
tremendous capacity. Even though our Defense budget is not continuing to grow 
as a consequence of our desire to deal with the deficit issues in the United States. 
In that budget we are shifting the weight of innovation and investment from 
counter-insurgency type warfare to the kinds of capabilities which are most 
relevant to the Asia-Pacific theatre. For both those reasons we have abundant 
resources to make this rebalancing. (via Youtube, US Department of State ± East 
Asia & Pacific Media Hub) 
Hence, with such a regional refocusing underway, America seems attentive in 
efforts to keep Chinese regional hegemonic aspirations thwarted and beyond reach. In 
the face of these efforts, agreeing to politely disagree with the Philippines concerning its 
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maritime claims while reducing direct diplomatic pressure appears to be the current 
thrust of American foreign policy. This decision allows the U.S. to potentially benefit 
regionally in their efforts to improve relationships with allies and strengthen their 
deployed presence of U.S. military personnel.  
Indeed, the Philippines and the United States recently reached an agreement to 
allow the U.S. military to once again have a foothold in the Philippine archipelago. The 
agreement was summarized by a Philippine government official who statHG³WKH86
will not return to the bases they gave up in 1991, but they will be here regularly and are 
welcome here" (The Diplomat, October 16, 2012).  The probable explanation for this 
type of arrangement can be found in comments made in July 2012 by a Philippine 
Presidential spokesperson, rejecting the idea of the U.S. military re-establishing bases on 
Philippine soil due to such actions violating the Philippine Constitution (ABS-CBN 
News, July 18, 2012).   
The direction of American foreign policy and attitude is further reinforced when 
taking the Philippine case into consideration. The United States are aware of the status 
and progress of the ASL submission issue within the Philippines. Accordingly, the 
breathing room afforded the Philippines through the removal of the FON operations is a 
minimal risk as the Philippines struggles with their own foreign policy as it relates to 
possible ASL submission.  
Furthermore, the United States are safe in the knowledge that any ASL 
submission by the Philippines to the IMO will be fully exposed to the IMO process. As 
discussed, this process will significantly influence the Philippine submission, and the 
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process itself is influenced by intervener states, of which the United States is all but 
guaranteed to be one. With respect to the previously explained IMO process, it was 
QRWHGWKDWWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVYLHZV³FRQWLQXLQJDQGSDUWLFLSDWLRQLQWKH,02>DV@RQHNH\
WRHQVXULQJDUHJLPHWKDWSURWHFWV86YLWDOLQWHUHVWV´*DOGRULVL 
7KH3HRSOH¶V5HSXEOLFRI&KLQD 
The Philippines must also carefully weigh where an ASL proposal would fall 
within their existing foreign policy priorities. There are significant disputes in Southeast 
Asia between the various ASEAN countries, as well as China, over contested islands, 
territorial waters, and the continental shelf. The islands themselves are not the main 
prize; rather it is the territorial waters and marine resources (fisheries, natural resources) 
which are the true bounty (Royle, 2001, p. 156). China has largely been the instigator 
(and antagonist) of WKHVHGLVSXWHV'XWWRQLVRIWKHEHOLHIWKDW³&KLQDLV
pursuing three main objectives in the South China Sea and Southeast Asia: regional 
integration, resource control, and enhanced security´ 
The official Chinese position was stated in May 2009 in official correspondence 
WRWKH8QLWHG1DWLRQVZKLFKUHDG³&KLQDKDVLQGLVSXWDEOHVRYHUHLJQW\RYHUWKHLVODQGV
in the South China Sea and the adjacent waters, and enjoys sovereign rights and 
jurisdiction over the relevant ZDWHUVDVZHOODVWKHVHDEHGDQGVXEVRLOWKHUHRI´5DKPDQ
and Tsamenyi, 2010: 328). 
The Chinese policy around the contested South China Sea involves their recently 
well-publicized claim line (identified as a solid red line in Figure 16). This claim line 
was for the first time officially expressed and submitted to an international body on May 
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7, 200940 (Bensurto Jr., 2011: 19). However, Beijing has always been rather vague as to 
its intentions and the depth and specifics of this claim. Dutton (2011: 45) refers to it as 
³DVWXGLHGSROLF\RIDPELJXLW\DERXWWKHOLQH¶VPHDQLQJ´ Dutton goes further in 
LGHQWLI\LQJ³IRXUGRPLQDQWVFKRROVRIWKRXJKW´IRXQGLQ&KLQDUHODWHGWRWKHSROLF\IRU
basing or explaining their claim: sovereign waters, historic waters, island claims, and 
security interests. Having numerous competing strategies being enforced by a wide 
range of government departments, military commands and state agencies further 
magnifies the lack of clarity (The Economist, April 28, 2012). 
Therefore, these strategies are seemingly loosely packaged into Chinese actions 
which lend themselves to a type of creeping jurisdiction. Booth defines creeping 
MXULVGLFWLRQDV³Whe extension of national or international rules and regulations, and 
rights and duties over and under the sea, in straits and coastal zones, on and under the 
VHDEHGDQGLQWKHYDVWVWUHWFKHVRIWKHKLJKVHD´%RRWK:KLOHQRWLQJWKH
Chinese claim line is a static line, it is the state actions within the claim zone where this 
creeping jurisdiction is occurring.41 All four of the schools of thought identified by 
Dutton, are strengthened by the outward expansion of formalized jurisdiction by the 
Chinese state. Hence, it would appear that China has formally pushed out its boundaries 
and are now moving to solidify their holdings within this claim zone prior to 
international scrutiny.  
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 Bensurto Jr. refers to the Chinese claim OLQHDVWKH³GDVKOLQH´+HIXUWKHUGLVWLQJXLVKHVWKDWLQ
WKH&KLQHVHQDWLRQDOLVWJRYHUQPHQWRIWKHGD\LVVXHGDPDSFRQWDLQLQJD³-GRWWHGOLQH´7KLVGRFXPHQW
lends weight to the Historic Waters ideology identified by Dutton. 
41
 Tony Walker refers to Chinese scholars terming the Chinese actions in relation to the Spratly Islands as 
³FUHHSLQJDVVHUWLYHQHVV´6HH³7KH:DWHUV%H\RQG0LVFKLHI5HHI´Financial Times. March 15, 1995. p. 
23. These actions have most certainly continued since 1995, leading to a blending of creeping 
assertiveness aging into creeping jurisdiction in a sense.  
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South China Sea 
 
The entire South China Sea region is filled with overlapping jurisdictional 
claims, contested islands and competing continental shelf submissions (Figure 17). This 
region, which includes the Scarborough Shoal, is claimed in its entirety by China, and 
smaller claims are staked by Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines. The 
background, footing, and standing in international law of each claim are too immense to 
discuss here, and are not required to be distilled for this particular case. It is however, 
important to note for the purposes of this case, that the respective countries contest each 
RWKHU¶VRYHUODSSLQJFODLPV42 Therefore, the dispute is a massive study in its own right, 
the most complex and pending overlapping jurisdictional claim at this point in time, and 
one which I only shall reference to a few specific incidents to illustrate its impact on 
Philippine foreign policy and a possible ASL submission. 
Mischief Reef Incident 
The Mischief Reef (Chinese: Meiji; Philippine: Panganiban) is an atoll, 130 
miles from the island of Palawan, which is part of the Philippines Kalayaan Island 
Group, itself part of the bigger Spratly Islands within the 200 103KLOLSSLQHV¶((=
(Philippines Daily Inquirer, May 2, 2012). The PhilippineV¶FODLPWRthe Kalayaan 
Island Group involved fifty islands within the larger Spratly Islands (Storey, 1999). The 
Chinese military occupied Mischief Reef at some point in the monsoon season in 1994, 
a season in which the Philippine Navy were not engaged in patrolling the region 
(Philippines Daily Inquirer, May 2, 2012).  
                                                     
42
 Bensurto Jr. (2011) notes that the Chinese claim was officially protested by the Philippines, Indonesia, 
Vietnam and Malaysia. 
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The Chinese occupation of the reef first came to Philippine attention after a 
Philippine fishing vessel skipper alerted authorities that he and his crew were 
imprisoned for multiple days by Chinese military forces at Mischief Reef (Makinano, 
1998: 20, as quoted in Storey, 1999). Storey (1999) explains what the Philippines 
discovered upon investigation: 
Reconnaissance aircraft later confirmed the existence of Chinese structures on 
the Reef -- four platforms on stilts, with three to four octagonal bunkers on each 
platform, equipped with satellite communication equipment. Eight Chinese naval 
vessels were also seen near the Reef. 
Facilities that were described initially as four structures were explained by the 
&KLQHVHJRYHUQPHQWDV³VKHOWHUVIRUILVKLQJYHVVHOV´Financial Times, March 15, 
1995). The Philippines protested this intrusion into their EEZ, and attempted to seek a 
resolution to the issue. The Chinese refused to budge, but the two countries signed a 
µ&RGHRI&RQGXFW¶³DLPHGDWSUHYHQWLQJVLPLODULQFLGHQWVRFFXUULQJLQWKHIXWXUHDQG
increasing bilateral co-RSHUDWLRQLQWKH6RXWK&KLQD6HD´6WRUH\ 
The situation remained static until October 1998, when the Philippines released 
³SKRWRJUDSKVRI&KLQHVHYHVVHOVXQORDGLQJFRQVWUXFWLRQPDWHULDOVDWWKHUHHI´6WRUH\
1999). Over the course of the subsequent year, China constructed what one recent 
Pilipino QHZVDUWLFOHFDOOHG³DIRXU-VWRU\PLOLWDU\JDUULVRQ´Philippine Daily Inquirer, 
May 2, 2012). In September 2012, Philippine news sources reported that photographs 
from July 2012 showed significant facilities upgrades had occurred on Mischief Reef 
once more. The article included a photo mosaic (Figure 17) from different years 
VKRZLQJWKHLQFUHDVLQJVWUXFWXUDOIRRWSULQWDQGLGHQWLILHG³DZLQGPLOOVRODUSDQHOVD
FRQFUHWHSODWIRUPVXLWDEOHIRUXVHDVDKHOLSDGDQGDEDVNHWEDOOFRXUW´DVWKHPRVWUHFHQW
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upgrades (The Philippine Star, September 3, 2012). The Mischief Reef continues to be a 
lasting reminder to Manila of what must be perceived as the threatening aspirations of 
China in the South China Sea. Such a background is fortified by the pattern of Chinese 
state actions. 
Reed Bank Incident 
In March 2011, two Chinese patrol boats forced the survey vessel MV Veritas 
Voyager to withdraw from the Reed Bank area; an area within the Philippine EEZ which 
is also claimed by China (Storey, 2011: 7). The Philippine General in charge of the 
region is on record saying the ship was ordered by the Chinese vessels to stop its 
undertakings due to the area being under Chinese jurisdiction (Storey, 2011). The 
Republic of the Philippines lodged an official complaint with the Chinese embassy in 
Manila; responding to this complaint roughly two weeks later a Chinese Foreign 
Ministry spokesperson stated:  
China owns indisputable sovereignty over the [Spratly] Islands and their adjacent 
waters. Oil and gas exploration activities by any country or company in the 
ZDWHUVXQGHU&KLQD¶VMXULVGLFWLRQZLWKRXWSHUPLVVLRQRIWKH&KLQHVHJRYHUQPHQW
FRQVWLWXWHVYLRODWLRQRI&KLQD¶VVRYHUHLJQW\ULJKWVDQGLQWHUHVWVDQGWKXVDUH
illegal and invalid. (as quoted in Storey, 1991) 
ASEAN Proposal  
The Philippines have explored different means to address such regional foreign 
policy episodes. As mentioned, in an effort to limit and resolve Mischief Reef, they 
signed a pact with China. Another example was in September 2011 when the Philippines 
held a regional meeting in Manila with maritime and legal experts from the ASEAN 
States to study a Philippine proposal which, amongst other things, advocates for turning 
WKHFRQWHVWHGLVODQGVLQWRD³]RQHRISHDFHIUHHGRPIULHQGVKLSDQGFRRSHUDWLRQ´
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(Associated Press, as reported in The China Post, September 23, 2011). This proposal 
has been a non-starter, and all sides remain entrenched in their claims. 
Scarborough Shoal Incident 
At the time of writing (January 2013), China and the Philippines are locked into 
a territorial dispute over the Scarborough Shoal (Chinese: Huangyan Island; 
Philippines: Bajo de Masinloc). The Shoal is located within the Philippines 200 NM 
EEZ as set forth in international law. However, it is also within the extensive Chinese 
dotted line, a horseshoe shaped claim over the South China Sea by China. As in Figure 
16, the Chinese claim is illustrated in Figure 18, as the red dotted line, however the 
Philippine EEZ is not shown. 
This dispute escalated in April 2012, when Philippine fishermen discovered 
eight Chinese fishing vessels in these waters which are disputed and claimed by both 
countries. The incident which I will detail below was reported by Foreign Policy (April 
12, 2012) as ³the tensest moment militarily for the Philippines in years´ Additionally, 
the Government of the Republic of the Philippines was quoted as stating to the Chinese 
DPEDVVDGRU³>7KH3KLOLSSLQHVZDV@SUHSDUHGWRVHFXUHLWVVRYHUHLJQWy [in the disputed 
DUHDV@´Foreign Policy, April 12, 2012). 
Upon discovery of the Chinese fishermen and vessels, the Pilipino Navy 
responded to the area, rather swiftly around April 11-12, with a warship and attempted 
to detain the Chinese, under accusations of illegal entry and poaching. (Associated 
Press, April 15, 2012). These efforts were hindered and ultimately prevented by two 
Chinese patrol boats that had also responded. During the course of the standoff, the 
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Chinese fishermen withdrew during the period of April 14-15 (Associated Press). All 
the ships remained in a standoff as both sides were unwilling to withdraw.  
On April 25, 2012, a Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson warned the 
3KLOLSSLQHV³LQWHUQDWLRQDOL]LQJWKLVLVVXHZLOORQO\FRPSOLFDWHDQGPDJQLI\WKH
VLWXDWLRQ«:H>&KLQD@GRQRWZLVKWRVHHWKH3KLOLSSLQHVJHWRWKHUcountries 
LQYROYHGDQGJHWWKHPWRWDNHVLGHVRYHUWKHLVVXH´Agence France-Presse, April 25, 
2012). On April 26, 2012, it was reported that the Philippines were interested in 
bringing the matter before the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) to 
mediate the conflict.43 A spokesman for the Chinese Embassy in Manila was quoted in 
response: 
>7KH6KRDO@LV&KLQD¶VLQKHUHQWWHUULWRU\RQZKLFKZHKDYHVXIILFLHQWOHJDOEDVLV
«>0DQLODVKRXOG@IXOO\UHVSHFW&KLQD¶VRYHUHLJQW\«>7KH3KLOLSSLne 
government must] commit to the consensus we reached on settling the incident 
through friendly diplomatic consultations, and not to complicate or aggravate 
this incident so that peace and stability in that area can be reached. (Philippine 
Daily Inquirer, April 26, 2012) 
In retort to the Chinese comments, a Philippine spokesperson stated concerning the 
,7/26SURFHVV³ZHDUHSUHSDUHGWRGRLWDORQH´Philippine Daily Inquirer). 
Al Jazeera: 101 East ± µ6WDQGRIIDW6FDUERURXJK6KRDO¶ 
The Al Jazeera current affairs news show 101 East aired an episode entitled 
µ6WDQGRIIDW6FDUERURXJK6KRDO¶RQ$XJXVW7KHVKRZUHSRUWHGWKDWWKH&KLQHVH
fishermen were engaged in poaching sharks and collecting rare corals and giant clams. It 
                                                     
43
 In January 2013 the Philippines delivered a Note Verbale to the Chinese indicating that they have 
requested the tribunal, under Article 287, to rule on the validity of the Chinese claim line within the South 
China Sea. The Chinese reiterated their position that the ASEAN countries should solve their disputes and 
not internationalize the issues (even though China is not a member state of ASEAN). 
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further revealed that, after a two month standoff, the Philippine government reported 
that both sides agreed to withdraw their vessels and impose a fishing ban.  
The Al Jazeera presenter chartered a Philippine vessel to take her out to the 
Shoal to investigate the situation. As the vessel approached the Scarborough Shoal, they 
found four Chinese patrol vessels, one of which came upon them and ordered them 
away. When queried by the Al Jazeera chartered vessel why they were being asked to 
leave, the reason radioed back by the Chinese vesVHOZDV³<RXUYHVVHOKDVHQWHUHGWKH
VHDDUHDXQGHUWKHMXULVGLFWLRQRIWKH3HRSOH¶V5HSXEOLFRI&KLQDDQGOHDYHWKHDUHD
LPPHGLDWHO\´7KH&KLQHVHSDWUROYHVVHOVHVFRUWHGWKH$O-D]HHUDFKDUWHG3KLOLSSLQH
vessel a full ten nautical miles away, before turning back. It should be noted that the 
program (101 East) issued an interview request to the Chinese embassy in Manila which 
was declined. 
Finishing Thoughts 
Rahman and Tsamenyi (2010: 329) conclude in their analysis that China is 
coupling longstanding economic and political pressures together with ratcheted up 
militarized pressure against other claimant states and regional interveners such as the 
8QLWHG6WDWHV7KHDXWKRUVYLHZWKHVHDFWLRQVDV³DFRQFHUWHGHIIRUWWREROVWHULWV
>&KLQD¶V@VWUDWHJLFSRVLWLRn in the South China Sea, returning to a trend that had been 
evident since the early 1970s, but which is now enabled by far greater resources and 
military FDSDELOLWLHVWKDQEHIRUH´5DKPDQDQG7VDPHQ\L). The Mischief Reef, Reed 
Bank, and the more recent Scarborough Shoal incidents are all blatant examples of what, 
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from the Philippine perspective, is a very difficult and challenging relationship between 
regional neighbours.  
West Philippine Sea Naming 
Philippine President Benigno Aquino III issued Administrative Order 29, signed 
September 5, 2012, retitling DVWKH:HVW3KLOLSSLQH6HD³WKH/X]RQ6HDDQGWKHZDWHUV
around, within and adjacent to the Kalayaan Island Group, which form parts of Spratlys, 
and Bajo De Masinloc, which is also known as Scarborough Shoal´ This action was 
denounced by both China and Taiwan. A spokesperson for President Aquino III is 
quoted in a newspaper article stating: "We've been calling the EEZ as West Philippine 
Sea so that should not be an area where should be friction among nations²ASEAN. So 
we don't see it as a cause for conflict among ASEAN or our other neighboUV´Sun Star, 
September 12, 2012). 
Hence, with such volatility in the region, the Philippines must determine whether 
they wish to appear to weaken their international relations by ceding their claims on 
internal waters in order to submit an ASL proposal. 
International Public Opinion & Civil Society Actors  
This factor was explicitly identified by Tsamenyi and Mfodwo (2001: 37) who write:  
This [factor] clearly has a long range/long-term character and influences both 
States and international organisations in unpredictable ways. The principal 
conduit for these diffuse pressures is the internationally active non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), with some degree of support from sympathetic 
governments, international organisations and the mass media.  
Whilst most pressure on navigational rules comes from NGOs with an explicit 
maritime agenda (for eg. Greenpeace and WWF) the influence of NGOs active 
in other arenas (eg human rights NGOs, animal welfare NGOs, trade and 
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development NGOs) should not be overlooked as these groups also contribute to 
the overall process of norm change in international law generally.  
An excellent example of this type of pressure is the heightened and generalised 
public concern in all countries with regard to the ecological health of the oceans. 
In legal and political terms this is evidenced in the growing calls for the 
application of the precautionary principle to all uses of the sea. 
It is clear that in the years since the publication of Tsamenyi and Mfodwo this factor 
remains very much in evidence and at play. There is great potential for international 
public opinion and civil-society actors to influence any Philippine submission. 
Meanwhile the situation here remains tense and can degenerate into a regional military 
confrontation.  
3.7: CONCLUSION 
This chapter has identified and introduced the facts of the case of the Republic of the 
Philippines as it relates to UNCLOS. Philippine domestic history around the 
archipelagic concept, with respect to national legislation and actions of the executive 
branch was presented in a timeline and discussed. Additionally, this chapter highlighted 
a 1997 text which presented a case for archipelagic sea lane (ASL) designation in the 
Philippines including two technically thought-out ASLs. This is followed by the most 
important part of the case: the very recent legislative efforts of Philippine lawmakers to 
domestically designate three ASLs. These actions are examined with a specific focus to 
identify possible factors influencing the Republic of the Philippines in this process. 
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Chapter Four: Findings and Analysis 
 
The law of the sea is a dynamic phenomenon. While the words in UNCLOS may 
remain static, their interpretation will change over time 
(Sam Bateman, 2007: 55) 
 
4.1: INTRODUCTION 
%DWHPDQ¶VTXRWHDERYHKLJKOLJKWVWKHVLJQLILFDQWFKDOOHQJHVWKDWVWLOOIDFH81&/26WR
WKLVGD\7KLVµG\QDPLFSKHQRPHQRQ¶LVGHSHQGHQWRQRQH¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQZKLFKDV
Bateman forecasts does not remain static over the long run. Add in domestic and foreign 
agendas around politics and policy, and it becomes easier to see how murky and gray the 
implementation of UNCLOS has been and shall continue to be.  
4.2: SCENARIOS 
The longstanding assumption was that any submission by the Philippines would stand as 
complete due to the density of the archipelago, which severely limits the number of 
possible ASLs; but the possibility of a partial designation and its implications were not 
anticipated (Batongbacal, 2004: 60). Therefore, the findings and analysis will serve to 
illustrate which scenario is most likely to occur. 
There are three envisioned scenarios pertaining to the matter of Philippine ASL 
submission and adoption by the IMO. The first scenario to review would be a decision 
by the Philippines to not go forward with an ASL submission, thus maintaining the 
status quo. In the case of a non-submission, as per the UNCLOS Article 53 (12), 
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freedom of navigation on existing routes would be retained by all VWDWHV³,IDQ
archipelagic state does not designate sea lanes or air routes, the right of archipelagic sea 
lanes passage may be exercised through the routes normally used for international 
QDYLJDWLRQ´ Kaye (2008: 16) notes a non-submission by archipelagic sWDWHV³LVDOVRWKH
most advantageous position for maritime sWDWHVZDQWLQJIUHHGRPRIQDYLJDWLRQ´ 
The second probable scenario is a Philippine submission resulting in a 
partial regime designation by the IMO. Batongbacal (2004: 55) offers the 
following analysis:  
The concept of partial designation may be critically questioned. The idea 
that an ASL designation that does not cover all routes through the 
archipelago is deemed a partial designation, and does not prevent the 
exercise of the ASLP in other undesignated routes, renders the designation 
practically ineffective. No benefit is gained by the archipelagic state in 
making a partial proposal and designation, since all routes not 
designated are still subject to ASLP anyway. A partial designation is 
like no designation at all [emphasis added]. 
The third scenario would be a submission which was fully adopted by the IMO, thus 
giving the Philippines the sole distinction of having a full ASL regime. Beckman (2007: 
129) notes that an advantage gained through ASL designation is the ability to have 
clearly defined routes and to be better able to monitor traffic within these lanes for 
vessel-source pollution. 
4.3: THE FAILURE OF ACHIEVING THE ARCHIPELAGIC CONCEPT 
In weighing all the factors, one vital fact must be strongly considered. There is broad 
agreement amongst scholars that the Philippines were not successful in gaining support 
and recognition of their territorial boundaries ± the very core piece of their internal 
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waters and archipelagic concept (Bautista, 2010: 135). The results of this failure spelled 
out by Batongbacal are clear: 
The Philippines ultimately has no choice but to implement the 
Convention, for non-compliance places it in a far less favourable 
position on account of the non-recognition by foreign nations of any 
action that is inconsistent witKWKH&RQYHQWLRQ¶VUXOHV [emphasis added] 
(Batongbacal, 2001, as quoted in Bautista, 2010: 136). 
%DXWLVWDFRQWLQXHVWRVXSSRUW%DWRQJEDFDO¶VYLHZV, drawing the conclusion 
WKDW³7KHLGHDRIVRYHUHignty carries  a  very  strong  emotional  appeal  to  the  
nationalistic  sentiments  of  Filipinos, or to the people of every nation for that matter. 
However, obstinately holding on to an  idea  which  does not  have  a  secure  basis  in  
international  law  is  more embarrassing to the PKLOLSSLQH*RYHUQPHQW´This point is 
IXUWKHUUHLQIRUFHGE\%DWRQJEDFDOLQDPRUHUHFHQWDUWLFOH+HVWDWHV³7KH,QWHUQDWLRQDO
Treaty Limits are not universally recognized as comprising the full extent of the 
Philippine national territory.  As far as the world is concerned, our territorial waters end 
DWQDXWLFDOPLOHVIURPHDFKLVODQG¶VVKRUHV´ 
4.4: FINDINGS 
Hence, the Philippines find themselves currently in a very difficult position. In order to 
better appreciate this state of affairs, a review of the findings related to the six posed 
research questions is proposed below.  
Research Question #1 
Will the Philippines enact ASLs? 
Bensurto Jr. notes that RA 9522 is the first step of a three step legislative process: the 
other two steps being maritime zone legislation and ASL legislation (2012, Slide 7). 
116 
 
Additionally, this thesis, has already discussed WKHIDFWWKDWWKH3KLOLSSLQH3UHVLGHQW¶V
priorities as acknowledged through his LEDAC committee include proposed legislation 
for both maritime zones and ASLs. Indeed, the bills for these remaining steps 
highlighted by Bensurto Jr., the legislating of maritime zones and ASLs, prioritized by 
the President, are currently (February 2013) before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee as highlighted in Chapter Two.44  
The evidence found in the research data seems to suggest that the Republic of the 
Philippines will move forward to enact ASLs. The twin bills from both Houses, 
HQGRUVHGDQGDPRQJVWWKH3UHVLGHQW¶VSULRULWLHVVKow that the Philippine Government is 
indeed on course. However, it is impossible to say with absolute certainty that these bills 
will pass, and that the designation of ASLs will overcome all obstacles to become 
Philippine law.  
While enacting domestically legislated ASLs can be considered a step forward, 
XQGHUWKHWHUPVRI81&/26DQ\$6/VPXVWEHVHQWRQWRWKHµFRPSHWHQWLQWHUQDWLRQDO
RUJDQL]DWLRQ¶WKDWEHLQJWKH,02IRUDGRSWLRQ7KHUHVHDUFKGDWDVXJJHVWVWKDWWKH
Philippines do intend to forward their domestically approved ASLs to the IMO.  
Research Question #2 
How specifically has the Indonesian experience influenced the Philippines in its own 
ASL process? 
This case has set out to investigate and explain that the Republic of the Philippines and 
their actions and decisions surrounding whether to submit archipelagic sea lanes to the 
                                                     
44
 The April 27, 2012 Senate Foreign Relations Committee meeting agenda contained the Scarborough 
Shoal incident (Agenda Item No. 1), Maritime Zone Bills ± SBN 2723, SBN 2737, HBN 4185 (Agenda 
Item No. 2), and ASL Bills ± SBN 2738, HBN 4153 (Agenda Item No. 3)  
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International Maritime Organization has been influenced by the Indonesian experience 
of archipelagic sea lane submission to the International Maritime Organization.  
During the course of investigation there has been no qualitative research data 
uncovered which directly and explicitly states that the Republic of the Philippines has 
been influenced by the Indonesian case. However, such explicit data would need to be 
sourced directly from the Philippine Government in order to lend it legitimacy and 
validity. Moreover, such documents, if they were to exist, would do so at a very senior 
and highly confidential level.  
Hence, given the unlikeliness of unearthing such research data, this case was 
designed to use a wide range of data sources in lieu of such documentation. While this 
thesis is unable to offer explicit evidence of Indonesian influence, the data uncovered 
does offer some indication of probable direct and indirect influence. Having thus 
framed this analysis as direct and indirect Indonesian experience influence, how is one 
to explain the specifics of these influences? 
Patterns of Shared Experiences 
When reviewing the experience of Indonesia and the Philippines, there are some 
major patterns which can be extrapolated. It is clear that the concession of maritime 
sovereignty for defined archipelagic sea lanes has been a divisive issue for both states. 
While not debating the reality and viability of the maritime sovereignty these states 
claim, regardless of its legality, their sovereignty has been deeply enshrined into the 
individual and collective psyche of the peoples of Indonesia and the Philippines. 
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Both states fought long and hard in their efforts for international recognition for 
their archipelagic concept. This concept is closely tied, in both cases, to the nationalistic 
narrative of independence. Each of these states has a comparatively short history of 
independence, one which stretches just past the start of the UNCLOS process. Hence, 
the memories and feelings around the gains of independence are still quite fresh.  
Once independent, Indonesia and the Philippines were proactively working 
through their respective Parliaments to enshrine their archipelagic concept and maritime 
sovereignty in national legislation. During the course of the UNCLOS conferences 
Indonesia and the Philippines were the two archipelagic states who worked 
collaboratively and tirelessly to advance the idea of the archipelagic concept. They were 
joined by other archipelagic states (Fiji, Mauritius) for UNCLOS III to passionately 
represent, advocate and criticize in the name of the archipelagic concept; however, the 
archipelagic torch was clearly carried for many years by Indonesia and the Philippines 
alone. 
Indonesia weighed the perceived benefits, while not necessarily anticipating a 
µSDUWLDOUHJLPH¶DQGGHFLGHGWRJRDKHDGZLWKDQ$6/VXEPLVVLRQ7KH3KLOLSSLQHVLV
currently found in a very interesting position which appears to be leaning towards a 
formal submission to the IMO. I must surmise that this pattern of shared experience has 
influenced this case. 
Republic of the Philippines comment on the IMO Indonesian Process 
Secondly, the Philippines did interject during the Indonesian process, arguing it 
represented a one-off and not a precedent, and refused to be bound by that process or its 
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outcome. The Philippines also wish to reserve the right to suggest changes to the 
GPASLs in the future. To reserve the ability to amend the GPASLs seems to be a 
fallback position should the Philippines be bound to the IMO process followed with the 
,QGRQHVLDQVXEPLVVLRQ6XFKDQDFWLRQZRXOGDSSHDUWRZHDNHQWKH3KLOLSSLQHV¶
objection in the first place. Additionally, with respect to the fight to not follow the IMO 
process, it would seem very unlikely that the Philippines will win such a battle in the 
court of international opinion and the halls of the United Nations. Regardless, these 
interjections can be viewed as a direct influence on the Philippine case.  
IMO Influence  
It is clear from the research data that the mid-ocean archipelagic states did not 
foresee the rise of a partial regime. The literature further reveals the role which this 
regime plays in altering the UNCLOS landscape and tilting it in favour of the maritime 
powers. This is owing to the fact that as interveners, interested states are able to 
influence the end product of a formal ASL submission by a mid-ocean archipelagic 
state. Such influence I recognize as a by-product of the Indonesian case, as Indonesia 
was the first mid-ocean archipelagic state to formally submit proposed archipelagic sea 
lanes to the IMO.  
As previously noted in this thesis, American foreign policy in Southeast Asia, 
while being driven by apparent Chinese hegemonic aspirations, is leading to a closer 
military relationship with American regional allies, specifically the Philippines. The 
easing of hard power diplomacy, such as the FON Program, is transforming into soft 
power, made easier by the Philippine desire for semi re-establishment of American 
military assistance and security guarantees.  
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Applying the IMO influence to the Philippine case, this transition illustrates 
shifting foreign policy concerns of both the United States and the Philippines 
respectively, with the added failsafe, or incentive, for America of the IMO influence 
variable for any Philippine maritime policy pursuits (designating ASLs). That being 
said, it appears that the evidence supports that the Republic of the Philippines are 
confident in the belief that they can subvert the IMO influence variable by means of 
setting their national house in order and domestically designating ASLs before bringing 
these forward as a complete package. This belief is supported through the Philippine 
opinion, dating back to the Indonesian case, that the IMO has no role or authority to 
alter submissions. This would seem to be the second pillar of which the Philippines hold 
to the belief of avoiding any influence from the Indonesian experience. 
It should be noted that this was the same opinion held by Indonesia during its 
own submission. Indonesia argued this position after submitting its domestically 
approved proposal. The end results of the Indonesian case which were quite 
XQIDYRXUDEOHWR,QGRQHVLDZHUHRIFRXUVHWKHXQIRUHVHHQµSDUWLDOUHJLPH¶ being enacted. 
As a signatory state to UNCLOS, the Philippines are obligated to conform, this 
conversion occurring in a stand-alone forum of the IMO, as governed by international 
interpretations of vague references in UNCLOS. It is clear that the Philippines are still 
viewed with great importance by the IMO. The current Secretary-General of the IMO 
took office on January 1, 2012 and his first official mission to a Member State was to 
the Philippines in early February (IMO Press Release, February 9, 2012). While the 
official IMO press release concerning the visit did not directly mention ASL issues, the 
UHOHDVHDIILUPHGVXSSRUW³«LQDOOIDFHWVRIWKHFRXQWU\¶VPDULWLPHGHYHORSPHQW´LELG 
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The path forward chosen by the Philippines appears to be an ASL submission to 
the IMO for adoption. But, the simple example of the birth of the GPASL and the 
µSDUWLDOUHJLPH¶VKRXOGVHUYHWRGHPRQVWUDWHWKHXQSUHGLFWDELOLW\IURPDPLG-ocean 
DUFKLSHODJLFVWDWH¶VYLHZRIWKLVHQWLUHH[HUFLVH 
Consequently, I feel the Philippines have long been influenced by the Indonesian 
experience, stretching as far back as their stated objections to Indonesian process and 
precedent. This direct influence stems from the interjected objection, influencing a 
belief that this on-the-record objection will merit them a clean slate.  Adamantly 
convinced they shall be a fresh, stand-alone case for IMO consideration, there is further 
influence, in the form of the rather confident Philippine position, that the domestically 
legislated ASLs will be adopted by the IMO without amendment.  Be this as it may, I 
remain rather skeptical of the Philippine ability to avoid the IMO influence variable in 
the course of formal ASL designation. Thus, I think the Indonesian experience shall 
indirectly influence the Philippine case in the form of future IMO influence to any ASL 
submission. For these stated reasons, it is my belief that the Indonesian experience has 
both directly and indirectly influenced the Philippines case. 
Research Question #3 
What additional factors are influencing the Philippines? 
These additional factors have been extrapolated from the research data, and represent a 
substantial composition of converging evidence. This interconnecting trait can be 
DWWULEXWHGDVWKHµDUFKLSHODJLFHIIHFW¶RIPDULWLPH policy in the Philippines.  
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Full UNCLOS Compliance 
As this thesis has identified, the Philippines have a few interconnected issues 
relating to UNCLOS, including the designation of ASLs. Designating ASLs is but one 
component of the larger matter of the Philippines becoming compliant to UNCLOS. 
Furthermore, while ASL designation is non-compulsory, the other issues such as 
baselines (addressed in RA 9522) are in fact mandatory. The legality of the Republic of 
3KLOLSSLQHV¶SRVLWLRQLVTXHVWLRQHGE\%DXWLVWDZhen he points out: 
once a state expresses its consent to be bound by an international undertaking, 
that state must comply  with  its  obligations  arising  from  that  undertaking  in  
good  faith.   This is embodied in the international legal principle  of pacta sunt 
servanda, codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which in 
$UWLFOHVWDWHVµ>H@YHU\WUHDW\LQIRUFHLVELQGLQJXSRQWKHSDUWLHVWRLWDQG
PXVWEHSHUIRUPHGE\WKHPLQJRRGIDLWK¶7KXVWKH3KLOLSSLQH*RYHUQPHQWLV
obliged to observe this rule vis-à-vis its commitments under the LOSC 
[UNCLOS] (2011: 46-47). 
The Republic of the Philippines issued a declaration on October 26, 1988 which 
indicated that it will abide by UNCLOS and that the Republic is indeed intending  to 
uniform its domestic legislation  with UNCLOS, and furthermore, will be legislating 
ASL passage in the future (Lotilla, 1995, as quoted in Bautista, 2011: 45).  
Baselines/Territorial Boundaries 
Encomienda makes reference in 2009, to efforts to pass updated and compliant 
EDVHOLQHOHJLVODWLRQZKLFKXOWLPDWHO\SDVVHGDQGEHFDPH5$DV³FOHDUSURRIWKDW
ZHZDQWDQGZHDUHLQWKHSURFHVVRIFRPSO\LQJZLWK81&/26´ 460).  Bensurto 
Jr. corroborates WKLVLQQRWLQJLQKLVSUHVHQWDWLRQWKDW5$LV³VLJQLILFDQW´DQG
LOOXVWUDWHVDPRYHWRZDUGV³FRPSOHWHDGKHUHQFHWR81&/26´%HQVXUWR-U6OLGH
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*LYHQWKHWZRPHQ¶VSRVLWLRQVZLWKin the Republic of the Philippines45 the validity 
and credibility of this data is strong. The continuity of their message and positions, 
which seems to parallel the current presidential term of Aquino III, is also important. In 
examining the actions and statements of key Philippine officials and legislators it would 
appear that the Republic of the Philippines intends to become fully compliant with 
UNCLOS in the near future.  
Constitution definition including Internal Waters 
Having assurances that the Philippines intends to fully comply with UNCLOS, 
the last major domestic legal hurdle remains that of the Constitution. The Constitution 
opens with an unambiguous statement that the waters of the Philippines are internal 
waters. As shown in a previous chapter, this branding is very much inconsistent with 
UNCLOS.  
Given that maritime zone legislation is currently before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, I must surmise that this legislation will adequately comply with 
UNCLOS in its designation of the maritime zones of the Philippines.  While my 
research has failed to identify the exact method as to how the Republic of the 
Philippines will reach a solution to their Constitution, such tinkering is an inflammatory 
exercise at the best of times. Thus, I strongly doubt that the Philippines would choose to 
rekindle the divided domestic opinion through a full opening and amending of the 
national Constitution. It will be interesting to see how the Philippine Administration 
brings the Constitution into UNCLOS compliance.  
                                                     
45
 Encomienda is identified as the then: Secretary-General, Maritime and Ocean Affairs Center, 
Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of the Philippines (2009, Page 393). Bensurto Jr. is identified as 
the then: Secretary-General, Commission on Maritime and Ocean Affairs Secretariat (2012, Slide 1).  
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Environmental Concerns 
This factor stands both on its own merit, and can also be connected to the 
forthcoming factRUVRI³5RXWLQJ&RQFHUQV´DQG³7LPH	([SHQVHIRU$6/3URSRVDO´  
Bensurto Jr., highlights the growing concern of marine environment protection as the 
key trigger for government action to designate ASLs through legislation:  
If the Philippines does not designate, MPAs would be vulnerable. Thus, it is 
better for the Philippines designate ASL in order to protect MPAs by limiting the 
area covered by ASL. Indeed, this was one of the rationale behind the 
designation of ASL so as to avoid as many MPAs and Fishery areas as possible 
(2012, Slide 50). 
He further reinforces the importance of environmental protection, citing it also as the 
reason why the Philippines has chosen to act immediately by legislating ASLs 
domestically, rather than by first going through the IMO process: 
,WLVSUHFLVHO\EHFDXVHRIWKHXUJHQF\RISURYLGLQJSURWHFWLRQWRWKHFRXQWU\¶V
marine biodiversity and corals that the procedure under Article 53.9 should not 
be looked at as something that prevents the archipelagic state from exercising its 
substantive and inherent right to protect its marine resources for its people. This 
is state-preservation (2012, Slide 55). 
7KHUHIRUH³(QYLURQPHQWDO&RQFHUQV´ is having a dual influence on the Philippines. 
Firstly, it would seem to be the main cause for government action on this issue; and 
secondly, it also is the stated primary catalyst for the urgency of government action. It is 
evident that the Philippines, like Indonesia, will desire to keep the number of ASLs 
through its archipelago to an absolute minimum. Beckman (2007: 127) supports this 
position arguing that it is likely to be defended by the Philippines under the auspices of 
environmental considerations. $VVXFKWKHIDFWRURIµ(QYLURQPHQWDO&RQFHUQ¶DSSHDUV
to be significantly influencing the Republic of the Philippines and the ASL issue. 
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Domestic Public Opinion 
The Philippines has found the issues of ASL designation and the larger context 
of UNCLOS compliance to be quite contentious, dating back to the negotiations. Indeed, 
the government undertook the unprecedented step of a stated objection while signing 
UNCLOS, indicating that the Philippine position of sovereignty over its waters was 
unchanged. Such a step, identified to ease domestic opposition, starkly highlights how 
difficult consensus has been to locate and achieve.  
Mr. Anders Sjaastad, Senior Advisor at the Norwegian Institute of International 
Affairs (NUPI) offered this observation in relation to South-HDVWHUQ$VLDQ6WDWHV³«IRU
some of the littoral states that can still remember their colonial past, the principle of 
sovereignty is sacrosanct and any arrangement or action, which could be seen to 
uQGHUPLQHLWLVWDERR´). It is has been conceded by Philippine state officials 
that divided opinion exists; indeed it would be next to impossible not to recognize this 
IDFWRU³'LYLGHG3XEOLF2SLQLRQ´ has influenced this case for well over four decades. 
Nonetheless, given the recent actions of the Philippines, it appears that while the state 
acknowledges divided public opinion, it has made the decision to push forward 
regardless. TakinJWKDWTXDOLILHULQWRDFFRXQW³'RPHVWLF3XEOLF2SLQLRQ´ has the future 
possibility of influencing the Philippine case, as it has done previously. 
Time & Expense for ASL Proposal 
On the surface, it is difficult to ascertain the preparatory work and cost incurred 
in working up the ASLs contained in the currently debated legislation. However, the 
embodiment of this factor is the adage ³GRLWRQFHDQGGRLWULJKW´It is clear through 
the data that the Republic of the Philippines has thought long and hard about ASL 
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designation and submission. While internal government information concerning 
expenditures and human resource allocation are not contained in my data, it is telling 
that the current administration has made the larger matter of UNCLOS compliance and 
the concurrent issue of ASL designation a priority. Given this distinction, I must accept 
that the President and the government have invested required levels of resources into 
developing these lanes. Furthermore, dating back to previous administrations, I would 
propose that since the ratification of UNCLOS in 1994, continuing through the 
Indonesian experience and also the 1997 proposal, that preparatory work would have 
been undertaken if not externally, then most certainly internally, to mock up the various 
scenarios facing the Philippines with ASLs. 
:KHQ,FRQVLGHUWKHIDFWRURI³7LPH	([SHQVHIRU$6/3URSRVDO,´ I view it as 
only being possible to influencing the case in a cautious, delaying fashion. However, 
since Philippine officials have indicated the challenges faced by such a divisive public 
opinion, I would argue that the short-term political implications have played a larger 
role in the delayed fate of the Philippine case, as opposed to various administrations 
WDNLQJWKHµ7LPH	([SHQVHIRU$6/3URSRVDO¶LQWRFRQVLGHUDWLRQ 
Since ASLs have been identified, included in Presidential priorities, and are 
before the Congress currently, I am led to suppose that all due diligence has been 
completed. On this probable assumption, I must also believe that all necessary 
preparatory work, technical activities and engagement exercises would be included in 
such due diligence. Therefore, while the data is unable to determine conclusively, it 
would seem that there was sigQLILFDQWLQIOXHQFHVXUURXQGLQJ³7LPH	([SHQVHIRU$6/
3URSRVDO´ prior to the 2011 tabled legislation in the Philippine case.  
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Routing Concerns 
This identified factor ties very closHO\LQWRWKHSUHFHGLQJIDFWRUV³(QYLURQPHQWDO
&RQFHUQV´³7LPH	([SHQVHIRU$6/3URSRVDO´ and as well the succeeding factor 
³Inter-Island Transport/DRPHVWLF(FRQRP\´ The research data reveals two sets of 
ASLs publically proposed in the Philippines. While one set (1997ASL Proposal) was 
put forth in text by seemingly informed experts, the second set (2011) is found in the 
currently pending legislation. Therefore, in order to analyse any influence around 
routing concerns, the most logical approach would seem to be to compare the two sets of 
ASLs.  
For starters, it is worth pointing out that, of the three 2011 routes, only one 
appears identical to a proposed 1997 route (ASL #2). Next, ASL #3 the North-South 
route, contains one leg that appears identical as proposed in the second 1997 route, 
while the routing south of Panay Island is different in the two proposed routes (1997 & 
2011). Thus, this leads me to conclude that the routing change is due to an output of 
preparatory work. Additionally, ASL #1, the East-West route in the Luzon Strait, only 
appears in this research within the outstanding proposed legislation. Examined closer, 
there are two smaller east-west straits running between various Philippine islands in the 
larger Luzon Strait. Hence, WKHUHKDVPRVWFHUWDLQO\EHHQ³5RXWLQJ&RQFHUQV´ taken into 
consideration to choose one over the other. Clearly there would seem to be a great deal 
of work which has gone into taking numerous concerns, opinions, and considerations 
into account while developing the now proposed ASLs. Thus, the combination of these 
developments around routing ilOXVWUDWHVWKDWIDFWRULQJµ5RXWLQJ&RQFHUQV¶KDV
influenced the Philippine ASL issue.  
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Philippine National Marine Policy (1994) 
As discussed in Chapter Three, one of the core criteria found within the 
3KLOLSSLQH103LV³Implementation of the LOSC [Law of the Sea Convention] must be 
consistent with national interests as prescribed in the NMP.´ Therefore, as an ASL 
submission is optional, the NMP is primarily concerned with any Philippine compliance 
to UNCLOS being carried out in the best interest of the State. It is evident that, over the 
course of development, the authors of the NMP would have consulted extensively with 
stakeholders and experts to produce sound, tight policy. Also taking note that this policy 
decree occurred the same year as UNCLOS came into force (1994), this policy was in 
all probability laid down to guide any future courses of action chosen by the Republic of 
the Philippines.  
Moreover, the overwhelming viewpoint of the vast majority of the research data 
indicates that becoming UNCLOS compliant is the best course for the Philippines. By 
embracing UNCLOS, the Philippines passed RA 9522 which provides recognized 
baselines which demarcate a larger national territory than under the Treaty of Paris 
OLPLWV$V-XVWLFH&DUSLR¶VGHFLVLRQLQ G.R. No. 187167 (Prof. Merlin 
Magallona, et al. v. Eduardo Ermita, et. al.) found: ³5$LVWKHUHIRUHDPRVWYLWDO
step on the part of the Philippines in safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the 
&RQVWLWXWLRQDQGRXUQDWLRQDOLQWHUHVW´$VDdmitted by officials, the pending legislative 
pieces that enact maritime zones and designate ASLs are the next steps in UNCLOS 
compliance that seek to meet the terms of the NMP and by extension the national 
interest of the Republic of the Philippines. In the clear efforts to champion and abide by 
the NMP and the action of becoming UNCLOS compliant and designating ASLs, 
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reinforced by the unanimous ruling of the Supreme Court of the Philippines, I must 
WKHRUL]HWKDWWKHµ([LVWLQJ1DWLRQDO0DULQH3ROLF\¶KDVLnfluenced the Philippine case.  
Inter-Island Transport/Domestic Economy 
This factor, as already stated, is FORVHO\WLHGWRWKHIDFWRUVRI³5RXWLQJ&RQFHUQV´ 
and by the aforementioned OLQNDJHLGHQWLILHGWKURXJKWKH³7LPH	([SHQVHRI$6/
3URSRVDO´IDFWRU7KHIDFWRURI³Inter-IsODQG7UDQVSRUW'RPHVWLF(FRQRP\´ is 
heightened by the almost total reliance of the Philippines on marine-based domestic 
movement of goods. Given the large number of fishers operating within Philippine 
waters, as well as the importance of prescribed lanes, the integrated, safe management of 
marine users becomes obvious.  
7KLVFRQQHFWLRQWR³5RXWLQJ&RQFHUQV´ owes in no small part to the illustrated 
variance between the 1997 and 2011 proposed ASLs. These changes would have come 
about for a variety of reasons, which can be interrelated with fair likelihood to 
³EnvironmenWDO&RQFHUQV´DQG³Inter-IslDQG7UDQVSRUW'RPHVWLF(FRQRP\´7KLV
H[SODQDWLRQDWWHVWVWKDW³Inter-IsODQG7UDQVSRUW'RPHVWLF(FRQRP\´ has influenced the 
Philippine case. 
Regulatory & Enforcement Capacity 
The Philippines is required upon designation of ASLs to properly protect and 
regulate these lanes as well as to have the ability to enforce these measures. As noted 
when discussing international law, the burden of enforcement falls to the affected state, 
and there is no obligation for any state to take action. Also UNCLOS, Part IV places a 
further onus on the archipelagic states if designating ASLs, to ensure that they are safe 
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by regulating traffic and invoking traffic separation schemes if necessary. The evidence 
VKRZVWKDW³Regulatory & Enforcement Capacit\´ has definitely influence this case, and 
will continue to.  
Political Geography 
To bHJLQWKLVFDVHKDVLGHQWLILHG³3ROLWLFDO*HRJUDSK\´ in the context of 
international level, external influence. However, prior to analysing this factor in the 
external setting, scrutiny must be paid to its relationship to other already reviewed 
LQIOXHQFHV7KHIDFWRURI³3ROLWLFDO*HRJUDSK\´ is intricately woven into many of the 
previously identified and analysed domestic influences. In fact, this factor should be 
recognized as both a state level and international level influence. Arguments can be 
made that it GRPHVWLFDOO\OLQNVGLUHFWO\WR³5RXWLQJ&RQFHUQV´ Given the strategic 
location, from a domestic perspective, the routing of possible routes must make sense at 
the local, national and inteUQDWLRQDOOHYHO$GGLWLRQDOO\³3ROLWLFDO*HRJUDSK\´ very 
much factors into internal Philippine foreign policy decisions. 
On the strictly international level, the ³3ROLWLFDO*HRJUDSK\´ of the Philippines is 
a huge consideration for regional foreign policy in Southeast Asia as much as for any 
other state. On tKLVEDVLV³3ROLWLFDO*HRJUDSK\´ is interconnected to all the regional 
foreign policy agendas of other states termed as external influences in this case. Hence, 
³3ROLWLFDO*HRJUDSK\´ is studying the intersection of geographical and political 
considerations; the two substantive issues of the Philippines case. This leads me to 
LGHQWLI\³3ROLWLFDO*HRJUDSK\´ as the main conjoining factor, significantly influencing 
this case.   
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Physical Geography 
Within the Philippine case, physical geography can be observed to have 
previously been included in the factors RI³5RXWLQJ&RQFHUQV´ and to what I would 
argue a slightly smaller exWHQWRI³(QYLURQPHQWDO&RQFHUQV´ No two archipelagos are 
alike. Granted, UNCLOS offers loose parameters in order to group them into a 
distinctive category. However, as pointed oXWPDQ\WLPHVLQWKHGDWDWKH³3K\VLFDO
*HRJUDSK\´ of the Philippines presents a unique set of challenges relating to ASLs, 
specifically as I noted in Chapter Three, pertaining to the condensed concentration of the 
islands. The impact of this is through the spatial inability to site ASLs in many of the 
straits in the Philippines. This, therefore, places a quantifiable limit on the viable 
number of ASLs that can be dHVLJQDWHG6RLQWKLVPDQQHU³3K\VLFDO*HRJUDSK\´has 
already and will continue to influence this case. 
International System Influences in Southeast Asia 
Chapter Three notes there are a number of state actors operating in the Southeast 
Asian region exerting possible influences on this case.  The ones of main interest and 
thus highlighted in the case include China, Australia and the United States. There is also 
a major regional intergovernmental organization (ASEAN) in which all states including 
the Philippines (but not China) hold membership. 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
Prior to reviewing the state actors, it is prudent to first look more closely at 
ASEAN. This organization is the primary platform for regional diplomacy, and acts as a 
counterbalance to China. Broadly, it is where discussions around the disputed islands of 
the South China Sea occur amongst the neighbour claimant states. In the context of this 
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case, it was mentioned that ASEAN was the venue for the attempted resolution of the 
Mischief Reef incident, and the Philippine shared sea/zone of cooperation proposal. 
However, as both these examples illustrate, ASEAN is a venue for ideas and discussion 
and is limited by that mandate. For this case, ASEAN does not have a large role to play 
concerning ASLs, but is involved through the regional tensions which themselves are 
influencing this case. Since ASEAN is unable to resolve these tensions owing to the 
vested national interests of all the state parties, ASEAN has not had an influence on this 
case.  
Theoretically, ASEAN could influence this case, in the event that the issue of 
Philippine ASLs becomes an overriding regional matter. Yet, this is a doubtful course of 
action, since Philippine compliance to UNCLOS would only help to strengthen their 
case to the international community for the Scarborough Shoal and the KIG. Further, 
ASEAN member states are hesitate to engage China on behalf of any other state, as each 
ASEAN member has its own priorities, claims and foreign policy agenda. Therefore, it 
is not likely any other ASEAN states will be pressuring the Philippines around this 
issue, and ASEAN should continue to be a non-factor in this case. 
Australia 
While Australia is predominately dependent on the Southeast Asian marine 
shipping routes, it is more intertwined to Indonesian than the Philippine routes owing to 
physical geography. In addition, in the last number of months we have seen the Obama 
administration shift their foreign policy focus towards Asia-Pacific, and the Gillard 
government has warmed to a closer security relationship with America as a result. The 
research suggests that Australia to date has not influenced the Philippine case. 
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Furthermore, the projection of American regional hegemony means that Australia stands 
little chance of influencing the Philippine case into the future.  
The United States of America 
The United States have had a long and direct relationship with the Philippines. 
This relationship has evolved from colonial power to hegemonic security protectorate to 
regional ally. As the main strategic ally in the region, the Philippines was previously 
home to major US military bases for decades, and after a divorce of more than two 
decades,  recently welcomed back a semi-permanent American military presence. In the 
context of this case, the U.S. have actively opposed the archipelagic concept during the 
UNCLOS process, the Philippine baselines prior to RA 9522 and the Philippine claim of 
internal waters within their baselines. This opposition took the form of diplomatic 
protest and also the FON program. 
These recent developments, discussed further in Chapter Three, indicate that the 
Americans are once again going to play a vital, on location role in Philippine regional 
security in Southeast Asia. This is one major aspect of the American foreign policy shift 
towards the Asia-Pacific. Also given the strong allied association between the two 
states, it would appear that the U.S. is poised to play a leading role in Philippine foreign 
policy in the future. The United States has and will continue to influence this case.  
7KH3HRSOH¶V5HSXEOLFRI&KLQD 
China has been the most prolific source of episodic influence around this case in 
the period following UNCLOS entering into force. As the extensive section in the 
preceding chapter outlined, there have been a number of incidents between the 
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Philippines and China in the contested South China Sea. These incidents have a direct 
influence on this case because of their temporal and spatial dimensions. The continual 
pressure which Beijing has ratcheted and applied to Manila has flared up the already 
divided issue of jurisdiction and sovereignty over Philippine waters. The Mischief Reef, 
Reed Bank, and Scarborough Shoal incidents have all occurred within the Philippine 
maritime jurisdiction of its UNCLOS mandated Economic Exclusive Zone (EEZ).  
The Chinese seem intent on strengthening their hold over the South China Sea. 
As noted, there appear to be multiple paths proposed with the many branches and organs 
of the state on how to proceed. While the ambiguity of official policy remains as cloudy 
as international law itself, VWDWHDFWLRQVZRXOGVXJJHVWD³possession is nine tenths of the 
ODZ´belief, in essence a case of effective occupation. It is a possibility that these factors 
will produce a scenario of a Chinese effort, similar to the archipelagic states with the 
archipelagic concept, to secure international support for their South China Sea holdings 
through recognition into customary international law.  
In addition, the reintroduction of an American military presence (albeit semi-
permanent)in the Philippines will evoke a Chinese response. These two powerful states 
and their actions will ultimately play a large role in the future of this case. This data as a 
result leads me to conclude that Chinese influence has been long-standing and shall 
continue in this case.   
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International Public Opinion & Civil Society Actors 
This external influence ties into the IDFWRUVRIµ,02,QIOXHQFH¶DQG
µ(QYLURQPHQWDO&RQFHUQV¶$VUHODWHGWRµ,02,QIOXHQFH¶GXULQJWKH81&/26SURFHVV
the archipelagic states failed in their efforts to sway international public opinion for 
recognition and acceptance of the archipelagic concept. A second feature connecting to 
µ,02LQIOXHQFH¶LVWKHVWDWHGEHOLHIRIWKH5HSXEOLFRIWKH3KLOLSSLQHVWKDWWKHPRVW
crucial test, for what they hope are their soon-to-be domestically legislated ASLs, is to 
command respect from the international community. 
6HFRQGO\WKHUHLVWKHGLUHFWDVVRFLDWLRQZLWKµ(QYLURQPHQWDO&RQFHUQV¶
Tsamenyi and Mfodwo (2001) cite the ecological well-being of the oceans as their 
example when identifying this factor. Thus, the most likely scenario for influence would 
seem to involve environmental considerations. The plight of the marine environment has 
become engrained in the lexicon of citizens, policy makers and pundits throughout the 
LQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\7KLVVXJJHVWLRQLVJUHDWO\YDOLGDWHGE\(QFRPLHQGD¶V366$ 
SURSRVDODQG%HQVXUWR-U¶VLQGLFDWLRQWKDWHQYLURQPHQWDOSURWHFWLRQLVWKHPDLQ
reasoning behind ASL designation. Taken all together, these strands indicate that 
µ,QWHUQDWLRQDO3XEOLF2SLQLRQ	&LYLO6RFLHW\$FWRUV¶KDYHVLJQLILFDQWO\LPSDFWHGWKH
Philippines case and will continue to do so.   
The Influence of International Law 
After careful consideration, there is one significant influence which this case has 
yet to formally account for and anaO\VH7KLVLVWKHLQIOXHQFHRI³,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ´an 
influence that outshines all others previously identified and analysed. 
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The efforts of the international community to address the legality of many 
maritime matters in the post-World War II period, was to be the first significant effort at 
a universal doctrine for the maritime area of international law. Wight (1978: 108) 
defines the purpose of international law DV³WRGHILQHWKHULJKWVDQGGXWLHVRIRQHVWDWH
acting on behalf of its nationals, towards other states´ Therefore, it can be argued that 
international law (UNCLOS) represents the starting point for interpretation, foreign 
policy direction and diplomacy.  
It has been noted that international law is quite decentralized and 
³RYHUZKHOPLQJO\WKHUHVXOWRIREMHFWLYHVRFLDOIRUFHV´0RUJHQWKDX
MorgHQWKDXDOVRDGYLVHVWKDWLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ³RZHVLWVH[LVWHQFHDQGRSHUDWLRQWRWZR
factors, both decentralized in character: identical or complementary interests of 
individual states and the distributiRQRISRZHUDPRQJWKHP´The dispersing traits found 
in the international law carry down into the three components of legal systems: 
³OHJLVODWLRQDGMXGLFDWLRQDQGHQIRUFHPHQW´0RUJHQWKDX). Morgenthau keys in on three 
main areas concerning the legislative component of international law: the usage of 
vague wording, the openness in interpretation (magnified by this vagueness), and the 
binding force (or not) applied to signatory states. Looking specifically at the issue of 
vagueness, Morgenthau writes:  
For such documents, in order to obtain the approval of all subjects of the law, 
necessary for their acquiring legal force, must take cognizance of all the 
divergent national interests that will or might be affected by the rules to be 
enacted. In order to find a common basis on which all those different national 
interests can meet in harmony, rules of international law embodied in general 
treaties must often be vague and ambiguous, allowing all the signatories to read 
the recognition of their own national interests into the legal text agreed upon  
(ibid: 260). 
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Moving onward to the component of adjudication, three important matters 
highlighted are, most importantly, the scope and mandate of the jurisdiction of legal 
system, as well as the organizational structure of the legal system and the ramifications 
of legal decisions (Morgenthau, 1993: 262). The judicial body with jurisdiction for 
UNCLOS is the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). Immediately, 
one must recognize there is a limitation of jurisdiction with ITLOS, to only the signatory 
states of the Convention. Also any cases are only brought forward upon agreement from 
all affected parties, and there is a lack of legal linkage with other courts or the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ).  
The final component of legal systems is enforcement of any judicial decisions. 
There is most definitely a challenge to small or less powerful states when it comes to 
enforcement. The principle of law enforcement in international law is that while the 
victim has the right to enforce, no state has the obligation to enforce (Morgenthau, 1993: 
266). Hence as explained by Morgenthau (1993, ³7KHVPDOOQDWLRQPXVWORRNIRU
the protection of its rights to the assistance of powerful friends; only thus can it hope to 
oppose with a chance of success an attempt to violatHLWVULJKWV´ 
This assistance is weighed against national interest of the power (larger state), 
political (domestic and foreign policy) concerns and a sizing up of the situation 
(Morgenthau, 1993: 266). As this case has shown, the Philippines have lived this 
nightmare specifically in the context of Chinese expansion into their EEZ, and the warm 
and cool (and warm again) security relationship with the United States to combat this 
encroachment.  
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The challenges found in international law in relation to the case are best 
VXPPDUL]HGE\DYHU\WHOOLQJSDUDJUDSKLQ0RUJHQWKDX¶VFRUQHUVWRQHWH[W 
Governments, however, are always anxious to shake off the restraining influence 
that international law might have upon their foreign policies, to use international 
law instead for the promotion of their national interests, and to evade legal 
obligations that might be harmful to them. They have used the imprecision of 
international law as a ready-made tool for furthering their ends. They have done 
so by advancing unsupported legal claims and by misinterpreting the meaning of 
generally recognized rules of international law. Thus the lack of precision 
inherent in the decentralized nature of international law is breeding ever more 
lack of precision, and the debilitating vice that was present at its birth continues 
to sap its strength (1993: 259). 
Analysis 
The future is not certain for the archipelagic concept under UNCLOS and the ASL 
regime. A 2006 conference hosted by the United States Naval War College, posed the 
question of long term (2020) stability of the ASL passage regime, to forty-two attending 
legal experts from various sWDWHV³GLGQRWEHOLHYH>$6/@SDVVDJHZRXOGUHPDLQ
VWDEOH´.D\H,QUHODWLRQWRWKLVVKDUHGYLHZ%DWHPDQ¶VYLHZVDUH 
insightful; the belief that the regional tensions and domestic political influences of East 
Asia will cause state practices to differ from traditional interpretations of law; indeed he 
WHUPV(DVW$VLDDV³FULWLFDO´JRLQJIRUZDUGLQWKHIRUPDQGdesign of any international 
Law of the Sea.  
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Research Question #4 
What are the implications of these findings on the Philippines? 
Implementation Rival Theory (Parallel Streams)  
This case is a multiple case of two linked processes: Philippine designation of ASLs 
accomplished by means of domestic legislation; and, international recognition of 
Philippine ASLs through adoption by the IMO. 
This aspect of this case can be identified as a possible implementation rival 
theory. The rationale behind this reasoning has to do with the order in which these two 
processes are occurring. The Republic of the Philippines has made the explicit choice to 
conduct a domestic process prior to any formalized international exposure, thus 
introducing international influences more so towards the end rather than closer to the 
beginning. As such, I believe once this process reaches the international level, that the 
result will be a parallel reflexive exposure to the majority of these factors once again. 
This exposure exercise will be facilitated by the IMO and involved the states prior 
branded as influences in this case, in their roles an intervener states.  
Once again, to restate, this theoretical offering is strengthened and I would argue 
validated by the analysis of my first and second research question. The Indonesian 
experience involved a first process of Indonesia domestically designating ASLs after 
careful consideration of numerous factors (Table 1), followed by Indonesia taking these 
lanes to the IMO and being exposed to significant influencing factors (³,02LQIOXHQFH´: 
intervener states, the introduction of GPASLs) with the end result EHLQJWKDWRID³SDUWLDO
regime.´ Furthermore, the partial regime forces Indonesia to be susceptible to external 
140 
 
influence with a requirement to enact a fourth lane (East-West) hanging over its head, 
and mostly definitely, as a result influencing domestic factors yet again.  
Realist View of International Law 
Moving this analysis up or back once more, depending on your perspective, we 
can apply this theory to the actions of the archipelagic states in the setting of the entire 
thirty year period of UNCLOS. For this particular period, the archipelagic states began 
negotiations with a firm position of the archipelagic concept, the result of external 
influences including independence, and domestic factors which were manipulated as a 
result of external influences (the easiest example being independence). This archipelagic 
concept developed at the state level, was then exposed to the international level through 
UNCLOS negotiations. After working through the international level influences, the 
archipelagic concept was not readily accepted. This response led the archipelagic states 
to enact domestic legislation to strengthen their archipelagic concept, prior to it being 
bumped back up to the international level in the next round of UNCLOS.  This cycle 
illustrates another example of the implementation rival theory for archipelagic states and 
the Law of the Sea.  
Research Question #5 
What are the implications of these findings on other mid-ocean archipelagic states? 
The issue of ASL submission for other mid-ocean archipelagic states has the potential to 
be as difficult as it has been for Indonesia, and for the ongoing Philippine case. One 
specific matter which would need addressing by the respective archipelagic states is the 
matter of baselines which obey the criteria outlined in UNCLOS, Article 47. This matter 
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is at issue for states such as Cape Verde, the Dominican Republic and the Maldives, 
which as previously mentioned have enacted non-compliant baselines.  
Furthermore, the remaining mid-ocean archipelagic states must weigh the benefit 
of archipelagic status should they choose to claim it and subsequently enact compliant 
baselines. Once settling the issue of baselines, only then can archipelagic states look to 
address further UNCLOS matters such as the choice to designate and seek IMO 
adoption of ASLs. This all being so, it can be said that Indonesia and the Philippines can 
be considered the two most pressing cases in relation to the international system given 
their political geography and their long-standing historical positions.  
This as such, a comment as to the implications on the larger international system 
is warranted as well. The primary interested parties are those connected to the IMO 
process; the intervener states and the IMO itself.  The reasoning for this is rather simple. 
As this thesis has laid out above, the one maritime user group specifically targeted and 
therefore affected by ASL adoption are warships.46 Thus, while commercial marine 
traffic is guaranteed ASLP with or without designated ASL, restrictive conditions are 
attached to warships upon the adoption of ASLs.  
Therefore while certainly having an interest in this case, the international system, 
outside of major maritime powers and their respective navies, is not fully vested upon 
the outcome of Philippine ASL designation and IMO adoption. As such, the 
implications on the greater international community would appear to be rather clear. The 
                                                     
46
 This is owing to the fact that the designation of ASLs restricts all maritime traffic to these lanes with 
strict restrictions on military activities mirroring the restrictions of transit passage. All traffic is confined 
only to these lanes, whereas in the absence of designation, a much less concise and more open to 
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQVHFWLRQµURXWHVQRUPDOO\XVHGIRULQWHUQDWLRQDOQDYLJDWLRQ¶$UWLFOH>@DEVHQWRI
conditions is used. 
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acts of ASL designation and adoption are of interest to the international community; 
however, these acts are of most concern those states affected by them, the major 
maritime powers and the particular mid-ocean archipelagic state.  
4.5: CONCLUSION 
The most-likely scenario for the Republic of the Philippines based on the implications of 
this analysis is as follows. In all likelihood, the Philippines will go forward to the IMO 
with its three domestically designated ASLs as a complete package in their eyes. Firstly, 
the Philippines will submit this package and indicate that this is the extent of its 
VXEPLVVLRQGXHWR³(QYLURQPHQWDO&RQFHUQV´7KH³,02,QIOXHQFH´RIWKH,02LWVHOI
and the intervener states will with high probability reject this outright. This will force 
the Philippines to argue its case that the IMO has only the mandate to adopt, not amend 
any archipelagic state submission. The Philippines will fight the same battle as 
Indonesia did in the previous century. Given the evidence collected, the Philippines may 
be likely to lose this debate.  
 The Philippines shall then point to its objection during the Indonesian process 
and request a new, unique process. Again, it would seem this argument is likely to fail. 
The next most logical fallback will be the Philippines turning to its interjection during 
the Indonesian process, that the Philippines have reserved the right to amend the 
GPASL. While I choose not to speculate on the outcome of this last particular point, the 
main implication drawn from these findings is that the Philippines will still be 
forced to endure influence from many factors, the probable results of which will be 
a request for additional ASLs and, depending on the outcome of that request, a 
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partial designation of the Philippines submission by the IMO (thus rendering the 
three domestically legislated ASLs powerless).   
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Chapter Five: Conclusion 
 
³:HDUHWKHVHDZHDUHWKHRFHDQZHPXVWZDNHXSWRWKLVDQFLHQWWUXWKDQG
together use it to overturn all hegemonic views that aim ultimately to confine us 
again, physically and psychologically, in the tiny spaces which we have resisted 
accepting as our sole appointed place, and from which we have recently 
OLEHUDWHGRXUVHOYHV´  
 
(EpeOL+DX¶RID2XU6HDRI,VODQGV16) 
 
5.1: CLOSING REMARKS 
,QGHHG³$UFKLSHODJLF0DWWHUV´ serves a dual purpose for this case. I have chosen it as 
the title, and even more importantly, it embodies the essence of the challenge for the 
Philippines respecting the Law of the Sea. Archipelagos are centrifugal in nature; the 
international system is as well, and so too are the numerous influences on the pending 
designation of ASL by the Philippines; further still, centrifugal claims can be made 
concerning the IMO and the process of adoption of ASLs. The intentions of the 
Republic of the Philippines are clear: it intends to conform to UNCLOS, designate 
ASLs, and have them adopted by the IMO. 
It would appear that the Philippines seeks to mirror how Indonesia proceeded, by 
domestically enacting ASLs through national legislation and then bringing those ASLs 
forward in a formal submission to the IMO. While the intentions are good and 
honourable, it is troubling to see the Philippines choosing to interpret the role of the 
IMO as it does. While the Philippine position in this regard is on record and has been 
unchanged for many years, I must question why it has not changed given the rise of the 
³SDUWLDOUHJLPH´ and the Indonesian experience. 
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The IMO influence will have a substantive impact on any future ASL 
submissions by mid-ocean archipelagic states. The variance in this influence shall be 
dependent on how early in an ASL submission process the respective mid-ocean 
archipelagic state identifies this influence. Early identification would afford the mid-
ocean archipelagic state the foresight to be fully prepared for this influence since all 
future ASL submissions, including those of the Philippines, will be subjected to it. 
5.2: INTERNATIONAL LAW, GEOPOLITICS AND ARCHIPELAGOS 
The deliberately vague nature of UNCLOS allows for a wide range of interpretations. 
Hence, the ever maturing archipelagic states began to look towards ASL submission 
upon UNCLOS entering into force in 1994. The major maritime powers were in 
retrospect, not prepared in the beginning, for such a hardened position by Indonesia.  
The Indonesian proposal, domestically codified, failed to contain any East-West 
lane as desired. This lack of any east-west lane would have alarmed the maritime 
powers: such an absence would eliminate the possibility of any ASL substitution as 
allowed under Article 53(7). Undeniably, however, the physical geography of the 
Indonesian archipelago would suggest only one probable route for an east-west lane. 
Seemingly, the hard stance that Indonesia took led the maritime powers to seek an 
alternative solution to an apparent standoff that concerned the number of ASLs. 
What followed is an interesting example of power politics on full display by the 
maritime powers. As noted, international law is challenged by the limitations of 
interpretation; therefore, it is rather open to the perception of each respective state. As 
previously explained, there was a slight identity crisis for the IMO as it pertained to 
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UNCLOS, Part IV. It would appear that the major maritime powers, unable to persuade 
Indonesia for a fourth lane, determined they would instead demand satisfaction to their 
problem from the IMO.  
Again, as earlier discussed, UNCLOS requires archipelagic states to submit their 
designated ASLs to the IMO (the competent international organization) for adoption. 
Absence from the text is any reference, passing or otherwise, that gives this organization 
the mandate to edit, alter, amend, or pass judgment upon any submission.  Nevertheless, 
the major maritime powers found agreeable interpretation at the IMO, leveraged one 
would presume through all possible avenues, to construct an entirely new conditional 
framework attached to and negating the spirit of UNCLOS. The GPASLs placed further 
onus and burden on archipelagic states, allowing the maritime powers to reclaim the 
balance of power lost and advantage they had ceded (temporally it now appears) through 
the negotiated agreement of UNCLOS.  
A further comment is reserved to acknowledge the absolute impact the United 
States of America has held, as the great hegemonic power of the second half of the 20th 
century, on the negotiations, development and internationally recognized interpretation 
on many portions of the law of the sea. The unfortunate irony for lesser states, including 
the archipelagic states, is the continual refusal of the United States to become a 
signatory to UNCLOS. This irony is further advanced within this case by the resurgence 
of the American influence in Southeast Asia and precisely in the Philippines.   
Therefore, I must conclude my interpretation of the data collected is that 
international law and more accurately the Law of the Sea has, to date, failed archipelagic 
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states, through all three of its components: legislation, adjudication, and enforcement. 
Additionally, it would appear that the Law of the Sea shall continue to fail archipelagic 
states into the future.  
5.3: A PARTING NOTE 
Regional foreign policy tensions and concerns coupled with overlapping, 
competing jurisdictional claims will inevitably delay the Philippine ASL process. This 
process and its stakeholders, pressures and influences are intricately connected, as has 
been stated repeatedly in this paper. This case intersects and links all levels of the state, 
such as the archipelagic concept itself. A resolution of the South China/West Philippine 
Seas disputes would certainly go a long way to putting the ASL issue on firmer footing 
within the Philippines.  
As demonstrated by the case, the issue is influenced by countless domestic, 
national and foreign influences, interests and concerns. Owing to this composition and 
construction, the matter shall only be resolved at such time as a correct majority of 
variables align. This majority must be led by a domestic mandate, a buy-in by the 
Philippine people to legitimize compliance to UNCLOS through agreeable public 
opinion.  
The process of deciding upon archipelagic sea lane submission and the 
submission itself are both susceptible to variable influences from a wide range of 
VRXUFHV2QFHLWGRHVSURFHHGWRWKH,02UHJDUGOHVVRIWKH3KLOLSSLQHV¶FRQWUDGLFWRU\
held belief and any forthcoming efforts, it is likely that the IMO influence, be it through 
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intervener states, the IMO itself, or most likely a combination of both, shall be imposed 
against a Philippine submission.   
Notwithstanding this, given the role played by the IMO and its actions to date, 
including the installation of GPASLs and the partial regime, questions can be asked 
concerning the mandate, role, and actions of the IMO into the future. It has been thirty 
years since the signing of UNCLOS, and close to twenty years since it has come into 
force. Yet, while twenty-two states claim mid-ocean archipelagic status, only Indonesia 
has submitted archipelagic sea lanes. The Indonesian submission, as explained, has been 
deemed partial, and there is no indication of a timely resolution towards a full 
designation.  
Meanwhile, the Philippine case is currently being influenced by a multitude of 
factors with national legislation being considered, but as of yet no official 
acknowledgement or indication of a formal ASL submission to the IMO.47 Boiled down 
to the crux of the issue, the Philippines must weigh the benefit of UNCLOS compliance 
and ASL designations, together with United States assistance against Chinese intentions, 
rising jurisdictional concerns around South China Sea, and dispute resolution through 
ITLOS. 
5.4: FURTHER STUDY  
This thesis has argued that the Republic of the Philippines has be influenced in 
its action to enact archipelagic sea lanes by many influences including the experiences 
of Indonesia in enacting and adoSWLQJLWV¶RZQDUFKLSHODJLFVHDODQHV7KLVWKHVLVKDV
                                                     
47
 While Bensurto Jr. confirms in his conference presentation that the ASLs contained in the domestic 
legislation will be forwarded to the IMO, there has been no correspondence or statements via official 
branches or bodies of the State.  
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structured compelling data which would appear to indicate that the Republic of the 
Philippines does intend to enact archipelagic sea lanes and seek adoption via the 
International Maritime Organization. However, I must note that this case study design 
along with my research methods do pose a few limitations upon these results. These 
limitations are found in the inability to explicitly quantify and verify my results.  Firstly, 
this thesis builds a very strong body of secondary data, but I was unable to receive 
confirmation directly from the Philippines government as to its intentions.48 I can 
support my results through statements made by representatives of the Permanent 
Mission of the Republic of the Philippines to the United Nations concerning the rule of 
law. In an address by the Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs to the General 
Assembly on October 1, 2012, the Secretary stated:49 
Furthermore, from the perspective of the rule of law, and given the maritime 
disputes that have intensified in the Asian region, the UN Convention on the 
Law of the Sea has never been more relevant than it is today. All States must 
respect their obligations to settle their maritime disputes by peaceful means, 
without threats or use of force, under UNCLOS. A rules-based approach under 
UNCLOS can peacefully resolve these Asian maritime disputes. 
Today, my country faces its most serious challenge to the security of its maritime 
domain and integrity of its national territory, as well as its effective protection of 
its marine environment. 
To address this challenge and to arrive at a durable resolution, we must rely on 
the rule of law and not the force of arms. We must rely on the body of rules that 
state that disputes must be resolved peacefully. We must rely on the norms and 
rules enshrined in the UNCLOS. 
 
We therefore rely on our friends and allies and all those who believe in the 
peaceful and fair management of the seas and oceans to uphold the rule of law 
                                                     
48
 I contacted the Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Philippines to the United Nations directly by 
email in Spring 2013 asking for the written policy positions of the state relating to my research questions.  
49
 http://www.un.int/philippines/statements/20121001generaldebate_67thUNGA.htm.  
See also: http://www.un.int/philippines/news/20121001nypm10.htm 
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and UNCLOS. We will endeavor to elicit a more proactive action from the 
General Assembly. 
This statement does seem to indicate strong desires of the Republic of the Philippines to 
adhere to UNCLOS and the rule of law.  
Secondly, this thesis and research strategy has limitations of validity of results.  
This thesis could have produced a falsification of my thesis statement through an 
unexpected outcome; however as discussed above verification is not as easily 
accomplished in this case. Also, case study design can raise questions around 
generalization and replication. Given the unique nature of archipelagic states, there is 
potential for future study to be challenged if drawing generalities from this thesis and 
likewise attempting to replicate these results.  
However, this research can be expanded upon in a variety of ways. The major 
domestic issue of perceived internal waters sovereignty traded off against the 
archipelagic waters regime could be researched at a local community and/or national 
level within the respective mid-ocean archipelagic states. Such research could be used 
by the particular mid-ocean archipelagic states, academia, other mid-ocean archipelagic 
states or even international bodies such as the United Nations. 
Non-Complaint Baselines 
 There is also a unique avenue available to study the issue of baseline compliance 
for the five other mid-ocean archipelagic states mentioned above. Additionally this issue 
can be studied in the context of possible ASL submission by the said states, for as has 
been mentioned above, these states shall be unable to proceed on ASL submission until 
their baselines are compliant.  
151 
 
ASL Cases of other Archipelagic States 
Outside of Indonesia and the Philippines, my literature review and research did 
not uncover any other mid-ocean archipelagic states that are entertaining possible ASL 
submission to the IMO. Thus, the question should be posed: why has no other mid-
ocean archipelagic state pursued ASL submission? This issue is an important one in the 
context of island studies and international maritime law. The possibility exists that the 
factors identified by this case could be influencing other mid-ocean archipelagic states. 
Researching additional cases would provide answers as to why mid-ocean archipelagic 
states are seemingly rejecting the option of designating ASLs.  
There is also vast potential to further research this issue and look to the future 
and to the large number of mid-ocean archipelagic states who have yet to act at all. 
Indonesia and the Philippines were the most vocal, highest profile and geopolitically 
important archipelagic states. Is there a desire by any additional archipelagic states to 
seek ASL adoption? Likewise, is there a desire by the major maritime powers or the 
³JUHDWHULQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\´IRUSDUWLFXODUDUFKLSHODJLFVWates to adopt ASLs? 
Advancing the knowledge will assist the greater understanding of the many factors 
which all mid-ocean archipelagic states should soberly consider in relation to the rights 
granted under UNCLOS, Part IV. Clearly archipelagos do matter.
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Appendix A: UNCLOS, Part IV 
 
PART IV 
ARCHIPELAGIC STATES 
Article 46 
Use of terms 
For the purposes of this Convention: 
(a) "archipelagic State" means a State constituted wholly by one 
or more archipelagos and may include other islands; 
(b) "archipelago" means a group of islands, including parts of 
islands, interconnecting waters and other natural features which 
are so closely interrelated that such islands, waters and other 
natural features form an intrinsic geographical, economic and 
political entity, or which historically have been regarded as such. 
Article 47 
Archipelagic baselines 
1. An archipelagic State may draw straight archipelagic baselines joining 
the outermost points of the outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago 
provided that within such baselines are included the main islands and an area in 
which the ratio of the area of the water to the area of the land, including atolls, is 
between 1 to 1 and 9 to 1. 
2. The length of such baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles, 
except that up to 3 per cent of the total number of baselines enclosing any 
archipelago may exceed that length, up to a maximum length of 125 nautical 
miles. 
3. The drawing of such baselines shall not depart to any appreciable 
extent from the general configuration of the archipelago. 
4. Such baselines shall not be drawn to and from low-tide elevations, 
unless lighthouses or similar installations which are permanently above sea level 
have been built on them or where a low-tide elevation is situated wholly or partly 
at a distance not exceeding the breadth of the territorial sea from the nearest 
island. 
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5. The system of such baselines shall not be applied by an archipelagic 
State in such a manner as to cut off from the high seas or the exclusive economic 
zone the territorial sea of another State. 
6. If a part of the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State lies 
between two parts of an immediately adjacent neighbouring State, existing rights 
and all other legitimate interests which the latter State has traditionally exercised 
in such waters and all rights stipulated by agreement between those States shall 
continue and be respected. 
7. For the purpose of computing the ratio of water to land under 
paragraph l, land areas may include waters lying within the fringing reefs of 
islands and atolls, including that part of a steep-sided oceanic plateau which is 
enclosed or nearly enclosed by a chain of limestone islands and drying reefs 
lying on the perimeter of the plateau. 
8. The baselines drawn in accordance with this article shall be shown on 
charts of a scale or scales adequate for ascertaining their position. Alternatively, 
lists of geographical coordinates of points, specifying the geodetic datum, may 
be substituted. 
9. The archipelagic State shall give due publicity to such charts or lists of 
geographical coordinates and shall deposit a copy of each such chart or list with 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 
Article 48 
Measurement of the breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone,  
the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf  
 
The breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive 
economic zone and the continental shelf shall be measured from archipelagic 
baselines drawn in accordance with article 47. 
Article 49 
Legal status of archipelagic waters, of the air space 
over archipelagic waters and of their bed and subsoil 
 
1. The sovereignty of an archipelagic State extends to the waters enclosed 
by the archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with article 47, described as 
archipelagic waters, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast. 
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2. This sovereignty extends to the air space over the archipelagic waters, 
as well as to their bed and subsoil, and the resources contained therein. 
3. This sovereignty is exercised subject to this Part. 4. The regime of 
archipelagic sea lanes passage established in this Part shall not in other respects 
affect the status of the archipelagic waters, including the sea lanes, or the 
exercise by the archipelagic State of its sovereignty over such waters and their 
air space, bed and subsoil, and the resources contained therein. 
Article 50 
Delimitation of internal waters 
Within its archipelagic waters, the archipelagic State may draw closing 
lines for the delimitation of internal waters, in accordance with articles 9, 10 and 
11. 
Article 51 
Existing agreements, traditional fishing rights 
and existing submarine cables 
 
1. Without prejudice to article 49, an archipelagic State shall respect 
existing agreements with other States and shall recognize traditional fishing 
rights and other legitimate activities of the immediately adjacent neighbouring 
States in certain areas falling within archipelagic waters.  The terms and 
conditions for the exercise of such rights and activities, including the nature, the 
extent and the areas to which they apply, shall, at the request of any of the States 
concerned, be regulated by bilateral agreements between them.  Such rights shall 
not be transferred to or shared with third States or their nationals.  
2. An archipelagic State shall respect existing submarine cables laid by 
other States and passing through its waters without making a landfall.  An 
archipelagic State shall permit the maintenance and replacement of such cables 
upon receiving due notice of their location and the intention to repair or replace 
them. 
Article 52 
Right of innocent passage 
1. Subject to article 53 and without prejudice to article 50, ships of all 
States enjoy the right of innocent passage through archipelagic waters, in 
accordance with Part II, section 3. 
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2. The archipelagic State may, without discrimination in form or in fact 
among foreign ships, suspend temporarily in specified areas of its archipelagic 
waters the innocent passage of foreign ships if such suspension is essential for 
the protection of its security.  Such suspension shall take effect only after having 
been duly published. 
Article 53 
Right of archipelagic sea lanes passage 
1. An archipelagic State may designate sea lanes and air routes 
thereabove, suitable for the continuous and expeditious passage of foreign ships 
and aircraft through or over its archipelagic waters and the adjacent territorial 
sea. 
2. All ships and aircraft enjoy the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage 
in such sea lanes and air routes. 
3. Archipelagic sea lanes passage means the exercise in accordance with 
this Convention of the rights of navigation and overflight in the normal mode 
solely for the purpose of continuous, expeditious and unobstructed transit 
between one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another 
part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone. 
4. Such sea lanes and air routes shall traverse the archipelagic waters and 
the adjacent territorial sea and shall include all normal passage routes used as 
routes for international navigation or overflight through or over archipelagic 
waters and, within such routes, so far as ships are concerned, all normal 
navigational channels, provided that duplication of routes of similar convenience 
between the same entry and exit points shall not be necessary. 
5. Such sea lanes and air routes shall be defined by a series of continuous 
axis lines from the entry points of passage routes to the exit points.  Ships and 
aircraft in archipelagic sea lanes passage shall not deviate more than 25 nautical 
miles to either side of such axis lines during passage, provided that such ships 
and aircraft shall not navigate closer to the coasts than 10 per cent of the distance 
between the nearest points on islands bordering the sea lane. 
6. An archipelagic State which designates sea lanes under this article may 
also prescribe traffic separation schemes for the safe passage of ships through 
narrow channels in such sea lanes.  
7. An archipelagic State may, when circumstances require, after giving 
due publicity thereto, substitute other sea lanes or traffic separation schemes for 
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any sea lanes or traffic separation schemes previously designated or prescribed 
by it. 
8. Such sea lanes and traffic separation schemes shall conform to 
generally accepted international regulations. 
9. In designating or substituting sea lanes or prescribing or substituting 
traffic separation schemes, an archipelagic State shall refer proposals to the 
competent international organization with a view to their adoption.  The 
organization may adopt only such sea lanes and traffic separation schemes as 
may be agreed with the archipelagic State, after which the archipelagic State 
may designate, prescribe or substitute them. 
10. The archipelagic State shall clearly indicate the axis of the sea lanes 
and the traffic separation schemes designated or prescribed by it on charts to 
which due publicity shall be given.  
11. Ships in archipelagic sea lanes passage shall respect applicable sea 
lanes and traffic separation schemes established in accordance with this article. 
12. If an archipelagic State does not designate sea lanes or air routes, the 
right of archipelagic sea lanes passage may be exercised through the routes 
normally used for international navigation. 
Article 54 
Duties of ships and aircraft during their passage, 
research and survey activities, duties of the archipelagic State 
and laws and regulations of the archipelagic State 
relating to archipelagic sea lanes passage 
 
Articles 39, 40, 42 and 44 apply mutatis mutandis to archipelagic sea 
lanes passage. 
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Appendix B: UNCLOS Definitions 
 
Archipelago 
"archipelago" means a group of islands, including parts of islands, 
interconnecting waters and other natural features which are so closely 
interrelated that such islands, waters and other natural features form an intrinsic 
geographical, economic and political entity, or which historically have been 
regarded as such. (Article 46 [b]) 
Archipelagic State 
"archipelagic State" means a State constituted wholly by one or more 
archipelagos and may include other islands; (Article 46[a]) 
Archipelagic Sea Lane 
An archipelagic State may designate sea lanes and air routes thereabove, suitable 
for the continuous and expeditious passage of foreign ships and aircraft through 
or over its archipelagic waters and the adjacent territorial sea. (Article 53[1]) 
Archipelagic Sea Lane Passage 
All ships and aircraft enjoy the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage in such sea 
lanes and air routes. (Article 53[2]) 
Archipelagic sea lanes passage means the exercise in accordance with this 
Convention of the rights of navigation and overflight in the normal mode solely 
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for the purpose of continuous, expeditious and unobstructed transit between one 
part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high 
seas or an exclusive economic zone. (Article 53[3]) 
Such sea lanes and air routes shall traverse the archipelagic waters and the 
adjacent territorial sea and shall include all normal passage routes used as routes 
for international navigation or overflight through or over archipelagic waters 
and, within such routes, so far as ships are concerned, all normal navigational 
channels, provided that duplication of routes of similar convenience between the 
same entry and exit points shall not be necessary. (Article 53[4]) 
Such sea lanes and air routes shall be defined by a series of continuous axis lines 
from the entry points of passage routes to the exit points.  Ships and aircraft in 
archipelagic sea lanes passage shall not deviate more than 25 nautical miles to 
either side of such axis lines during passage, provided that such ships and aircraft 
shall not navigate closer to the coasts than 10 per cent of the distance between 
the nearest points on islands bordering the sea lane. (Article 53[5]) 
An archipelagic State which designates sea lanes under this article may also 
prescribe traffic separation schemes for the safe passage of ships through narrow 
channels in such sea lanes. (Article 53[6]) 
An archipelagic State may, when circumstances require, after giving due 
publicity thereto, substitute other sea lanes or traffic separation schemes for any 
sea lanes or traffic separation schemes previously designated or prescribed by it. 
(Article 53[7]) 
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Such sea lanes and traffic separation schemes shall conform to generally 
accepted international regulations. (Article 53[8]) 
In designating or substituting sea lanes or prescribing or substituting traffic 
separation schemes, an archipelagic State shall refer proposals to the competent 
international organization with a view to their adoption.  The organization may 
adopt only such sea lanes and traffic separation schemes as may be agreed with 
the archipelagic State, after which the archipelagic State may designate, 
prescribe or substitute them. (Article 53[9]) 
The archipelagic State shall clearly indicate the axis of the sea lanes and the 
traffic separation schemes designated or prescribed by it on charts to which due 
publicity shall be given. (Article 53[10]) 
Ships in archipelagic sea lanes passage shall respect applicable sea lanes and 
traffic separation schemes established in accordance with this article. (Article 
53[11]) 
If an archipelagic State does not designate sea lanes or air routes, the right of 
archipelagic sea lanes passage may be exercised through the routes normally 
used for international navigation. (Article 53[12])  
Contiguous Zone 
In a zone contiguous to its territorial sea, described as the contiguous zone, the 
coastal State may exercise the control necessary to: (a) prevent infringement of 
its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations within its 
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territory or territorial sea; (b) punish infringement of the above laws and 
regulations committed within its territory or territorial sea. (Article 33[1]) 
The contiguous zone may not extend beyond 24 nautical miles from the 
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. (Article 
33[2]) 
Passage Rights 
Passage means navigation through the territorial sea for the purpose of: (a) 
traversing that sea without entering internal waters or calling at a roadstead or 
port facility outside internal waters; or (b) proceeding to or from internal waters 
or a call at such roadstead or port facility. (Article 18[1]) 
Passage shall be continuous and expeditious.  However, passage includes 
stopping and anchoring, but only in so far as the same are incidental to ordinary 
navigation or are rendered necessary by force majeure or distress or for the 
purpose of rendering assistance to persons, ships or aircraft in danger or distress. 
(Article 18[2]) 
Innocent Passage 
Subject to this Convention, ships of all States, whether coastal or land-locked, 
enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea. (Article 17) 
Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or 
security of the coastal State.  Such passage shall take place in conformity with 
this Convention and with other rules of international law. (Article 19[1]) 
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Passage of a foreign ship shall be considered to be prejudicial to the peace, good 
order or security of the coastal State if in the territorial sea it engages in any of 
the following activities: 
(a) any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or 
political independence of the coastal State, or in any other manner in violation of 
the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United 
Nations; 
(b) any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind; 
(c) any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the defence or 
security of the coastal State; 
(d) any act of propaganda aimed at affecting the defence or security of the 
coastal State; 
(e) the launching, landing or taking on board of any aircraft; 
(f) the launching, landing or taking on board of any military device; 
(g) the loading or unloading of any commodity, currency or person contrary to 
the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations of the coastal 
State; 
(h) any act of wilful and serious pollution contrary to this Convention; 
(i) any fishing activities; 
(j) the carrying out of research or survey activities; 
177 
 
(k) any act aimed at interfering with any systems of communication or any other 
facilities or installations of the coastal State; 
(l) any other activity not having a direct bearing on passage.  
 (Article 19[2]) 
Innocent Passage under Part III: Straits used for International Navigation 
The regime of innocent passage, in accordance with Part II, section 3, shall apply 
in straits used for international navigation: (a) excluded from the application of 
the regime of transit passage under article 38, paragraph 1; or (b) between a part 
of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and the territorial sea of a foreign 
State. (Article 45[1]) 
There shall be no suspension of innocent passage through such straits. (Article 
45[2]) 
Innocent Passage under Part IV: Archipelagic States 
Subject to article 53 and without prejudice to article 50, ships of all States enjoy 
the right of innocent passage through archipelagic waters, in accordance with 
Part II, section 3. (Article 52[1]) 
The archipelagic State may, without discrimination in form or in fact among 
foreign ships, suspend temporarily in specified areas of its archipelagic waters 
the innocent passage of foreign ships if such suspension is essential for the 
protection of its security.  Such suspension shall take effect only after having 
been duly published. (Article 52[2]) 
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Internal Waters 
Except as provided in Part IV, waters on the landward side of the baseline of the 
territorial sea form part of the internal waters of the State. (Article 8[1])  
Territorial Sea/Waters 
Every State has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit 
not exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from baselines determined in 
accordance with this Convention. (Article 3) 
Transit Passage 
In straits referred to in article 37[Straits used for International Navigation], all 
ships and aircraft enjoy the right of transit passage, which shall not be impeded; 
except that, if the strait is formed by an island of a State bordering the strait and 
its mainland, transit passage shall not apply if there exists seaward of the island a 
route through the high seas or through an exclusive economic zone of similar 
convenience with respect to navigational and hydrographical characteristics. 
(Article 38[1]) 
Transit passage means the exercise in accordance with this Part of the freedom 
of navigation and overflight solely for the purpose of continuous and expeditious 
transit of the strait between one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic 
zone and another part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone.  However, 
the requirement of continuous and expeditious transit does not preclude passage 
through the strait for the purpose of entering, leaving or returning from a State 
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bordering the strait, subject to the conditions of entry to that State. (Article 38 
[2]) 
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Appendix C: Philippine government declaration upon 
signing UNCLOS50 
 
The government of the Republic of the Philippines hereby manifests that in signing the 
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, it does so with the 
understandings embodied in this declaration, made under the provisions of Article 310 
of the Convention, to wit: 
The signing of the Convention by the Government of the Republic of the Philippines 
shall not in any manner impair or prejudice the sovereign rights of the Republic of the 
Philippines under and arising from the Constitution of the Philippines; 
Such signing shall not in any manner affect the sovereign rights of the Republic of the 
Philippines as successor of the United States of America, under and arising out of the 
Treaty of Paris between Spain and the United States of America of December 10, 1898, 
and the Treaty of Washington between the United States of America and Great Britain 
of January 2, 1930; 
Such signing shall not diminish or in any manner affect the rights and obligations of the 
contracting parties under the Mutual Defense Treaty between the Philippines and the 
United States of America of August 30, 1951, and its related interpretative instrument; 
nor those under any other pertinent bilateral or multilateral treaty of agreement to which 
the Philippines is a party; 
Such signing shall not in any manner impair or prejudice the sovereignty of the Republic 
of the Philippines over any territory over which it exercises sovereign authority, such as 
the Kalayaan Islands, and the waters appurtenant thereto; 
 
 
                                                     
50
 As quoted in Batongbacal (2002), p. 4-5 
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The Convention shall not be construed as amending in any manner any pertinent laws 
and Presidential Decrees or Proclamations of the Republic of the Philippines. The 
Government of the Republic of the Philippines maintains and reserves the right and 
authority to make any amendments to such laws, decrees or proclamations pursuant to 
the provisions of the Philippine Constitution; 
The provisions of the Convention on archipelagic passage through sea lanes do not 
nullify or impair the sovereignty of the Philippines as an archipelagic state over the sea 
lanes and do not deprive it of authority to enact legislation to protect its sovereignty 
independence and security; 
The concept of archipelagic waters is similar to the concept of internal waters under the 
Constitution of the Philippines, and removes straits connecting these waters with the 
economic zone or high sea from the rights of foreign vessels to transit passage for 
international navigation; 
The agreement of the Republic of the Philippines to the submission for peaceful 
resolution, under any of the procedures provided in the Convention, of disputes under 
[A]rticle 298 shall not be considered as a derogation of Philippine sovereignty. 
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Appendix D: Images 
Figure 1: Cross-sectional View of UNCLOS Marine Zones51 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
51
 6RXUFH%HQVXUWR-U+HQU\6³$UFKLSHODJLF 3KLOLSSLQHV$4XHVWLRQRI3ROLF\DQG/DZ´&RQIHUHQFH
Presentation. (2012), Slide 34. 
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Figure 2: UNCLOS, Part IV: Archipelagic Regime52 
 
      
 
 
 
                                                     
52
 Source: Jayewardene, Hiran W. Mid-ocean Archipelagos, in, ³The regime of islands in international 
law´.  Kluwer Academic Publishers. Dordrecht, Netherlands. (1990), p. 151 
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Figure 3: Southeast Asia (with Indonesian Straits identified)53 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
53
 6RXUFH6WRUH\,DQ³Securing Southeast Asia's Sea Lanes: A Work in Progress´. Asia Policy. No. 6. 
(2008), p. 102 
185 
 
Figure 4: Flowchart of the IMO Process 
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Figure 5: Comparison of Maritime Boundaries in RA 3046 and RA 952254 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
54
 6RXUFH%HQVXUWR-U+HQU\6³$UFKLSHODJLF3KLOLSSLQHV$4XHVWLRQRI3ROLF\DQG/DZ´&RQIHUHQFH
Presentation. (2012), Slide 6. 
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Figure 6: Projected Maritime Zones of the Philippines55 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
55
 %HQVXUWR-U+HQU\6³$UFKLSHODJLF3KLOLSSLQHV$4XHVWLRQRI3ROLF\DQG/DZ´&RQIHUHQFH
Presentation. (2012), Slide 35. Note that the single light blue circle west of the main archipelago 
UHSUHVHQWVWKHµ5HJLPHRI,VODQGV¶IRUWKH6FDUERURXJK6KRDOand the clustered light blue circles to the 
VRXWKZHVWUHSUHVHQWVWKHµ5HJLPHRI,VODQGV¶IRUWKH.,* 
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Figure 7: Illustration of Proposed ASLs (1997)56 
 
 
 
                                                     
56
 6RXUFH0DULR0DQDQVDOD³'HVLJQDWLRQRI$UFKLSHODJLF6HD/DQHVLQWKH3KLOLSSLQHV´LQ0DULEHO%
Aguilos, ed., Ocean Law and Policy Series, Issue Focus: Designation of Archipelagic Sea Lanes in the 
Philippines. Vol. 1, No. 1, (1997), p. 11 (as appears in Palma (2009), p. 9; Cay (2010), p. 58) 
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Figure 8: Archipelagic Sea Lanes proposed in HB4153/SBN 273857 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
57
 6RXUFH%HQVXUWR-U+HQU\6³$UFKLSHODJLF3KLOLSSLQHV$4XHVWLRQRI3ROLF\DQG/DZ´&RQIHUHQFH
Presentation. (2012), Slide 36. 
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Figure 9: ASL #1 ± Balintang Channel58 
 
  
                                                     
58
 Source: Google Maps. The ASL is clearly defined in yellow with waypoint endpoints (A) and (B). This 
is the official ASL as contained in the legislation, as the waypoint coordinates were entered into Google 
Maps. 
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Figure 10: ASL #2 ± Surigao Strait-Bohol Sea-Sulu Sea-Nasubata Channel-Balabac 
Strait 59 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
59
 Source: Google Maps. The ASL is clearly defined in yellow with waypoints (A), (B), (C), (D), (E), and 
(F). This is the official ASL as contained in the legislation, as the waypoint coordinates were entered into 
Google Maps. 
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Figure 11: ASL #3 ± Basilan Strait-Eastern Sulu Sea-Mindoro Strait60 
 
 
                                                     
60
 Source: Google Maps. The ASL is clearly defined in yellow with waypoints (A), (B), (C), (D), (E), (F), 
(G), and (H). This is the official ASL as contained in the legislation, as the waypoint coordinates were 
entered into Google Maps. 
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Figure 12: Southeast Asian Centric World Map61  
 
 
                                                     
61
 Source: Google Maps. I have outlined the Indonesian archipelago in yellow, and the Philippines archipelago in red. 
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Figure 13: Major International Shipping Routes in Southeast Asia62 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
62
 Source: Tangsubkul, 1984: 26. The position of the numbers relates to the approximate location of the 
corresponding strait, channel or passage.  
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Figure 14: International Navigation Routes in Philippine Waters63 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
63
 Source: Philippine Navy (as appears in Palma, 2009: 7) 
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Figure 15: Flight Paths of U.S. F-18s (red) and Indonesian F-16s (blue) during Bawean Island incident64 
 
                                                     
64
 Source: Air Marshal Erris Heryanto, CO National Aerial Defence Command. Seminiar Presentation on Sovereignty over Indonesia Territory. Jakarta, April 12-
13, 2006. (as appears in Buntoro, 2010: 191). 
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Figure 16: South China Sea map illustrating overlapping claims65 
 
 
                                                     
65
 Source: Shoal Mates. The Economist. April 28, 2012 
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Figure 17: Chinese Mischief Reef Structures66 
 
                                                     
66
 Source: 5RPHUR$OH[LV³¶&KLQDH[SDQGLQJ0LVFKLHIVWUXFWXUHV¶´The Philippine Star. Sept. 3, 2012 
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Figure 18: Screen grab from 101 East showing contested South China Sea67 
 
                                                     
67
 Source: Al Jazeera. 101 East ± Standoff at Scarborough Shoal. August 3, 2012. (Screen grab) 
